Institute for the Find out about of Warfare

Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluate, October 15, 2024
Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 15, 2024, 7:20pm ET
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day along the static maps provide on this record.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s three-D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (no longer a cell software) is strongly really useful for the usage of this data-heavy device.
Click on right here to get entry to ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Those maps supplement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by means of appearing a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive per month.
Observe: The information cut-off for this product was once 1:30pm ET on October 15. ISW will quilt next studies within the October 16 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluate.
The Kremlin is most likely leveraging the new June 2024 Russia-North Korea complete strategic partnership settlement partially to offset Russian power technology and border safety necessities—additional cementing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dedication to heading off mobilization for so long as imaginable. Ukrainian retailers Suspilne and Liga reported on October 15, bringing up nameless army intelligence assets, that the Russian eleventh Airborne (VDV) Brigade is forming a three,000-person “battalion” staffed by means of North Korean voters (the numerical energy is some distance past a battalion’s).[1] Ukrainian intelligence assets assessed that the “battalion” will probably be interested by ongoing Russian defensive operations in Kursk Oblast and reported that as much as 18 North Korean squaddies have already abandoned their positions in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts sooner than the unit has been dedicated to fight operations.[2] ISW can not independently ascertain the veracity of those studies, however Russian officers particularly didn’t deny them on October 15. Putin submitted the textual content of the Russia-North Korea complete strategic partnership settlement, which each nations signed in June 2024, to the Russian State Duma for ratification on October 14.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov emphasised in a remark to Kremlin newswire TASS that the Russia-North Korea settlement is “unambiguous” in its provision of “mutual protection and safety cooperation.”[4] The Kremlin is most likely the usage of the “mutual protection” provision of the settlement to give you the prison justification for the deployment of North Korean squaddies to the fight zone in Russia in accordance with the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. ISW has lately noticed studies {that a} small contingent of North Korean body of workers was once running close to occupied Donetsk Town.[5]
Past the prison justification, then again, the Kremlin’s willingness to go into right into a mutual protection settlement with North Korea, ensuing within the reported dedication of North Korean body of workers into fight operations in Russia, highlights Putin’s persisted reliance on pursuing selection power technology avenues as a substitute of committing to pointing out partial or normal mobilization. ISW has reported at duration on Putin’s persisted reliance on crypto-mobilization and the formation of latest volunteer formations to keep away from the home ramifications of carrying out a society-wide normal mobilization or any other partial mobilization wave.[6] This predicament has turn into in particular acute for Putin since Ukraine’s August 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion, because the Russian army needed to reckon with new manpower necessities offered by means of the wish to protect a wholly new entrance inside Russia itself. Putin’s reaction to the Kursk incursion has been in line with his dealing with of Russian power technology all over the battle to this point, then again, and he has maintained his unwillingness to counter the incursion extra severely with a much broader mobilization, as a substitute specializing in the advert hoc advent of latest territorial protection gadgets, the redeployment of current gadgets from Ukraine, and the usage of conscripts.[7] The usage of North Korean body of workers beneath the mutual protection clause of the Russia-North Korea settlement is a part of the similar wider effort. Putin seems extra keen to take in North Korean body of workers into the Russian army and hotel to different abnormal power technology efforts than to name for a much broader mobilization to in fact cope with the fight scenario within the theater of operations.
