Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, December 31, 2024
Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Fredrick W. Kagan
December 31, 2024, 7:15 pm ET
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day along the static maps provide on this record.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
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Click on right here to get admission to ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Those maps supplement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by way of appearing a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive per 30 days.
Observe: The information cut-off for this product used to be 12pm ET on December 31. ISW will duvet next stories within the January 2 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation. ISW and CTP won’t submit a marketing campaign evaluate (or maps) the following day, January 1, in observance of the New 12 months vacation. Protection will resume on January 2.
Russian forces received 4,168 sq. kilometers, in large part made out of fields and small settlements in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, at a reported value of over 420,000 casualties in 2024. Ukrainian Commander-in-Leader Colonel Common Oleksandr Syrskyi said on December 30 that Russian forces suffered 427,000 casualties in 2024.[1] ISW has seen geolocated proof to evaluate that Russian forces complex 4,168 sq. kilometers in 2024, indicating that Russian forces have suffered roughly 102 casualties in step with sq. kilometer of Ukrainian territory seized. ISW up to now seen that Russian forces received 2,356 sq. kilometers in alternate for an estimated 125,800 casualties throughout a duration of intensified Russian offensive operations in September, October, and November 2024.[2] Russian forces made 56.5 % in their 2024 territorial positive factors throughout the September thru November 2024 duration. Russian Safety Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on December 24 that 440,000 recruits signed army provider contracts with the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) in 2024, suggesting that Russia is most likely recruiting simply sufficient army body of workers to switch its lately top casualty charges one for one.[3]
Russian advances have slowed in December 2024, on the other hand. ISW has seen geolocated proof to evaluate that Russian forces received 593 sq. kilometers or 18.1 sq. kilometers in step with day in December 2024, whilst the choice of day by day Russian casualties in December 2024 remained very similar to the estimated day by day casualty price in November 2024. The Ukrainian Common Group of workers reported a day by day Russian body of workers casualty reasonable of one,585 in December 2024, marking a fourth all-time top of Russia’s day by day casualty price following stories that Russia’s reasonable day by day Russian body of workers casualty reached a brand new all-time top of one,523 casualties in step with day in November 2024.[4] Russian forces had been advancing on the significantly upper price of 27.96 sq. kilometers in step with day in November 2024.[5] Syrskyi said on December 30 that Russian forces have suffered 1,700 casualties in step with day over the last week (since December 23), indicating the Russian forces can have suffered an excellent upper casualty price in the previous few weeks of 2024 whilst Russian advances slowed.[6] The Russian army command most likely tolerated report ranges of body of workers casualties from September thru November 2024 to facilitate better territorial positive factors, but it surely stays unclear if the Russian army command will likely be keen to maintain such casualties if Russian forces’ price of advance continues to say no as Russian forces proceed to advance on extra closely defended settlements reminiscent of Pokrovsk.
The Russian army command in large part prioritized efforts to take hold of the rest of Donetsk Oblast and identify a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast in 2024 however failed to perform those objectives. Intensified Russian offensive operations in early 2024 resulted within the seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February 2024 and next Russian advances west of Avdiivka within the instructions of Pokrovsk and Selydove all over spring, summer time, and fall 2024.[7] Russian forces additionally introduced a in large part unsuccessful offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast geared toward developing an unspecified “buffer zone” to shield Belgorod Town from Ukrainian shelling in Might 2024 and renewed offensive operations close to Toretsk and west and southwest of Donetsk Town in June and July 2024.[8] Western and Ukrainian resources assessed in 2023 and 2024 that Russia supposed to take hold of everything of Donetsk and Luhansk by way of the top of 2024, however Russia’s gradual advances in early and mid-2024 most likely precipitated the Russian army command to think again and establish the seizure of Pokrovsk as Russian forces’ number one offensive effort for the rest of 2024.[9]
Russian forces thus became again to the Pokrovsk course in past due Summer season and early Fall 2024 amid a marvel Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and effectively exploited the seizure of Selydove and Vuhledar to make additional advances round Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and later Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces lately seized Kurakhove and are making an attempt to envelop Velyka Novosilka from the north and south.[10] Russian forces closely depended on platoon-, company-, and battalion-sized mechanized attacks to advance within the open fields within the Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka instructions in fresh months however persistently incurred vital armored cars losses throughout those attacks.[11] Russian forces are these days making an attempt to envelop Pokrovsk from the south and northeast however have so far did not make vital fresh development on this effort.[12] Russian forces may additionally no less than quickly be transferring their focal point from the envelopment of Pokrovsk to creating opportunistic advances due west against the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border throughout a crucial second of Russia’s ongoing efforts to undermine Western enhance for Ukraine.[13]
