Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluate, August 8, 2024
Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 8, 2024, 10pm ET
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day along the static maps provide on this record.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s 3-d management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (now not a cell software) is strongly advisable for the use of this data-heavy device.
Click on right here to get right of entry to ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Those maps supplement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by way of appearing a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive per thirty days.
The information cut-off for this product used to be 2:45pm ET on August 8. ISW will quilt next experiences within the August 9 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluate.
Be aware: Russian assets are recently moving a lot in their reporting to hide the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and in consequence don’t seem to be offering the similar stage of element concerning the scenario alongside the frontline in Ukraine.
Ukrainian cross-border mechanized offensive operations into Kursk Oblast that started on August 6 are proceeding as a part of a Ukrainian operational effort inside Russian territory. ISW is not going to be offering checks concerning the intent of this Ukrainian operation with a purpose to steer clear of compromising Ukrainian operational safety. ISW is not going to make forecasts about what Ukrainian forces may or may now not do or the place or when they could do it. ISW will proceed to map, observe, and review operations as they spread however is not going to be offering perception into Ukrainian making plans, ways, or ways. ISW isn’t ready to map management of terrain inside Russia right now and can as a substitute map noticed occasions related to the Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory as nicely the maximalist extent of claims and unverified experiences about Ukrainian advances. Maximalist claims and unverified experiences about Ukrainian advances inside Russia don’t constitute territory that ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have seized or management. Inferring predictions about Ukrainian operations from ISW maps and checks that don’t explicitly be offering such predictions is irrelevant and now not in accord with their supposed use.
Geolocated pictures and Russian claims point out that Ukrainian forces endured fast advances additional into Kursk Oblast on August 8, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly found in spaces so far as 35 kilometers from the global border with Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces maximum surely don’t management all the territory inside the maximalist extent of Russian claims about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, alternatively. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces complicated so far as Kromskiye Byki and Molyutino (as much as 35 kilometers from the global border and 17 kilometers southeast of Lgov) however famous that those are small teams now not in an instant looking to dangle territory.[1] Russian milbloggers issued contradictory claims about Ukrainian positions in Sudzha (northeast of Sumy Town and more or less 10 kilometers from the global border), with some milbloggers claiming that Ukrainian forces seized the agreement whilst different milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces most effective seized a part of the agreement.[2] Geolocated pictures printed on August 8 signifies that Ukrainian forces most likely complicated in opposition to Russkoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces additionally complicated additional north of Sudzha alongside the 38K-024 freeway close to Anastasyevka.[3] Geolocated pictures printed on August 7 and eight presentations Ukrainian forces running inside Goncharovka (simply west of Sudzha) and north of Zaoleshenka (northwest of Sudzha), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Goncharovka.[4] A geolocated picture presentations Ukrainian forces running inside Novoivanovka (10km north of the global border and northwest of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Novoivanovka and Bogdanovka (northwest of Sudzha).[5] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces additionally complicated northwest of Sudzha into Malaya Loknya and to the outskirts of Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; northeast of Sudzha close to Kruglenkoye, Martynovka, and Bolshoye Soldatskoye; and east of Sudzha close to Mirny, even though two Russian milbloggers denied claims that Ukrainian forces are running close to and inside Bolshoye Soldatskoye.[6] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian assault close to Korenevo (north of Sumy Town and more or less 23 kilometers north of the global border) and that Ukrainian forces attacked inside Snagost (south of Korenevo) and close to Olgovka (east of Korenevo).[7]
Russian milbloggers claimed that small Ukrainian armored teams are advancing additional into the Russian rear and bypassing Russian fortifications sooner than enticing Russian forces after which taking flight from the engagements with out making an attempt to consolidate management over their furthest advances.[8] Russian milbloggers famous that the superiority of those armored teams is resulting in conflicting reporting as a result of Ukrainian forces are ready to briefly interact Russian forces close to a agreement after which withdraw from the world.[9] Ukrainian forces seem so to use those small armored teams to habits attacks previous the engagement line because of the low density of Russian group of workers within the border spaces of Kursk Oblast. Higher Ukrainian gadgets are reportedly running in spaces of Kursk Oblast nearer to the global border and are reportedly consolidating and fortifying some positions.[10]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are effectively fielding novel and cutting edge ways and technological functions throughout operations in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers have supplied main points on Ukrainian ways and technological functions that they regard as cutting edge, however ISW is not going to describe such main points right now or level to express assets with a purpose to maintain Ukrainian operational safety.