The Kremlin has elected to deal with the new controversy relating to its reliance on conscripts to repel Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast by means of providing monetary incentives to any body of workers interested by protecting the state border. The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) proposed on October 14 increasing the standards for Russian fight veteran standing to incorporate squaddies who’ve defended towards an “invasion into Russia” or “armed provocations at the state border,” which most likely contains conscripts and native territorial protection parts interested by dealing with Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast.[8] Prison Russian fight veteran standing would entitle those body of workers to veterans’ pensions and different social advantages, and Kremlin newswire TASS famous that the Russian federal expenditures to amplify the listing of army body of workers categorised as fight veterans will exceed 3.4 billion rubles (about $35 million) in 2025-2027.[9] Present Russian federal regulation stipulates that Russian conscripts can not take part in fight operations, and the Russian MoD has as a substitute depended on conscripts to behavior border safety purposes alongside the border with Ukraine to disencumber fight energy to deploy in different places within the theater.[10] Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast uncovered the vulnerability of Russia’s border safety and conscription insurance policies, as Russian conscripts actively participated in fight operations within the area in accordance with the incursion.[11] The Russian MoD’s imprecise proposal to increase veteran statuses to body of workers interested by border safety purposes is most likely any other loophole that may permit the Kremlin to covertly depend on conscripts to protect the border with out the wish to officially amend the Russian prison restrictions at the use of conscripts in fight. The proposal additionally most likely objectives to assuage conscripts and their households by means of offering monetary repayment and incentives with the most likely intention of heading off backlash very similar to the controversies the Soviet Union and later Russia confronted over the usage of conscripts in fight operations in Afghanistan and Chechnya.[12] Putin will have selected to amend the Russian regulation to officially permit conscripts to behavior fight purposes however as a substitute selected to amplify the fight veteran eligibility standards and build up spending for fight veterans.[13] The availability of veteran statuses additionally most likely objectives to incentivize recruitment into newly shaped territorial protection formations corresponding to BARS-Kursk and BARS-Belgorod. Putin has been increasingly more turning to issuing all kinds of longer term monetary incentives to generate manpower, appease mobilized body of workers and their households, and lengthen his battle effort in Ukraine, and Putin‘s power reliance on those incentives means that he stays involved in regards to the imaginable destructive penalties at the balance of his regime if he calls for involuntary sacrifices from Russian society.[14]
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a regulation permitting Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin to stick in his place in spite of attaining retirement age (once more) demonstrating Putin’s persisted desire for holding curated loyalists from his internal circle in positions of energy. Putin signed a regulation on October 14 permitting the Russian head of state (himself) to “prolong the time period of place of work of the pinnacle of the Investigative Committee who has reached the age of 70.”[15] Bastrykin grew to become 71 in August 2024 and has held his place since 2011. The former regulation mentioned that the utmost age for Investigative Committee officers was once 65 however that Putin may just prolong this time period to 70.[16] Putin has taken identical steps lately to lift the retirement ages of presidency and armed forces officers — present Russian Safety Council Deputy Chairperson after which Russian President Dmitry Medvedev diminished the age restrict for civil servants from 65 to 60 in 2010, however Putin raised this to 70 in 2013 when he returned to the presidency.[17] Putin additionally signed regulations in 2021 that allowed the president to increase the time period of military generals, marshals, fleet admirals, and presidential appointees.[18] Putin’s steady elevating of the retirement age lets in him to stay the ones inside his internal circle who’re dependable to him in positions of energy. Bastrykin was once particularly a classmate of Putin’s at college.[19] Bastrykin has additionally lately located himself as a distinguished determine in Russia’s ultranationalist neighborhood, in particular interesting to ultranationalist animus against migrants.[20] Putin has most likely calculated that having a loyalist like Bastrykin rhetorically lead the ultranationalist neighborhood is really useful for the Kremlin’s contemporary wider efforts to attraction to and co-opt this neighborhood, and has manipulated the regulation accordingly.[21] Putin lately promoted more youthful participants of his internal circle, corresponding to 52-year-old Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin, to positions throughout the Kremlin, however those more youthful appointees have additionally been dependable Putin supporters for many years.[22]
Key Takeaways:
The Kremlin is most likely leveraging the new June 2024 Russia-North Korea complete strategic partnership settlement partially to offset Russian power technology and border safety necessities—additional cementing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dedication to heading off mobilization for so long as imaginable.
The Kremlin has elected to deal with the new controversy relating to its reliance on conscripts to repel Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast by means of providing monetary incentives to any body of workers interested by protecting the state border.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a regulation permitting Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin to stick in his place in spite of attaining retirement age (once more) demonstrating Putin’s persisted desire for holding curated loyalists from his internal circle in positions of energy.