Russian forces have seized 4 mid-sized settlements – Avdiivka, Selydove, Vuhledar, and Kurakhove – in all of 2024, the most important of which had a pre-war inhabitants of simply over 31,000 other folks. Russian forces’ price of advance in large part stalled across the few extra city settlements that Russian forces sought to soak up 2024. Russian forces expended more or less 4 months in seizing Avdiivka in past due 2023 and early 2024 and two months each and every on efforts to take hold of and envelop Selydove and Kurakhove in 2024. Russian forces additionally incurred vital body of workers losses throughout efforts to take those settlements, and Ukrainian officers have lately estimated that Russian forces misplaced just about 3,000 body of workers within the Pokrovsk course in two weeks in mid-December 2024.[14] ISW has now not assessed that any of the settlements that Russian forces seized in 2024 are operationally vital, as seizing those settlements has now not allowed Russian forces to threaten any notable Ukrainian defensive nodes, and Russian forces have did not habits the type of fast, mechanized maneuver vital to transform those tactical positive factors into deep penetrations of Ukraine’s rear. ISW these days assesses that Russian forces should seize roughly 8,559 sq. kilometers, which come with vital Ukrainian defensive positions and big towns alongside Ukraine’s fort belt, to take hold of the rest of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces will require simply over two years to take hold of the rest of Donetsk Oblast at their 2024 charges of advance, assuming that every one their advances had been confined to Donetsk, that they may be able to take hold of huge city spaces as simply as small villages and fields, and that the Ukrainians don’t habits any vital counterattacks in Donetsk.
Ukrainian forces haven’t begun to prevent Russian forces from advancing of their precedence sectors, on the other hand, and Western help stays crucial to Ukraine’s skill to stabilize the frontline in 2025. Ukrainian defenders have in large part stalled Russian advances close to Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, however Russian forces proceed to make sluggish, grinding advances within the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka instructions. Ongoing Ukrainian manpower constraints and morale problems also are developing vulnerabilities in Ukraine’s defensive strains, and Ukrainian officers should deal with those problems and metal defenders towards Russian infantry attacks in jap and southern Ukraine.[15] Russian forces, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, are these days running beneath a principle of victory that assumes that Russian forces can indefinitely advance in Ukraine however fails to account for the chance that Ukrainian forces may just inflict losses enough to stall or forestall long run Russian offensive operations.[16] Ukrainian forces, with enhance from Ukraine’s Western allies, should subsequently paintings to combine Ukrainian drone operations, sufficiently resourced artillery and long-range strike functions, and dedicated Ukrainian infantry gadgets to shield towards Russian advances and undermine Putin’s principle of victory in 2025.
Russian President Vladimir Putin formally declared 2025 the “12 months of the Defender of the Native land” throughout his New 12 months’s deal with on December 31 – signaling the Kremlin’s persevered efforts to militarize Russian society and deal with regime balance by way of appeasing the increasing Russian veteran neighborhood.[17] Putin claimed that the “12 months of the Defender of the Native land” will honor present Russian servicemen, the eightieth Anniversary of the 2d International Battle, and different veterans who fought for Russia. Putin authorized an inventory of directions for the Russian govt on December 20 that objectives to extend Russia’s community of military-patriotic tutorial systems as a part of his “12 months of the Defender of the Native land” insurance policies.[18] Putin will most likely additionally proceed to extend and institutionalize further enhance systems for veterans as a part of the “12 months of the Defender of the Native land,” a lot of which the Kremlin started in 2023 and 2024 most likely out of a priority that an ever-growing choice of disillusioned Russian veterans may just threaten the steadiness of Putin’s regime. Putin significantly created and considerably expanded the purposes of Russia’s Defenders of Native land State Fund in 2023 and 2024, which pledges to enhance Russian veterans who fought in Ukraine.[19] Putin additionally offered the “Time of Heroes” state-wide initiative in Spring 2024, which objectives to put in Kremlin-selected Russian veterans into positions of energy inside the Russian govt and industry sector, and Russian government have already appointed two contributors of this program to guide two primary Russian military-patriotic establishments.[20] Putin additionally handed a lot of decrees providing veterans subsidies and advantages all over 2024 and can most likely proceed to take action in 2025 – in spite of the expanding prices of such insurance policies – to make certain that the veteran neighborhood does now not harbor grievances towards the Kremlin and its conflict effort in Ukraine.[21] Putin’s dedication to tasks such because the “12 months of the Defender of the Native land” and different enhance efforts for veterans are more and more committing Russia to long-term monetary tasks.