The Kremlin will virtually surely enterprise to retake Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized and forestall Ukrainian process additional into Russia, as really extensive Ukrainian advances inside Russia could be a strategic blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian steadiness, safety, and geopolitical resurgence. Putin held a digital assembly with Kursk Oblast Performing Head Alexey Smirnov on August 8 about Ukraine’s operations into the oblast and said that he “usually know[s] the placement” however nonetheless want to listen Smirnov’s review of the placement.[11] Smirnov and Putin didn’t talk about Russian makes an attempt to repel Ukrainian forces and portrayed the Russian executive as successfully operating to make sure civilian protection and social and financial reimbursement. Russian milbloggers have highlighted issues over the protection of Russian civilians and disorganized civilian evacuations.[12] Putin most likely assesses that he will have to reply to the perceived danger to civilians with a purpose to guarantee the Russian public that the placement is below management and steer clear of vital home discontent. Smirnov claimed on August 7 that the placement is “below [Putin’s] non-public management,” at once linking Russian good fortune in repelling Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and mitigating similar civilian problems to Putin.[13] The Kremlin prior to now has portrayed itself as in a position to rapidly responding to pro-Ukrainian raids into Russia, and the Kremlin most likely assesses that vital Ukrainian territorial beneficial properties in Russia would pose a danger to the Kremlin’s efforts to border itself as a solid regime in management of the inner safety scenario inside Russia and an efficient supervisor of the struggle in Ukraine.[14]
If Russian reporting at the scenario in Kursk Oblast is correct and if the Russian army command perceives the placement to be the similar as Russian assets have described, then the Russian army command has an array of most likely classes of motion (COAs) it would pursue to reply to the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. ISW isn’t ready right now to evaluate which of those conceivable COAs is in all probability, and it’s conceivable that the Russian army command won’t depend on just one COA to reply to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Russian army command’s decision-making will probably be influenced by way of its belief of the scale and capacity of Ukrainian forces within the house, about which ISW makes no review. The next COAs don’t seem to be offered so as of chance.
COA 1: The Russian army command might come to a decision to make use of present conscripts, Federal Safety Carrier (FSB) border guards, Rosgvardia, and different abnormal forces already deployed to the global border house to push Ukrainian forces again and shield towards the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. Russian government have again and again confident Russians that conscripts is not going to deploy to struggle operations alongside the frontline in Ukraine, and as a substitute, the Russian army command has depended on conscripts for staffing gadgets answerable for border safety purposes alongside the global border with Ukraine.[15] Russian conscripts, FSB border guards, and components of Chechen “Akhmat” gadgets running below the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) are reportedly recently running in Kursk Oblast.[16] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 8 that Donetsk Other people’s Republic (DNR) abnormal forces, together with components of the “Dikaya Department of Donbas,” the “Pyatnashka” Brigade, the “Arbat” Separate Guards Particular Function Battalion, and the “Night time Wolves” drone detachment, arrived in Kursk Oblast.[17] Components of a battalion of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Department’s 217th VDV Regiment have been reportedly protecting a bit of the border in Kursk Oblast nowadays Might 2024, suggesting that there is also some fairly extra struggle efficient forces within the house, however the majority of Russian reporting signifies that almost all Russian forces running in Kursk Oblast are components of much less struggle efficient gadgets.[18] The Russian army command might pursue this COA will have to it assess that decrease high quality forces that will most likely be much less nicely supplied may just successfully forestall Ukrainian forces which have been reportedly effectively using cutting edge ways and technological functions. All of those forces are running within the house of accountability (AOR) of Russia’s Northern Grouping of Forces, however it’s unclear to what stage the Northern Grouping of Forces has authority over those components’ border safety purposes.