Russian forces lately complex in Kursk Oblast and close to Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
A former Russian Hurricane-Z trainer and milblogger closely criticized Russian forces’ reliance at the partially-encrypted communications platform Discord following Russia’s contemporary ban of the platform.

We don’t record intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of those actions are well-covered in Western media and do indirectly impact the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We can proceed to guage and record at the results of those prison actions at the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and in particular on fight in Ukrainian city spaces. We completely condemn Russian violations of the regulations of armed struggle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity despite the fact that we don’t describe them in those studies.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian Major Effort – Jap Ukraine (produced from 3 subordinate primary efforts)
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
Russian Mobilization and Drive Era Efforts
Russian Technological Diversifications
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces
Ukrainian Protection Commercial Base Efforts
Russian Data Operations and Narratives
Important Process in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian forces lately complex at the jap fringe of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid persisted preventing alongside all the salient on October 15. Geolocated pictures revealed on October 15 displays Russian forces advancing to a windbreak northwest of Ulanok (southeast of Sudzha) all through a kind of platoon-sized mechanized attack.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that parts of the fortieth and 810th naval infantry brigades (Pacific and Black Sea fleets, respectively) and thirtieth Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Department, forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are advancing alongside the Borki-Ozerki line (simply south of Ulanok) in an try to outflank Ukrainian forces within the space southeast of Sudzha.[24] ISW maximum lately noticed parts of the fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade running close to Zolota Nyva (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border space) as of October 11, suggesting that the Russian army command could have lately redeployed some portion of the fortieth Brigade to Kursk Oblast.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Leonidovo and complex in fields southeast of Olgovka (each southeast of Korenevo).[26] ISW has no longer but noticed affirmation of those claims, then again. Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov claimed on October 15 that Russian forces’ primary function in Kursk Oblast is to “entice” Ukrainian forces into an encirclement and “wreck” encircled Ukrainian forces.[27] Russian assets reported persisted preventing all over the Kursk Oblast salient southeast of Korenevo close to Tolsty Lug, Zeleny Shlyakh, Nizhny Klin, Lyubimovka, and Novoivanovka; east of Sudzha close to Russkaya Konopelka; and southeast of Sudzha close to Borki.[28] Components of the Russian a hundred and fifty fifth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Department) reportedly proceed running in Kursk Oblast.[29]
Restricted positional engagements persisted west of the Kursk Oblast salient in Glushkovsky Raion on October 15, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline. Russian assets reported persisted preventing close to Novy Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[30] Components of the Russian twenty second Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Basic Team of workers Major Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly running in Glushkovsky Raion.[31]
Russian assets complained in regards to the deficient group of Russian anti-tank defenses in Kursk Oblast, claiming that the location of “dragon’s tooth” roadblocks has resulted in unintended civilian hurt and deaths of servicemembers. A Russian insider supply claimed {that a} Russian first responder who was once using an evacuation automobile down the street in Rylsky Raion, Kursk Oblast, crashed into the dragon’s tooth at midnight, inflicting critical injury to the car.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that “dozens” of Russian carrier body of workers and civilians have died in injuries associated with the dragon’s tooth in Kursk Oblast, suggesting that there’s exceedingly deficient communique between Russian box commanders, native regulation enforcement, and engineering troops in regards to the building of such fortifications.[33]

Russian Major Effort – Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian purpose: Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town)
Geolocated pictures revealed on October 14 displays Ukrainian drones repelling a platoon-sized Russian assault performed by means of parts of the a hundred and fifty fifth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) close to the Belgorod-Kharkiv Oblast border within the agreement of Zhuravleevka (at once at the world border north of Kharkiv Town and about 10km northwest of Hlyboke).[34] Russian forces most likely introduced the mechanized attack in an try to toughen dwindling offensive operations within the Hlyboke-Lyptsi space north of Kharkiv Town however seem to have been unsuccessful.
