Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 17, 2024
The next is an excerpt from the Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Overview for August 17, 2024.
The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and Russian offensive operations in japanese Ukraine aren’t in themselves decisive army operations that may win the battle. Each Russian and Ukrainian forces lack the potential to behavior person decisive war-winning operations and should as a substitute behavior more than one successive operations with restricted operational goals which might be a long way wanting victory, however that during mixture can reach strategic goals. It’s too early to evaluate the results and operational importance of the Ukrainian incursion into Russia and the continued Russian offensive effort in japanese Ukraine. The importance of those operations is not going to emerge in isolation, additionally, however they are going to subject in as far as they relate to a chain of next Russian and Ukrainian campaigns through the years.
The dimensions of the battle in Ukraine prevents each side from resolving the battle in one decisive crusade. ISW not too long ago printed “Ukraine and the Downside of Restoring Maneuver in Recent Conflict,” by which Dr. Frederick W. Kagan and Dr. Kimberly Kagan famous that Ukraine and Russia each be capable to determine deep defensive positions and reserves that may save you any unmarried crusade from attaining strategic battle objectives sooner than it culminates.[1] Russia’s and Ukraine’s talent to generate sufficient fight energy to guy steady defensive positions and not using a open flanks and determine tactical intensity at vital issues alongside the frontline has pressured either side to try penetration battles which might be so expensive that next exploitation is incessantly no longer possible.[2] (Ukraine, in truth, took good thing about a flank the Russians had left open in Kursk Oblast, however Russia has sufficient fight energy to hide its frontiers if it so chooses at the price of pursuing different goals). Russia and Ukraine can in most cases determine defensive positions at far within the rear and sufficiently stabilize the frontline even within the match of a a hit penetration and exploitation.[3] Efficient Ukrainian and Russian crusade design subsequently calls for forethought and making plans for more than one successive operations that each and every set stipulations for the following operation.[4] Hardly ever has each side been in a position to behavior successive operations with out interruption, on the other hand, since operational pauses or lowered operational pace have introduced the opposite belligerent the chance to contest and clutch the initiative.[5]
Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian army command most likely view keeping up the theater-wide initiative as a strategic crucial to win a battle of attrition towards Ukraine, and each the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast and the Russian offensive effort in japanese Ukraine will affect whether or not Russian forces can retain the initiative within the non permanent. Russian forces seized the theater-wide initiative in November 2023 and feature since performed constant offensive operations right through japanese and northeastern Ukraine as a part of a crusade designed to stretch Ukrainian forces and save you Ukraine from amassing the assets essential to contest the initiative.[6] The Russian army has no longer pursued a brand new large-scale offensive operation in fresh months so as to care for a constant offensive pace in Ukraine, in particular in Donetsk Oblast, and Putin and the Russian army command have accredited that months of combating will proceed to lead to marginal tactical beneficial properties.[7] Putin has expressed a idea of victory in Ukraine that posits that Russian forces will be capable of proceed those sluggish creeping advances indefinitely, on the other hand, whilst combating Ukraine from carrying out a hit operationally vital counteroffensive operations.[8] Putin most likely assesses that so long as Russia can retain the initiative and save you Ukraine from carrying out operationally vital counteroffensive operations, Russia can inflict decisive losses on Ukraine over the long-term whilst outlasting Western safety help to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize extra of Ukraine’s financial system and inhabitants for the battle effort.[9]
The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has briefly allowed Ukrainian forces to clutch the battlefield initiative on one sector of the frontline and start contesting Russia’s theater-wide initiative.[10] The Russian army seems to be making an attempt to care for its offensive power in Donetsk Oblast, particularly its offensive operation to clutch Pokrovsk, and most likely hopes that sustained offensive pace in Donetsk Oblast will draw sufficient Ukrainian assets to defensive operations within the space to stop Ukraine from contesting the battlefield initiative in other places by way of exploiting the theater-wide affects of the incursion into Kursk Oblast.[11] Simply because Russian forces are prioritizing the offensive operation on Pokrovsk does no longer imply that Ukraine should come to a decision to prioritize the protection of Pokrovsk over efforts in other places, on the other hand.