COA 2: The Russian army command might come to a decision to make use of the prevailing Northern Grouping of Forces deployed alongside the Russian-Ukrainian border to reply to the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces reportedly had more or less 35,000 group of workers deployed to the border house in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts as of early Might 2024 and reportedly supposed to ascertain a grouping within the house this is between 50,000 to 75,000 group of workers in measurement.[19] The Northern Grouping of Forces most likely introduced the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast sooner than it reached its reported deliberate finish energy and has since suffered heavy casualties that experience most likely constrained Russian efforts to construct out the grouping. The Russian army command reportedly transferred an unspecified collection of forces to the global border house close to Kharkiv Oblast in past due Might and early June 2024, nevertheless it used to be unclear if the Russian army command deliberate to in an instant dedicate those redeployed forces to struggle or use them to support the Northern Grouping of Forces to deliver it nearer to its reported deliberate finish energy.[20] Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said on August 8 that the Russian army command started to redeploy forces most likely from the 18th Motorized Rifle Department (eleventh Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) and the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty fourth AC, LMD) from the Belgorod staff of the Northern Grouping of Forces running within the Vovchansk path northeast of Kharkiv Town to the crowd protecting the global border in Kursk Oblast.[21] Leader of the Russian Normal Workforce Military Normal Valery Gerasimov tried on August 7 to painting the Northern Grouping of Forces (in addition to the FSB) as an efficient defensive drive, claiming that those forces stopped Ukraine’s advances in Kursk Oblast and inflicted vital casualties.[22] The Northern Grouping of Forces has failed to succeed in even its restricted tactical targets in northern Kharkiv Oblast since early Might 2024 and its skill to habits efficient defensive operations and important counterattacks is unclear. The redeployment of vital components of the Northern Grouping of Forces to concentrate on pushing again Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast would most likely additional stretch those components and create vulnerabilities in Russian defenses in other places alongside the border. The Russian army command may additionally search to pursue this COA will have to it deem the Northern Grouping of Forces’ offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast to be much less of a concern than defensive operations in Kursk Oblast.
COA 3: The Russian army command might select to redeploy operational reserves that it amassed for its deliberate Summer time 2024 offensive effort and/or fairly higher provisioned and extra struggle efficient frontline gadgets to Kursk Oblast from in other places within the theater. The Russian army command might assess that it is going to want to deploy Russian gadgets to Kursk Oblast that experience extra revel in combating in Ukraine, upper finish strengths, extra apparatus, more practical hearth and strike functions, and extra complicated generation and ways than the present Russian components deployed alongside the border. The Northern Grouping of Forces may just theoretically supply those forces, however the Russian army command might resolve that the grouping lacks the to be had manpower and materiel to maintain the present Russian offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv Town whilst additionally enticing in a large-scale defensive effort in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces progressively established operational reserves forward of its deliberate Summer time 2024 offensive effort and are recently depending on those reserves to care for a constant offensive pace all over japanese and northeastern Ukraine.[23] Russian forces nonetheless care for vital operational reserves and may just come to a decision to dedicate those reserves to a large-scale defensive operation in Kursk Oblast. The Russian army command might resolve that those operational reserves are essential for present Russian offensive operations, alternatively, particularly reserves supposed to toughen the upper offensive pace that Russian forces are making an attempt to care for alongside a lot of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast.[24] The Russian army command might resolve that keeping up Russia’s present offensive pace in choose sectors of the entrance is a better precedence than maintaining offensive operations in different sectors and may just come to a decision to maintain present operational reserves supposed for prioritized sectors of the entrance and as a substitute redeploy frontline gadgets from much less prioritized sectors to Kursk Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are already redeploying components of an operational reserve of the twentieth Blended Fingers Military (Moscow Army District), which has a number of gadgets dedicated to offensive operations northwest and west of Kreminna, and unspecified Russian Spetsnaz (Major Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Normal Workforce [GRU]) components to spaces southwest of Kursk Town, even though ISW has now not noticed wider reporting or affirmation of this declare.[25]
COA 4: The Russian army command might search to care for the forces it recently has dedicated to Kursk Oblast however may just redeploy vital aviation and strike components to the world so that you can enhance Russia’s skill to retake territory. Russian aviation recently conducts regimen sorties to strike frontline and rear Ukrainian positions all over the frontline, and the Russian army command might search to leverage to be had aviation belongings will have to it resolve that the present forces in Kursk Oblast are ill-fitted to retake territory whilst aiming to steer clear of redeployments from in other places within the theater. The Russian army command might envision that each rotary- and fixed-wing aviation operations at scale in airspace over Kursk Oblast would permit Russian forces to blunt Ukrainian maneuver and save you Ukrainian forces from securely consolidating positions and thereby permit the present Russian forces deployed within the house to extra successfully habits counterattacks and defensive operations. It’s unclear whether or not the present Russian forces deployed to Kursk Oblast would be capable of exploit the results of large-scale Russian aviation operations over Kursk Oblast, alternatively. It’s also unclear if large-scale aviation operations over Kursk Oblast would disrupt Russia’s skill to automatically use tactical aviation for go with the flow bomb moves all over the frontline. Russian assets have indicated that Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast, together with the “cell teams” running additional into Russian territory, have vital air protection functions that will most likely make large-scale Russian aviation operations within the house difficult.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are running rotary-wing plane in sure spaces of Kursk Oblast, which might counsel that present Russian air protection protection within the house is also sparse and might facilitate even restricted Ukrainian aviation operations that will additional complicate the Russian army’s skill to box aviation at scale over Kursk Oblast.[27] ISW has now not but noticed affirmation of reported Ukrainian air and air protection functions in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces may just additionally deploy ground-based strike functions at scale to spaces in and close to Kursk Oblast to constrain Ukrainian advances and disrupt Ukrainian consolidation at positions inside Russia, however Russian forces have usually confirmed incapable of the use of longer-range strike functions to set prerequisites for the kind of floor maneuver had to briefly retake territory in Kursk Oblast.