Russian forces persisted restricted offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 15 however didn’t make any showed advances. The Ukrainian Basic Team of workers reported that Russian forces performed flooring assaults northeast of Kharkiv Town close to Vovchansk, Tykhe (east of Vovchansk), and Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk) on October 14 and 15.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian reconnaissance and particular operations teams are lively in and close to Vovchansk and that Russian forces are intensely firing at the highway between Vovchansk and Lyptsi with a purpose to inhibit Ukrainian communications and logistics.[36]

Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian purpose: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northerly Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces lately complex southeast of Kupyansk amid persisted offensive operations alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 14 and 15. Geolocated pictures revealed on October 15 signifies that Russian forces lately complex into southeastern Kolisnykivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces interdicted the Kupyansk-Borova freeway close to Kruhlyakivka (northwest of Svatove) and complex one kilometer from the Zhuravka Gully against Makiivka (northwest of Kreminna) and 1.4 kilometers against Terny (west of Kreminna).[38] ISW has no longer noticed visible affirmation of those claims, then again. Kharkiv Oblast Army Management Head Oleh Synehubov introduced on October 15 necessary evacuations for all Ukrainian voters residing in Kupyansk, Kindrashivka, Kurylivka, and Borova hromadas (together with Kupyansk Town) because of the ”worsening army scenario” within the space, which has made it difficult to offer citizens with electrical energy and humanitarian assist.[39] Russian forces persisted assaults northeast of Kupyansk close to Synkivka, Kucherivka, Pershotravneve, and Holubivka; east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk close to Lozova, Novoosynove, Pishchane, Hlushkivka, Kruhlyakivka, Kolisnykivka, and Stepova Novoselivka and against Hrushivka; west of Svatove close to Vyshneve; southwest of Svatove close to Novoyehorivka, Makiivka, Novolyubivka, Hrekivka, Yampolivka, and Nevske; and west of Kreminna close to Torske, Terny, and Zarichne on October 14 and 15.[40]


Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian purpose: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces persisted offensive operations east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske on October 15, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline.[41] Components of the Russian “Siberia” Cossack Brigade are reportedly running within the Soledar-Bakhmut route, and reconnaissance parts of the Russian third Blended Palms Military [CAA] previously second Luhansk Other folks’s Republic Military Corps [AC]) are reportedly running within the route of Riznykivka (west of Siversk) as of October 15.[42]
Russian forces persisted offensive operations close to Chasiv Yar on October 15, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline. Russian forces performed offensive operations northeast of Chasiv Yar close to Orikhovo-Vasylivka; north of Chasiv Yar close to Kalynivka; south of Chasiv Yar close to Predtechyne and Dyliivka on October 14 and 15.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complex in western Kalynivka and as much as 900 meters deep around the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal west of Ivanivske (east of Chasiv Yar) alongside the T0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka freeway.[44] Components of Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz are reportedly running west of Ivanivske, and parts of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Department are reportedly running close to Chasiv Yar.[45] Ukrainian Luhansk Workforce of Forces Spokesperson Main Anastasiya Bobovnikova reported on October 15 that Russian forces are looking to profit from the present dry climate in Donetsk Oblast and are intensifying artillery and first-person view (FPV) drone moves with a purpose to advance sooner than the onset of iciness climate.[46] Bobovnikova mentioned that Russian forces have decreased the pace in their attacks close to Chasiv Yar and that probably the most intense Russian attacks are going on close to Toretsk.