Ukrainian naval drones reportedly downed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter close to occupied Cape Tarkhankut, Crimea, reportedly marking the primary time {that a} naval drone has shot down an air goal. Ukraine’s Major Army Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 31 that it destroyed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter the usage of the R-73 “Sea Dragon” missiles introduced from a Magura V5 naval strike drone within the Black Sea.[22] The GUR famous that Ukrainian naval drones broken every other Russian Mi-8 helicopter however that the broken helicopter sooner or later landed at an airfield. The GUR said that the naval drone strike towards Russian Mi-8 helicopters marked the historical first destruction of an aerial goal with a naval drone. Sevastopol profession governor Mikhail Razvozhayev claimed that Russian forces repelled 4 Ukrainian aerial drones and two naval drones over and within the Black Sea in a single day on December 31, however didn’t recognize the downing of the Mi-8 helicopter.[23] Russian milbloggers expressed considerations that Ukraine’s skill to include Ukrainian naval drones as a part of Ukraine’s air protection functions will complicate Russia’s efforts to ruin Ukrainian naval drones, as Russia is dependent upon helicopters and Su-30SM fighter jets to focus on naval drones which might be a ways from Crimea’s shore.[24] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces additionally destroyed a Russian Tor air protection gadget in southern Ukraine, and a neighborhood Crimean supply claimed that Ukrainian forces can have struck a Tor air protection gadget close to occupied Kozacha Bay (southwest of Sevastopol).[25]
Ukrainian forces struck the Yarsevskaya oil depot in Smolensk Oblast and a development utilized by the Russian army in Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 30 and 31. The Ukrainian Common Group of workers reported on December 31 that Ukrainian Particular Operations Forces (SSO) and Unmanned Techniques Forces (USF) introduced drone moves towards the Yarsevskaya oil depot, leading to a chain of intense explosions, heavy smoke, and oil tanks catching on hearth close to the depot.[26] The Ukrainian Common Group of workers added that the within reach oil refinery equipped the Russian conflict effort. Russian government showed that Ukrainian drones struck the oil refinery in Yarsevsky Raion, leading to an oil spill and hearth on the refinery.[27] Yartsevsky Raion Head Roman Zakharov showed the Ukrainian drone strike on social media however later deleted the publish and amplified Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin’s declare that the particles from downed Ukrainian drones ended in a fireplace on the oil refinery.[28] Russian opposition outlet Astra, bringing up unnamed resources, reported that Ukrainian forces introduced no less than six Hurricane Shadow missile towards a development utilized by Russian forces in Lgov on December 30.[29] Astra reported that the strike killed 8 Russian servicemembers, wounded a number of Russian servicemembers, and wounded one civilian. Kursk Oblast Appearing Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed that Ukrainian forces struck an condominium development in Lgov.[30]
Key Takeaways:
Russian forces received 4,168 sq. kilometers, in large part made out of fields and small settlements in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, at a reported value of over 420,000 casualties in 2024.
The Russian army command in large part prioritized efforts to take hold of the rest of Donetsk Oblast and identify a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast in 2024 however failed to perform those objectives.
Russian forces have seized 4 mid-sized settlements – Avdiivka, Selydove, Vuhledar, and Kurakhove – in all of 2024, the most important of which had a pre-war inhabitants of simply over 31,000 other folks.
Russian forces will require simply over two years to take hold of the rest of Donetsk Oblast at their 2024 charges of advance, assuming that every one their advances had been confined to Donetsk, that they may be able to take hold of huge city spaces as simply as small villages and fields, and that the Ukrainians don’t habits any vital counterattacks in Donetsk.