Putin and the Russian army command seem to measure luck in japanese Ukraine in explicitly territorial phrases and feature most likely pursued efforts to create wider operational pressures only to toughen efforts to succeed in mentioned territorial goals. Russian forces recently goal to clutch all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and the Russian army most likely measures the luck of Russian offensive operations in japanese Ukraine by way of how a lot nearer they carry Russian forces to this purpose. ISW has lengthy assessed that the Russian efforts to clutch Chasiv Yar or push Ukrainian forces off the east financial institution of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast are pursuing operationally vital goals, however Russian forces have as a substitute an increasing number of prioritized the efforts to clutch Pokrovsk and advance west and southwest of Donetsk Town, an goal this is of quite much less operational importance.[12] Russian forces is also specializing in advancing in those spaces as a result of those sectors of the entrance supply alternatives for better territorial beneficial properties and since those spaces permit Russian forces to advance nearer to the borders of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have sought to create theater-wide pressures on Ukrainian forces very similar to those that Ukraine is now causing on Russia with the incursion in Kursk Oblast, however Putin and the Russian army command have best sought to leverage those pressures to pursue restricted territorial goals and feature forgone pursuing extra operationally vital goals or wider makes an attempt to generate extra vital theater-wide results.
Ukrainian officers have indicated that Ukraine’s operation in Kursk Oblast does no longer have long-term territorial goals however as a substitute objectives to generate theater-wide operational and strategic pressures on Russian forces. Ukrainian officers have publicly mentioned that Ukraine isn’t concerned with conserving territory in Kursk Oblast over the long run and objectives partially to give protection to itself from Russian moves whilst forcing Russian forces to redeploy forces from in other places within the theater and complicating Russian logistics.[13] There are not any discernable operationally vital territorial goals within the space the place Ukraine introduced the incursion into Kursk Oblast, and Ukraine has no longer dedicated the assets to the operation essential to pursue exact operationally vital territorial goals additional into Kursk Oblast, similar to seizing Kursk Town. The luck of the Ukrainian incursion must thus no longer be evaluated with regards to Russian territory seized by way of Ukrainian forces.
The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast has already generated theater-wide operational and strategic pressures on Russian forces, and next levels of combating inside Russia will most likely generate even better pressures on Putin and the Russian army. The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has brought about the Russian army to redeploy as much as 11 battalions from inside Kursk Oblast and 4 Russian power groupings in other places within the theater to the frontline in Kursk Oblast thus far.[14] US officers reportedly advised the New York Occasions in an editorial printed on August 15 that Russia has dedicated reserves to Kursk Oblast that it differently would have dedicated to grinding offensive operations in japanese Ukraine within the coming months.[15] The redeployment of Russian forces and the dedication of parts of operational reserves has allowed Russian forces to sluggish to begin with speedy Ukrainian beneficial properties in Kursk Oblast and get started containing the level of the Ukrainian incursion.[16] Containment is best the primary and most likely least resource-intensive section of the Russian reaction in Kursk Oblast, on the other hand. Putin and the Kremlin will nearly for sure enterprise to retake Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized, as persisting Ukrainian profession of Russian territory can be a strategic blow to Putin’s decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian steadiness, safety, and geopolitical resurgence.[17]
A Russian counteroffensive operation to retake territory seized by way of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast will very most likely require much more manpower, apparatus, and materiel. Russian resources have claimed that Ukrainian forces are consolidating their positions inside Kursk Oblast and construction fortifications, even though it’s miles too early to evaluate how laborious Ukraine forces will protect occupied positions inside Russia towards most likely Russian counteroffensive operations.[18] It’s also too early to evaluate when Russian forces will prevent Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast utterly and clutch the battlefield initiative to release a bigger counteroffensive operation. Russian forces have expended really extensive fight energy at the effort to clutch Pokrovsk, which they started in mid-February 2024 after seizing Avdiivka, and feature since complicated kind of 23 kilometers within the space over six months of probably the most intense combating in Ukraine in 2024.[19] The present Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast seems to be kind of 56 kilometers large and as much as 28 kilometers deep, even though the realm the place Ukrainian forces are consolidating positions is most likely smaller in dimension. Russian forces will most likely must behavior a protracted counteroffensive effort to retake the entire territory seized by way of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast except they carry overwhelming power to undergo, and the Russian army command will most likely must devote further operational reserves and newly generated forces to maintain the trouble.