Russian forces lately complex close to Toretsk amid persisted offensive operations within the space on October 15. Geolocated pictures revealed on October 14 signifies that Russian forces lately complex west of Niu York (south of Toretsk).[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces additionally complex inside Toretsk, however ISW has no longer noticed affirmation of this declare.[48]  Donetsk Other folks’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that Russian forces have seized over 2/3 of Toretsk, however ISW has most effective noticed visible affirmation or Russian claims that counsel that Russian forces have seized 42 % of the agreement.[49] Russian forces performed offensive operations close to Toretsk; northeast of Toretsk close to Dachne; and west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka on October 14 and 15.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian defensive positions in high-rise structures in Toretsk are complicating Russian advances.[51]

Russian forces lately complex southeast of Pokrovsk amid persisted offensive operations within the space on October 14 and 15. Geolocated pictures revealed on October 15 displays that Russian forces lately complex in western Krasnyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk).[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces running southeast of Pokrovsk entered the Selydove Bolstered Concrete Plant on Selydove’s easternmost outskirts, and complex to the outskirts of Lysivka and by means of 800 meters close to Tsukuryne.[53] ISW has no longer noticed visible proof of those claims. Russian forces persisted offensive operations east of Pokrovsk close to Myrolyubivka, Myrnohrad, Promin, and Hrodivka; south of Pokrovsk within the route of Novotroitske; and southeast of Pokrovsk close to Krasnyi Yar, Selydove, Krutyi Yar, Lysivka, Tsukuryne, Mykolaivka, Sukhyi Yar, Kreminna Balka, Novodmytrivka, Novoselydivka, Izmailivka, Hirnyk, Zoryane, Kurakhivka,  and Novopavlivka on October 14 and 15.[54] Reconnaissance parts of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth CAA, Southern Army District [SMD]) are running within the route of Kurakhivka.[55]
Russian forces performed attacks east of Kurakhove close to Maksymilyanivka and Heorhiivka on October 14 and 15 however didn’t make showed advances.[56]

Russian forces attacked southwest of Donetsk Town close to Vuhledar on October 14 and 15 however didn’t make showed territorial good points. Russian forces persisted offensive operations northeast of Vuhledar close to Kostyantynivka, Antonivka, Katerynivka, and Vodyane; and northwest of Vuhledar close to Bohoyavlenka.[57] The Russian ”Siberia” staff of the thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, Jap Army District [EMD]) is reportedly running close to Vuhledar and within the route of Bohoyavlenka; and drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Basic Team of workers Major Directorate [GRU]) are running within the Bohoyavlenka route along artillery parts of the 2 hundredth Artillery Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, EMD) and parts of the 14th Engineering Brigade.[58]
Russian assets claimed that Russian forces complex within the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border space on October 14 and 15, however ISW has no longer noticed visible proof confirming those claims. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complex within the fields north of Novodonetske (southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and north of Levadne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[59] Russian forces reportedly attacked against Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka).[60]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian purpose: Handle frontline positions and protected rear spaces towards Ukrainian moves)
Russian forces performed flooring assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast close to Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) and Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne) on October 14 and 15.[61] Components of the Russian 4th Army Base (58th Blended Palms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly running close to Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne), and parts of the 1141st Artillery Regiment (seventh Airborne [VDV] Department) are reportedly running close to Verbove (east of Robotyne).[62] Ukrainian Khortytsia Workforce of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on October 15 that Russian forces are carrying out common missile and drone moves, counterbattery hearth, and offensive movements in southern Ukraine however don’t seem to be amassing forces for large-scale offensive operations within the space.[63] Voloshyn mentioned that Russian forces are maximum lively in southern Ukraine within the space between Velyka Novosilka and  Pryyutne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and close to Orikhiv (north of Robotyne) and Hulyaipole (northwest of Robotyne). Voloshyn mentioned that Russian forces are shifting body of workers to ahead positions and making ready for attacks close to Robotyne however don’t seem to be redeploying gadgets from different sectors of the entrance to this space.