Ukrainian forces haven’t begun to prevent Russian forces from advancing of their precedence sectors, on the other hand, and Western help stays crucial to Ukraine’s skill to stabilize the frontline in 2025.
Russian President Vladimir Putin formally declared 2025 the “12 months of the Defender of the Native land” throughout his New Years’ deal with on December 31 – signaling the Kremlin’s persevered efforts to militarize Russian society and deal with regime balance by way of appeasing the increasing Russian veteran neighborhood.
Ukrainian naval drones reportedly downed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter close to occupied Cape Tarkhankut, Crimea, reportedly marking the primary time {that a} naval drone has shot down an air goal.
Ukrainian forces struck the Yarsevskaya oil depot in Smolensk Oblast and a development utilized by the Russian army in Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 30 and 31.
Ukrainian forces lately complex close to Kreminna and in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces lately complex close to Kreminna, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
The Russian govt will deprive prisoners who volunteer to struggle in Ukraine of the one-time enlistment bonus beginning January 1, 2025, marking every other example of Russia looking to lower the mounting short- and long-term prices of conflict.
We don’t record intimately on Russian conflict crimes as a result of those actions are well-covered in Western media and do indirectly have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We will be able to proceed to guage and record at the results of those prison actions at the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on battle in Ukrainian city spaces. We totally condemn Russian violations of the regulations of armed struggle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity even if we don’t describe them in those stories.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian Major Effort – Jap Ukraine (made out of 3 subordinate major efforts)
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
Russian Mobilization and Power Era Efforts
Russian Technological Diversifications
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces
Vital Task in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces lately complex in Kursk Oblast amid persevered combating in Ukraine’s salient on December 31. Ukraine’s Particular Operations Forces (SSO) revealed later geolocated pictures on December 31 that signifies that Ukrainian forces seized Kruglenkoye (southeast of Korenevo) and reported that Ukrainian forces established positions in a agreement up to now held by way of North Korean and Russian forces in Kursk Oblast, most likely relating to Kruglenkoye.[31] Geolocated pictures revealed on December 30 presentations that Ukrainian forces additionally complex east of Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha) alongside the 38K-024 freeway.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complex from Russkaya Konopelka to Agronom (each east of Sudzha), the place Russian forces are these days attacking, and to the outskirts of Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha).[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are 2.5 kilometers clear of Sudzha.[34] Parts of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (seventh VDV Department) and the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly running in Kursk Oblast.[35] Parts of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Department are reportedly running in Korenevsky Raion.[36]
Russian Major Effort – Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town)
Russian forces persevered flooring assaults alongside the world border north of Kharkiv Town towards Kozacha Lopan, north of Kharkiv Town close to Lyptsi, and northeast of Kharkiv Town close to Vovchansk on December 30 and 31 however did make any showed advances.[37]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northerly Donetsk Oblast)
Ukrainian and Russian forces lately complex northwest of Kreminna amid persevered Russian offensive operations alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on December 31. Geolocated pictures revealed on December 30 signifies that Ukrainian forces lately complex in northern Terny (northwest of Kreminna).[38] Further geolocated pictures revealed on December 30 signifies that Russian forces lately complex in southern Terny.[39] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces these days management 90 % of Terny.[40] The Ukrainian Khortytsya Workforce of Forces reported on December 31 that Russian forces carried out a more or less strengthened platoon-sized mechanized attack close to Nova Kruhlyakivka (west of Svatove).[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that deficient climate stipulations, together with rain and fog, are complicating Russian operations alongside each banks of the Oskil River within the Kupyansk course.[42] Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk close to Holubivka; southeast of Kupyansk close to Zahryzove, Lozova, Stepova Novoselivka, and Kruhlyakivka; west of Svatove close to Zeleny Hai, Kopanky, Pershotravneve, Novoyehorivka, and Nadiya; northwest of Kreminna close to Makiivka, Ivanivka, Druzhelyubivka, Cherneshchyna, Novoserhiivka, and Terny; southwest of Kreminna close to Dibrova and Hryhorivka; and west of Kreminna close to Yampolivka on December 30 and 31.[43] Drone operators of the Russian sixteenth Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Common Group of workers’s Major Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly running close to Hrekivka (northwest of Kreminna).[44]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces lately complex close to Siversk amid persevered offensive operations within the house on December 31. Geolocated pictures revealed on December 24 signifies that Russian forces most likely seized Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized the agreement.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 31 that Russian forces are advancing against a water reservoir simply east of Siversk and that Russian forces complex 900 meters alongside a railway south of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[46] ISW has now not seen affirmation of those claims, on the other hand. The Ukrainian Common Group of workers reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka on December 30 and 31.[47]