The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast has additionally pressured a call level on Putin in regards to the long-term strategic necessities of protecting the thousand-kilometer-long global border with northeastern Ukraine, and it’s miles not likely that Russia will behavior extensive counteroffensive operations to push Ukrainian forces again around the border best to forget the global border space as soon as once more and depart it at risk of long run Ukrainian incursions.[20] Putin will most likely order the Russian army command to imagine the manpower and materiel necessities for protecting the global border, even though it’s miles unclear how he’s going to weigh those necessities towards Russian army necessities in Ukraine. The Russian army should imagine manpower and materiel necessities for protecting the global border as a part of its theater-wide crusade design, which is able to impose long-term operational making plans constraints that Russia up to now didn’t face.[21]
Russian forces won’t be able to retain the initiative right through japanese Ukraine indefinitely, and the fruits of Russian offensive operations will provide Ukrainian forces with alternatives to contest the initiative additional. Russia’s ownership of the theater-wide initiative has allowed Russia to resolve the positioning, time, depth, and necessities of combating in Ukraine, and Russian forces have leveraged those advantages to resolve an offensive pace in Ukraine that has allowed the Russian army to behavior extra sustainable offensive efforts and in large part keep away from fruits.[22] Russian forces pursued a protracted effort to ascertain strategic and operational reserves forward of Summer time 2024 to toughen ongoing offensive efforts, and the Russian army has most likely expended and dedicated many of those reserves to offensive operations right through japanese and northeastern Ukraine in Spring 2024 and over the process this summer time.[23] The Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast and the heightened Russian precedence of keeping up the pace of offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast will most likely position better pressure on Russia’s ultimate operational reserves and most likely start to affect Russia’s talent to maintain constant offensive operations right through the theater. Additional Russian redeployments to Kursk Oblast would additionally additional weaken Russia’s talent to maintain offensive operations in northeastern and japanese Ukraine, even though Russian forces are much more likely to start reducing offensive job on lower-priority sectors of the entrance than to take action similarly right through the frontline.
The Russian offensive operation to clutch Pokrovsk is emblematic of the Russian option to the battle in Ukraine that embraces positional war for sluggish creeping advances and seeks to win a battle of attrition. The Russian army command tasked the Central Grouping of Forces with figuring out and exploiting weaknesses in Ukraine’s line of defense following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February 2024.[24] Mechanized parts of the Central Grouping of Forces completed a notable tactical step forward northwest of Avdiivka in mid-April 2024 by way of exploiting exhausted and poorly provided Ukrainian forces, and the Russian army command persisted to take a position further manpower from Russia’s operational reserves to stop offensive operations east of Pokrovsk from culminating for a number of months.[25] Russian forces carried out persistently intense offensive power all alongside the entrance east and southeast of Pokrovsk and opportunistically exploited weaknesses in Ukraine’s defenses to advance on this course, and the Russian army command has tolerated vital manpower losses in change for advancing kind of two sq. kilometers in step with day (kind of 406 sq. kilometers in general) in Pokrovsk Raion during the last six months. Russian forces within the Pokrovsk course have occupied with frontal infantry attacks from small village to small village of their sluggish advance to Pokrovsk and feature spent weeks every now and then seeking to clutch small villages within the space with out making an attempt advance by way of maneuver.