Russian forces reportedly lately complex at the islands within the Dnipro River Delta, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline within the Kherson route on October 15. The Ukrainian Basic Team of workers reported on October 14 and 15 that Russian forces performed attacks within the Dnipro route, most likely relating to left (east) financial institution Kherson Oblast and the islands within the Dnipro River Delta.[64] Russian assets, together with Kherson Oblast profession senator Konstantin Basyuk, claimed that Russian forces had driven Ukrainian forces out of the islands within the Dnipro River Delta. ISW has no longer noticed affirmation that Russian forces have complex on Velykyi Potemkin and Kruhlyk islands, then again.[65] Voloshyn mentioned that Russian forces are looking to take management of the islands on the mouth of the Dnipro River, are shifting body of workers to the world, and might accentuate attack operations quickly.[66] Components of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Fight Military Reserve) are reportedly running within the Kherson route, and parts of the eightieth Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD] are reportedly running at the islands of the Dnipro River Delta.[67]

Ukrainian Army Spokesperson Captain 3rd Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on October 14 that the Dniprovska Gulf (Dnipro-Buh estuary) is most likely closely mined because of a vital collection of mines that most likely washed into the world following the Russian destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Energy Plant (KHPP) in June 2023.[68] Pletenchuk famous that the gulf stays a fight zone and that each Ukrainian and Russian forces have hearth management over the world, so Ukrainian government can not examine the level of the mining. Pletenchuk mentioned that Russian forces are making an attempt to switch small boats to the Dniprovska Gulf, noting that those vessels should be sufficiently small for Russian forces to simply switch overland.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and at the frontline)
Russian forces performed a sequence of missile and drone moves towards Ukraine in a single day on October 14 to fifteen. The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Russian forces introduced seven S-300/S-400 air protection missiles at Ukraine from occupied Crimea; two Kh-59 guided aerial missiles at Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts from over Kursk Oblast; and 17 unspecified strike drones (most likely Shahed-136/131 drones) from Kursk Oblast and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[69] The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 12 Russian drones over Mykolaiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Poltava, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, and Cherkasy oblasts, and that Ukrainian digital battle (EW) countermeasures brought about 4 drones to turn into misplaced in Ukraine.[70] Mykolaiv Oblast Head Vitaliy Kim mentioned that Russian forces struck infrastructure, retail structures, and home spaces in Mykolaiv Town with S-300 missiles.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian drones struck a Ukrainian airfield in Oleksandriya, Kirovohrad Oblast.[72]
A Ukrainian soldier who operates in a cell air protection unit mentioned on October 15 that Russian Shahed drones have been in the past very gradual, tough to move, and may just most effective fly at low altitudes however that Russian forces have since upgraded the elements within the Shahed drones to fly sooner and better.[73] The Ukrainian soldier famous that Ukrainian cell hearth teams have additionally stepped forward their apparatus and techniques with a purpose to proceed taking pictures down Shahed drones.
Russian Mobilization and Drive Era Efforts (Russian purpose: Enlarge fight energy with out carrying out normal mobilization)
Russian government proceed to extend one-time bills so that you can recruit contract squaddies and keep away from additional mobilization however nonetheless combat to draw new body of workers. Krasnodar Krai Head Veniamin Kondratyev signed a decree on October 15 expanding the regional fee from 1.2 million rubles (about $12,370) to one.5 million rubles (about $15,463), and Russian information outlet Kommersant famous that the entire sum of federal and regional one-time bills to new contract squaddies in Krasnodar Krai is two.3 million rubles (about $23,710).[74] Ukrainian army observer Petro Chernyk mentioned on October 15 that Russia is most effective recruiting about 36,000-38,000 new body of workers per 30 days however suffered about 1,200 losses according to day on reasonable in September 2024 (totaling about 36,000 casualties), indicating that present Russian recruitment efforts are most likely in large part supposed to at once change battlefield casualties slightly than staffing operational or strategic reserve formations.[75]