Russian forces lately complex in Chasiv Yar amid persevered offensive operations within the house on December 31. Geolocated pictures revealed on December 27 signifies that Russian forces complex to Lermontova Side road in northern Chasiv Yar.[48] Russian forces attacked inside Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar close to Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora on December 30 and 31.[49] Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Department are reportedly running in Chasiv Yar.[50]
Russian forces persevered offensive operations within the Toretsk course on December 31 however didn’t make any showed advances. Russian forces attacked inside Toretsk and west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka on December 30 and 31.[51] The Ukrainian Khortytsia Workforce of Forces reported on December 31 that Russian forces carried out a more or less company-sized mechanized attack within the course of Leonidivka (southwest of Toretsk).[52] Drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Mixed Palms Military [CAA], previously the first Donetsk Folks’s Republic [DNR] Military Corps [AC], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly running in Toretsk.[53]
Russian forces lately complex within the Pokrovsk course amid persevered offensive operations within the house on December 31. Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said on December 31 that Russian forces seized Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk), and a Russian milblogger additionally claimed that Russian forces seized the agreement.[54] The Russian milblogger additionally claimed that Russian forces seized Vozdvyzhenka (northeast of Pokrovsk) and Vovkove (southwest of Pokrovsk) and complex alongside the railway line towards Chunyshyne (south of Pokrovsk), however ISW has now not seen affirmation of those claims.[55] Russian forces persevered attacks northeast of Pokrovsk close to Vozdvyzhenka, Myrolyubivka, Zelene Pole, and Promin; east of Pokrovsk close to Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Zelene and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Dachenske, Novyi Trud, Zelene, and Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Vovkove, Kotlyne, Solone, Pishchane, Novovasylivka, Novoolenivka, Novoyelyzavetivka, Novovasylivka, and Ukrainka on December 30 and 31.[56] Mashovets said that components of the Russian 329th and eightieth tank regiments, 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (all ninetieth Tank Department, forty first CAA, Central Army District [CMD]), 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Department, 2d CAA, CMD), and 74th and fifty fifth motorized rifle brigades (forty first CAA, CMD) are running within the Pishchane-Kotlyne house and Novoolenivka-Novoyelyzavetivka house.[57]
Russian forces lately complex into the western outskirts of the Kurakhivska Thermal Energy Plant (TPP) simply west of Kurakhove however it’s not going that Russian forces have seized all of the TPP. Geolocated pictures revealed on December 31 signifies that Russian forces lately complex into the western outskirts of the TPP.[58] ISW assesses that Russian forces most likely complex into the western outskirts of the TPP from positions in Stari Terny (northwest of Kurakhove and the TPP), as it’s not going that Ukrainian forces held considerably fortified positions alongside the western shore of the Kurakhivske Reservoir. A Russian supply claimed on December 31 that Russian forces have encircled the Ukrainian grouping within the TPP and within reach commercial zone and every other Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing alongside the western shore of the reservoir, additional indicating that Russian forces most likely complex alongside the western shore of the reservoir and cling positions in each the jap and western outskirts of the TPP.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that components of the Russian fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) participated within the advance into the TPP and insinuated that Russian forces complex to the western outskirts of the TPP from the outskirts of Kurakhove and feature seized lots of the TPP.[60] Ukrainian forces might deal with positions within the central spaces of the TPP, on the other hand, as the economic house might supply enough defensible positions for Ukraine to deal with a restricted protection within the house. ISW up to now assessed that Russian forces might try to outflank Ukrainian positions on the TPP by way of advancing south from Stari Terny, and such an advance might complicate Ukraine’s skill to provide positions on the TPP and complicate long run Ukrainian withdrawals from the TPP.[61]