The loss of a coherent Russian reaction to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and the reported price of Ukrainian advance signifies that Ukrainian forces have been ready to succeed in operational marvel alongside the border with Russia. Each Russian and Ukrainian forces have struggled to succeed in operational marvel up to now 12 months and a part of combating because of the partly clear battlefield in Ukraine. Ukraine’s skill to succeed in operational marvel highlights that the fashionable visible and sensor-based transparency that all sides have established does now not translate into a completely clear battlefield, alternatively, and that the belligerents in Ukraine can leverage ambiguity round operational intent to succeed in operational marvel. One Russian milblogger criticized the Russian army command for failing to watch and react to Ukrainian forces allegedly massing at the border close to Kursk Oblast.[28] A outstanding Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces frequently warned the Russian prime command a few massing of Ukrainian forces alongside the border close to Kursk Oblast however that the Russian command didn’t adequately get ready for attainable Ukrainian offensive operations.[29] Ukrainian forces would have effectively hid their operational intent with a purpose to succeed in operational marvel if milblogger claims that Russian forces noticed a buildup of Ukrainian forces in border spaces are correct. ISW has prior to now assessed that Russian forces have didn’t internalize courses discovered concerning the difficulties of mechanized maneuver on an assumed clear battlefield in Ukraine.[30] Ukraine, alternatively, seems to be finding out and adapting to this facet of the battlefield given its skill to succeed in obvious operational marvel on this example.
Ukrainian officers haven’t begun to remark at once on Ukraine’s ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on August 8 that Russia “introduced the struggle to Ukraine” and will have to “really feel what it has performed” in reaction.[31] Guide to the Head of the Ukrainian President’s Place of work Mykhaylo Podolyak said the continued “occasions” in Kursk Oblast and famous that Russia is accountable for the placement, and an unnamed marketing consultant to Zelensky additionally said the continued Ukrainian army operation into Kursk Oblast throughout an interview with the Washington Submit on August 8.[32]
US officers famous that Ukraine’s ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast isn’t a contravention of US restrictions on Ukraine’s skill to strike army goals inside Russia’s border spaces. Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said throughout a press briefing on August 8 that Ukraine’s operation into Kursk Oblast is in step with US coverage and that the United States helps Ukraine’s proper to shield itself towards assaults around the global border.[33] White Space Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and State Division Spokesperson Matthew Miller additionally famous the Biden Management’s toughen for Ukraine’s “not unusual sense” and defensive movements on August 7.[34] Unnamed “US and Ukrainian officers” instructed The Gentleman Report on August 8 that Ukrainian forces hope to disrupt and demoralize Russian forces and partly divert Russian forces from frontline spaces in japanese Ukraine.[35]
Russian-backed Abkhazian International Minister Sergei Shamba instructed Kremlin newswire TASS on August 8 that there aren’t any plans to build a Russian naval base on the Ochamchire port in Russian-controlled Abkhazia, Georgia.[36] Shamba famous that Russian forces have stationed border patrol boats on the port. Shamba said in January 2024 that Russia used to be designing an enduring naval base in Abkhazia, alternatively, and Russian-backed Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania introduced in October 2023 that he signed an settlement with Russian government to build the bottom close to Ochamchire.[37] Naval Information reported in July 2024 that the Russian Challenge 22870 toughen send, which were prior to now docked at its house port in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, arrived on the Ochamchire port.[38] It’s unclear why the Russian executive would abandon its plans to build an enduring naval base in Abkhazia, as Ukrainian moves towards Black Sea Fleet belongings have in large part rendered naval basing in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea unnecessary and feature pressured Russia to hunt a extra everlasting basing development within the japanese Black Sea.[39]
Key Takeaways:
Ukrainian cross-border mechanized offensive operations into Kursk Oblast that started on August 6 are proceeding as a part of a Ukrainian operational effort inside Russian territory. ISW is not going to be offering checks concerning the intent of this Ukrainian operation with a purpose to steer clear of compromising Ukrainian operational safety.