A former Russian Hurricane-Z trainer and milblogger closely criticized Russian forces’ reliance at the partially-encrypted communications platform Discord following Russia’s contemporary ban of the platform.[76] The milblogger claimed that Discord was once one of the crucial common communications programs that Russian forces used, even on the brigade and regimental command ranges, and that Russian forces depend on Discord and Starlink (allegedly the one manner Russian forces can get entry to Discord) slightly than the officially-distributed “Glaz/Groza” tool package deal for horizontal communications. The milblogger cited a number of different milbloggers who in the past raised worry with Discord – together with Junior Sergeant Dmitry Lysakovsky alias “Goodwin,” a Russian drone operator whose dying in a Russian infantry attack sparked outrage over the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD)’s misuse of technical experts – however famous that individuals have advocated to prohibit Discord however didn’t suggest any significant choices for Russian frontline communications. Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor banned Discord in Russia on October 8 for allegedly violating Russian censorship regulations, most likely degrading some frontline Russian forces’ advert hoc communications programs within the close to time period.[77]
Russian Technological Diversifications (Russian purpose: Introduce technological inventions to optimize programs to be used in Ukraine)
Russian milbloggers posted pictures on October 15 reportedly of latest munitions for Russian TOS thermobaric artillery programs and claimed that those munitions have considerably greater levels from the prior variations, noting that Russian forces have already fielded those rockets within the Kupyansk route.[78]
Ukrainian Protection Commercial Efforts (Ukrainian purpose: Expand its protection business base to turn into extra self-sufficient in cooperation with US, Ecu, and world companions)
ISW is postponing publishing protection of Ukrainian protection business efforts till additional understand.
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces (Russian purpose: Consolidate administrative management of annexed spaces; forcibly combine Ukrainian voters into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance programs)
ISW isn’t publishing reporting on actions in Russian-occupied spaces nowadays.
Russian Data Operations and Narratives
Russian officers unfold false narratives about Ukraine’s alleged mistreatment of detainees, most likely with a purpose to deflect from Russia’s personal mistreatment of the ones held in Russian captivity. Russian and profession officers, together with Russian propagandist and RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan, falsely claimed {that a} Ukrainian girl died in a pretrial detention middle after Ukrainian government detained her for elevating a Russian flag at a monument in Odesa Town.[79] The Odesa Oblast Nationwide Police reportedly informed Russian unbiased outlet Mozhem Obyasnit (We Can Provide an explanation for) that the girl is alive and beneath area arrest.[80] Those false claims particularly observe Ukrainian officers’ October 11 affirmation that Ukrainian journalist Viktoriya Roshchyna lately died in Russian captivity.[81]
Russian media and milbloggers extensively amplified statements by means of Polish officers about Ukrainian refugees’ position in Polish society on October 15, most likely in an try to force a wedge between Ukraine and its Ecu companions, in particular Poland.[82]
Russian milbloggers tried to border Ukraine’s protection towards Russia’s full-scale invasion as Ukrainian makes an attempt to achieve management over Russian territory, most likely as a part of efforts to deflect consideration from Russia’s personal territorial ambitions in Ukraine and discredit Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed that the Ukrainian army is spreading narratives amongst army body of workers about Ukraine’s alleged ancient territorial claims deep into jap Russia with a purpose to “justify” Ukraine’s Kursk Oblast incursion.[83]
Important task in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and extra combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Workforce task in Belarus)
A delegation from the Other folks’s Republic of China (PRC) Central Army Fee’s Basic Division of Logistics met with Belarusian Assistant to the Protection Minister for Army Financial system and Finance and Head of the Belarusian Ministry of Protection’s (MoD) Major Monetary and Financial Division Igor Mozhilovsky on October 15.[84] The events reportedly mentioned monetary toughen for the Belarusian and PRC militaries and new, unspecified spaces of cooperation.[85] Russian Protection Minister Andrei Belousov met with PRC Protection Minister Dong Jun in Beijing on October 14 and mentioned Russian-PRC army cooperation.[86]
Observe: ISW does no longer obtain any categorised subject matter from any supply, makes use of most effective publicly to be had knowledge, and attracts widely on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially to be had satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial records as the root for those studies. References to all assets used are equipped within the endnotes of every replace.

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Author: OpenAI