Russian forces persevered offensive operations in different spaces of the Kurakhove course on December 31. Mashovets said that components of the Russian a hundred and tenth and fifth motorized rifle brigades (either one of the 51st CAA) lately complex from Stari Terny against Shevchenko (each northwest of Kurakhove) and both partly or utterly seized Shevchenko.[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are proceeding to push Ukrainian forces from last positions in Kurakhove and feature seized maximum of Shevchenko.[63] A Ukrainian servicemember running within the Kurakhove course reported that Russian forces were the usage of civilian cars to move infantry to frontline positions during the last month and that Russian forces are eliminating the doorways and rooves from those cars with a view to delivery extra infantry and provides.[64] Russian forces persevered attacks in Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove close to Petropavlivka, Ukrainka, Shevchenko, and Slovyanka; and west of Kurakhove close to Dachne on December 30 and 31.[65] Parts of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (twentieth Motorized Rifle Department, eighth CAA, Southern Army District [SMD]) and 68th Tank Regiment (a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Department, eighth CAA) are reportedly running close to Kurakhove.[66]
Russian forces persevered offensive operations within the Vuhledar course on December 31 however didn’t make any showed positive factors. Ukraine’s Khortytsia Workforce of Forces reported on December 31 that Russian forces carried out offensive operations with an unspecified choice of armored cars close to Kostyantynopolske (northwest of Vuhledar).[67] Mashovets said that components of the Russian a hundred and tenth and fifth motorized rifle brigades, thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, Jap Army District [EMD]), 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), and 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (fifth CAA, EMD) are making an attempt to advance on Ulakly (northwest of Vuhledar) from Shevchenko within the north and Zelenivka from the south.[68] Russian forces persevered attacking north of Vuhledar close to Uspenivka and northwest of Vuhledar close to Kostyantynopolske, Yantarne, Uspenivka, and Kostyantynopil on December 30 and 31.[69] Parts of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth CAA, Southern Army District [SMD]) are running close to Ulakly (northwest of Vuhledar).[70]
Russian forces persevered offensive operations close to Velyka Novosilka on December 31 however didn’t make any showed advances. Russian forces carried out offensive operations close to Velyka Novosilka itself, northeast of Velyka Novosilka close to Rozlyv, southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Novodarivka and Neskuchne, and west of Velyka Novosilka close to Vremivka and Novosilka on December 30 and 31.[71] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Common Group of workers’s Major Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly running close to Velyka Novosilka.[72]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Deal with frontline positions and protected rear spaces towards Ukrainian moves)
Russian forces persevered offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 30 and 31 however didn’t make any showed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on December 30 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within the Orikhiv course (north of Robotyne).[73] Russian forces carried out offensive operations close to Novoandriivka (northwest of Robotyne) on December 30 and 31.[74] Parts of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Struggle Military Reserve) are reportedly running within the Zaporizhia course, and components of the forty second Motorized Rifle Department (58th Mixed Palms Military, Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly running close to Orikhiv.[75]
Russian forces persevered attacks within the Dnipro course and at the islands within the Dnipro River Delta on December 30 and 31 however didn’t make any showed advances.[76]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and at the frontline)
Russian forces carried out a chain of missile and drone moves towards Ukraine at the evening of December 30 to 31. The Ukrainian Air Power reported on December 31 that Russian forces introduced six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast; one Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile and 8 Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tula Oblast; six Kh-69 cruise missiles from Belgorod Oblast; and 40 Shaheds and decoy drones from Bryansk and Rostov oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[77] The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Ukrainian forces downed one Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missile, 5 Kh-69 cruise missiles, and 16 Shaheds; that 24 decoy drones had been “misplaced,” most likely because of Ukrainian digital battle (EW) interference; and that Russian ballistic missiles struck objectives in Kyiv and Sumy oblasts. Kyiv Oblast Army Management reported on December 31 that Russian forces introduced in a single day missile and drone moves concentrated on Kyiv Oblast, leading to particles from downed drones destructive residential constructions.[78] Sumy Oblast Army Management Head Volodymyr Artyukh reported on December 31 that Russian forces introduced a morning strike involving 13 missiles towards Shostka, Sumy Oblast that broken infrastructure and 3 boiler rooms.[79]
The Ukrainian Air Power reported on December 31 that Ukrainian forces downed a complete of one,300 Russian missiles of quite a lot of varieties, 11,200 strike drones, 3,200 reconnaissance drones, 40 fixed-wing airplane, and 6 helicopters in 2024.[80] The Ukrainian Air Power reported that the Russian army higher its manufacturing and use of ballistic missiles towards Ukraine in 2024.