Geolocated pictures and Russian claims point out that Ukrainian forces endured fast advances additional into Kursk Oblast on August 8, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly found in spaces so far as 35 kilometers from the global border with Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces maximum surely don’t management all the territory inside the maximalist extent of Russian claims about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, alternatively.
The Kremlin will virtually surely enterprise to retake Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized and forestall Ukrainian process additional into Russia, as really extensive Ukrainian advances inside Russia could be a strategic blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian steadiness, safety, and geopolitical resurgence.
COA (Process Motion) 1: The Russian army command might come to a decision to make use of present conscripts, Federal Safety Carrier (FSB) border guards, Rosgvardia, and different abnormal forces already deployed to the global border house to push Ukrainian forces again and shield towards the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast.
COA 2: The Russian army command might come to a decision to make use of the prevailing Northern Grouping of Forces deployed alongside the Russian-Ukrainian border to reply to the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk Oblast.
COA 3: The Russian army command might select to redeploy operational reserves that it amassed for its deliberate Summer time 2024 offensive effort and/or fairly higher provisioned and extra struggle efficient frontline gadgets to Kursk Oblast from in other places within the theater.
COA 4: The Russian army command might search to care for the forces it recently has dedicated to Kursk Oblast however may just redeploy vital aviation and strike components to the world so that you can enhance Russia’s skill to retake territory.
The loss of a coherent Russian reaction to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and the reported price of Ukrainian advance signifies that Ukrainian forces have been ready to succeed in operational marvel alongside the border with Russia.
Ukrainian officers haven’t begun to remark at once on Ukraine’s ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast.
US officers famous that Ukraine’s ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast isn’t a contravention of US restrictions on Ukraine’s skill to strike army goals inside Russia’s border spaces.
We don’t record intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of those actions are well-covered in Western media and do indirectly impact the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We will be able to proceed to judge and record at the results of those prison actions at the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on struggle in Ukrainian city spaces. We totally condemn Russian violations of the rules of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity even supposing we don’t describe them in those experiences.
Russian Major Effort – Jap Ukraine (constructed from 3 subordinate major efforts)
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the global border with Belgorod Oblast and option to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
Russian Mobilization and Drive Technology Efforts
Russian Technological Variations
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces
Ukrainian Protection Commercial Base Efforts
Russian Knowledge Operations and Narratives
Important Job in Belarus
Russian Major Effort – Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the global border with Belgorod Oblast and option to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town)
Russian forces endured offensive operations north of Kharkiv Town close to Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv Town close to Vovchansk and Tykhe on August 7 and eight, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline.[40] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Crew of Forces reported on August 8 that Russian forces just lately transferred an unspecified unit from occupied Luhansk Oblast to the Vovchansk path and that Russian forces didn’t use tactical aviation within the Kharkiv path on August 8.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to Hlyboke.[42]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northerly Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces endured offensive operations alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 8, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline. The Ukrainian Normal Workforce reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk close to Synkivka; east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk close to Novoosynove and Kolisnykivka; northwest of Kreminna close to Novoserhiivka, Nevske, and Makiivka; west of Kreminna close to Terny; and southwest of Kreminna within the Serebryanske woodland house on August 7 and eight.[43]
Ukrainian army observer Yuriy Butusov said on August 8 that Ukrainian forces carried out a HIMARS strike on August 5 towards a command publish of the Russian 2d Battalion of the 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Department) close to occupied Bohdanivka, Luhansk Oblast, killing the battalion’s commander and several other Russian officials.[44] ISW can not independently verify this record.