The Russian army command seems to have deserted its efforts to make speedy tactical beneficial properties within the Pokrovsk course and embraced positional war.[26] Putin’s calculus that Russia can proceed sluggish creeping advances indefinitely all through a protracted state of positional war is based on Russia’s manpower and materiel benefit.[27] Russia’s ongoing power technology charges have allowed Russian forces to maintain their present pace of offensive operations right through the frontline by way of producing kind of as many new forces because the Russian army loses in a given duration.[28] Russia’s protection trade is reportedly in a position to generating or refurbishing sufficient armored cars to maintain Russia’s present fee of armored car losses in Ukraine for a minimum of two or 3 years.[29] Putin’s idea of victory rests at the assumption that Ukrainian forces can not gain and maintain the manpower and subject matter required to stop indefinite, sluggish Russian advances or contest the initiative, and Ukrainian forces seem to be actively difficult this assumption in Kursk Oblast.[30]
Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast illustrates how Ukrainian forces can use maneuver war to offset Russian manpower and materiel benefits. Russian forces have general occupied 1,175 sq. kilometers of territory right through all of the Ukrainian theater within the seven months from January and July 2024, as ISW not too long ago assessed.[31] In stark distinction, ISW has noticed claims that Ukraine’s operation in Kursk Oblast complicated kind of 800 sq. kilometers over six days from August 6 to twelve and complicated kind of 28 kilometers deep as of August 17.[32] Once more, the dimensions of the realm seized by way of Ukrainian forces isn’t a trademark of the luck of that operation–it is obtainable right here to turn that restoring maneuver can produce a lot more speedy advances than positional war. The preliminary Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast attacked in large part unprepared, unequipped, and unmanned Russian defensive positions alongside the border, however Ukraine has persisted to leverage maneuver to make speedy advances in Kursk Oblast following the deployment of Russian reinforcements to the realm.[33] Ukraine’s use of maneuver in Kursk Oblast serves for instance of ways Ukrainian maneuver, coupled with operational wonder, may end up in comparably sized beneficial properties in considerably shorter sessions of time with much less manpower and materiel. Extended positional war, against this, will best make Ukraine’s useful resource disadvantages extra pronounced and chronic battle will build up the prices to Ukraine and its companions.[34] Drs. Frederick and Kimberly Kagan famous that the problem of restoring operational maneuver to the battle stays the central downside for either side on the operational degree of battle, and Ukraine’s talent to succeed in speedy maneuver in Kursk Oblast means that Ukrainian forces have internalized courses from the previous months of positional war that can assist Ukraine leverage maneuver war one day.[35]
It is just too early to attract dispositive conclusions in regards to the lasting results that the 2 very other Russian and Ukrainian efforts may have at the process the battle. ISW will proceed to chorus from commenting on Ukrainian operational intent in Kursk Oblast or in other places within the theater past what Ukrainian officers themselves have stated so as to give protection to Ukrainian operational safety, however it’s miles secure to conclude that the operational importance of the incursion in Kursk Oblast is dependent upon how Ukrainian forces leverage the theater-wide pressures the operation has created in next operations that pursue operationally vital goals. ISW additionally considers tests in regards to the operational importance of the conceivable Russian seizure of Pokrovsk to be untimely given the chance that Russian offensive operations right through Donetsk Oblast will culminate within the coming weeks and months at yet-to-be-determined positions. The operational importance of Pokrovsk will most likely rely on Russia’s talent to leverage the seizure of the town in wider maneuver in Donetsk Oblast, which shall be extraordinarily tricky for Russian forces if offensive operations in other places in Donetsk Oblast culminate and within the absence of huge operational reserves. It additionally stays unclear if Russian forces will be capable of clutch Pokrovsk sooner than Russian forces culminate in this sector of the entrance.
ISW gives those observations in regards to the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast and the months-long Russian offensive effort in japanese Ukraine to supply a balanced framework for assessing the importance of the present Russian and Ukrainian operations at the process all of the battle, which is able to stay unsure for the foreseeable long run.
Be aware: ISW does no longer obtain any labeled subject matter from any supply, makes use of best publicly to be had data, and attracts broadly on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially to be had satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the root for those studies. References to all resources used are equipped within the endnotes of each and every replace.
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[12] ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis
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[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081624 ; ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081424 ;
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[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324 ;
[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324 ;
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[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2024; ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081324
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