Russian Mobilization and Power Era Efforts (Russian goal: Make bigger battle energy with out undertaking normal mobilization)
The Russian govt will deprive prisoners who volunteer to struggle in Ukraine of a one-time enlistment bonus beginning January 1, 2025, marking every other example of Russia looking to lower the mounting short- and long-term prices of conflict.[81] Russian Top Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree on December 28 that got rid of the correct to a one-time enlistment bonus for Russian prisoners who signal army provider contracts with the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD). Some Russian federal topics (areas) higher one-time enlistment bills to prisoners as much as 505,000 rubles ($4,786) in Fall 2024, and Russian government have higher such financial incentives in hopes of recruiting further troops to serve in Ukraine.[82] The decree significantly follows Russian President Vladimir Putin’s arguable resolution to modify Russian coverage in November 2024 making certain a one-time fee of 3 million rubles ($28,434) to all Russian servicemen who’ve been wounded in battle in Ukraine since March 2022 and as a substitute providing most effective an enhanced reimbursement of 4 million rubles ($37,912) to servicemen formally deemed “closely wounded” in battle.[83] The Russian govt firstly offered top enlistment bonuses for prisoners and reimbursement for all wounded servicemen to incentivize army recruitment after Putin determined towards pointing out normal mobilization in Spring 2022. Monetary incentives become the important thing pillar of the Russian army’s recruitment marketing campaign and body of workers retention efforts over the last just about 3 years, and ISW continues to evaluate that the reversal of such incentives signifies that the program is changing into economically unsustainable for the Kremlin.[84]
The Russian MoD’s Major Directorate of Struggle Coaching is reportedly failing to correctly teach new recruits, most likely since the Russian army command urgently wishes reinforcements to enhance grinding attacks in jap Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed that the MoD’s Major Directorate of Struggle Coaching provides a recruit coaching program for lower than 30 days as a substitute of the advisable 45 days.[85] The milblogger seen that the learning program and its timeframes don’t seem to be obligatory and that Russian Protection Minister Andrei Belousov has now not issued a decree formalizing a coaching program for recruits with a view to steer clear of launching new bureaucratic processes. The milblogger famous that the loss of a formalized coaching program creates an atmosphere by which coaching varies in accordance with the orders of particular person grouping of forces (GOF) commanders. The milblogger added that on reasonable Russian servicemen obtain about 14 to 16 days of coaching and that the period of time allotted for coaching is dependent upon the army command’s closing date for reconstituting gadgets and arrangements for offensives. The milblogger famous that Russian gadgets alongside the frontline most often seem like a mix of poorly educated infantry, closely broken apparatus, a loss of junior commanders, and very much diminished making plans functions.
The milblogger’s account differs dramatically from the Russian MoD’s description of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s naval infantry coaching program, which Russian Protection Minister Andrei Belousov inspected on December 31.[86] Belousov visited an unspecified Southern Army District (SMD) coaching flooring the place Russian recruits supposedly obtain tactical hearth, clinical, engineering, and battle coordination coaching beneath the management of Russian officials with prior battle enjoy in Ukraine. BSF Commander Vice-Admiral Sergei Pinchuk instructed Belousov that recruits additionally obtain specialised coaching reminiscent of the usage of and repelling unmanned aerial techniques (UAVs). Belousov additionally toured a UAV lab positioned on the coaching flooring used for coaching UAV crews and trying out new apparatus.
Russian Technological Diversifications (Russian goal: Introduce technological inventions to optimize techniques to be used in Ukraine)
Not anything vital to record.
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed spaces; forcibly combine Ukrainian electorate into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance techniques)
ISW isn’t reporting on actions in Russian-occupied spaces lately.
Vital task in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and extra combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Not anything vital to record.
Observe: ISW does now not obtain any labeled subject matter from any supply, makes use of most effective publicly to be had knowledge, and attracts broadly on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially to be had satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial records as the root for those stories. References to all resources used are supplied within the endnotes of each and every replace.
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