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces endured offensive operations within the Siversk path east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk close to Ivano-Darivka, Spirne, and Vyimka; and south of Siversk close to Pereizne on August 7 and eight.[45] Components of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Department are reportedly running close to Ivano-Darivka and Pereizne.[46]
Russian forces endured offensive operations close to Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar close to Kalynivka, and east of Chasiv Yar close to Ivanivske on August 7 and eight.[47] Components of the Russian 98th VDV Department reportedly proceed to function close to Chasiv Yar.[48]
Russian forces endured offensive operations close to Toretsk on August 8, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces endured to advance inside Niu York (south of Toretsk) and that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked within the house.[49] Russian forces additionally endured offensive operations close to Toretsk, east of Toretsk close to Pivnichne, and southeast of Toretsk close to Zalizne on August 7 and eight.[50] Components of the Russian ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk Other people’s Republic [DNR] Military Corps [AC]) are reportedly running close to Niu York.[51]
Russian forces reportedly complicated east of Pokrovsk on August 8, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces running east of Pokrovsk complicated as much as the outskirts of Hrodivka and close to Lysychne and Ivanivka.[52] Russian milbloggers additionally endured to assert that Russian forces seized Serhiivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[53] ISW has now not noticed affirmation of those Russian claims, alternatively. Russian forces endured offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk close to Vozdvyzhenka; east of Pokrovsk close to Kalynove, Novooleksandrivka, Ivanivka, and Lysychne; and southeast of Pokrovsk close to Zhelanne, Karlivka, and Yasnobrodivka on August 7 and eight.[54]
Russian forces reportedly complicated southwest of Donetsk Town on August 8 however didn’t make showed beneficial properties within the house. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complicated southeast of Vodyane (southwest of Donetsk Town), even though ISW has now not noticed affirmation of this declare.[55] Russian forces endured offensive operations west of Donetsk Town close to Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk Town close to Kostyantynivka, Paraskoviivka, Vodyane, Volodymyrivka, and Vuhledar on August 7 and eight.[56] Components of the Russian 163rd Tank Regiment (one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Department, eighth Blended Fingers Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly running within the Kurakhove path (west and southwest of Donetsk Town).[57]
Russian forces just lately made marginal beneficial properties south of Velyka Novosilka within the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border house, however Russian and Ukrainian assets didn’t record combating within the house on August 8. Geolocated pictures printed on August 8 signifies that Russian forces just lately made marginal beneficial properties northeast of Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka).[58]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Deal with frontline positions and protected rear spaces towards Ukrainian moves)
Russian forces endured floor assaults close to Robotyne and northeast of Robotyne close to Mala Tokmachka in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 7 and eight.[59]
The Ukrainian Normal Workforce reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within the Dnipro path (Kherson Oblast) on August 7 and eight.[60] Components of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Leningrad Army District [LMD]) reportedly proceed running at the islands within the Dnipro River Delta.[61]
The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian air protection techniques shot down a Ukrainian drone over occupied Crimea on August 8.[62]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Function: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and at the frontline)
Russian forces carried out a restricted collection of missile and drone moves towards Ukraine at the evening of August 7 to eight. Ukrainian Air Drive Commander Lieutenant Normal Mykola Oleshchuk said that Russian forces introduced two Kh-59 cruise missiles from over the Sea of Azov, two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Belgorod Oblast, and 4 Shahed-136/131 drones from Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai and that Ukrainian forces shot down two Kh-59 cruise missiles and 4 Shahed drones over Odesa, Kherson, and Kirovohrad oblasts.[63]
Russian Mobilization and Drive Technology Efforts (Russian goal: Amplify struggle energy with out accomplishing normal mobilization)
The Kremlin continues efforts to restrict violations to Russian army operational safety in Ukraine and management the distribution of details about the Russian army to the ideas house. Russian President Vladimir Putin authorized a regulation on August 8 that makes using digital “units” (non-public telephones and digital gadgets) by way of Russian army group of workers within the struggle zone in Ukraine to accomplish duties that don’t seem to be a part of their professional tasks a disciplinary offense punishable by way of as much as 10 days of arrest.[64] The regulation does now not observe to army group of workers the use of digital “units” to accomplish their professional tasks, alternatively. The regulation additionally states that army group of workers who distribute details about Russian army actions, unit deployments, or servicemembers’ households to the media or on the web face the similar punishment. Russian milbloggers prior to now extensively criticized the State Duma proposals bearing in mind the punishment of servicemembers for the use of “units” within the struggle zone, claiming that this is able to considerably complicate Russian logistics, command and management, and operations on the whole, and the overall regulation’s permission for Russian group of workers to make use of those gadgets to accomplish their professional duties are most likely in accordance with this backlash.[65]
Russian Technological Variations (Russian goal: Introduce technological inventions to optimize techniques to be used in Ukraine)
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger posted pictures on August 8 purportedly appearing components of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (twentieth Motorized Rifle Department, eighth Blended Fingers Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) the use of unmanned floor automobiles (UGVs) to ship ammunition and evacuate wounded group of workers in frontline spaces of japanese Ukraine.[66] The milblogger claimed that appearing Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobyov supported the manufacturing of the UGVs and famous that the Russian Ministry of Protection’s (MoD) design bureau is checking out a number of UGVs.
Ukrainian Protection Commercial Efforts (Ukrainian goal: Expand its protection business base to change into extra self-sufficient in cooperation with US, Ecu, and global companions)
ISW isn’t publishing protection of Ukrainian protection business efforts lately.
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed spaces; forcibly combine Ukrainian electorate into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance techniques)
ISW isn’t publishing protection of Russian-occupied spaces of Ukraine lately.
Russian Knowledge Operations and Narratives
Not anything vital to record.
Important process in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and extra combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Crew process in Belarus)
Impartial Belarusian tracking staff The Belarusian Hajun venture reported on August 8 that no less than 9 Russian Shahed-136/131 drones flew into Belarusian airspace from July 11 to 31.[67] The Hajun venture reported that one drone fell in Belarus, that seven flew to Ukrainian airspace, and that it’s unclear what took place to at least one drone. Belarusian forces are reportedly taking measures to offer protection to towards Russian drones by way of flying Su-30SM plane in southern Belarus throughout Russian air moves towards Ukraine and redeploying Belarusian helicopters to the Babruysk Airbase to shorten the flight time to the Ukrainian-Belarusian border to intercept drones.
Belarusian and Russian officers took additional steps to extend Belarusian-Russian cooperation during the Union State. Union State Secretary Dmitry Mezentsev and Belarusian Safety Council State Secretary Alexander Volfovich met in Minsk on August 8 and mentioned the overall draft of the Union State’s Safety Thought, which the Council of Ministers and the Ultimate State Council of the Union State will reportedly imagine within the close to long run.[68] Mezentsev and Volfovich reportedly mentioned the Ultimate State Council of the Union State’s techniques to enhance Belarusian and Russian forces’ infrastructure and rear amenities. Belarusian International Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov and Russian Ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov additionally met on August 8 in Minsk and reportedly mentioned preparation for the signing of the Union State’s Safety Thought.[69] The Nationwide Financial institution of Belarus and Central Financial institution of Russia signed an settlement on August 7 on cooperation and knowledge exchanges associated with the supervision and management of the monetary marketplace, imposing sides of the Treaty of the Status quo of the Union State.
Be aware: ISW does now not obtain any categorised subject material from any supply, makes use of most effective publicly to be had knowledge, and attracts broadly on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially to be had satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the foundation for those experiences. References to all assets used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
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[11] dot ru/occasions/president/information/74725
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[31] dot gov.ua/information/rosiya-prinesla-vijnu-na-nashu-zemlyu-j-povinna-vidchuvati-s-92549
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[41] ; dot ua/2024/08/08/vijska-rf-ne-vidhodyat-z-harkivshhyny-popry-boyi-u-kurskij-oblasti/
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[64] dot ru/obschestvo/21561113; dot pravo.gov.ru/record/0001202408080028
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[68] dot by way of/society/view/zavershena-sovmestnaja-rabota-nad-proektom-kontseptsii-bezopasnosti-sojuznogo-gosudarstva-652996-2024/
[69] dot by way of/society/view/ryzhenkov-i-gryzlov-obsudili-podgotovku-proekta-belorussko-rossijskogo-dogovora-o-garantijah-653049-2024/;
