Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, January 3, 2025
Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 3, 2025, 6:50 pm ET
Click on right here to look ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day along the static maps provide on this record.
Click on right here to look ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on right here to look ISW’s 3-D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (no longer a cell tool) is strongly really useful for the usage of this data-heavy software.
Click on right here to get admission to ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Those maps supplement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day via appearing a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive per month.
Notice: The information cut-off for this product used to be 12 pm ET on January 3. ISW will duvet next studies within the January 4 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky defined the stipulations that will have to be met to push Russia to comply with a “simply peace.” Zelensky mentioned on January 2 that attaining a “simply peace” in long term negotiations – an idea Zelensky highlighted in his December 31 New Yr’s cope with – calls for a robust Ukrainian army, safety promises from Western allies, and Ukraine’s long term club in NATO and the Ecu Union (EU) with a view to deter Russia from renewed aggression in opposition to Ukraine.[1] Zelensky mentioned that Ukraine can’t reach a simply peace with a small army, comparable to “40,000 or 50,000 squaddies” – a connection with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s preliminary call for all over the Istanbul peace talks between Russia and Ukraine in Spring 2022 that Ukraine demilitarize and most effective handle a pressure of kind of 50,000 body of workers.[2] Putin and different Kremlin officers have time and again demanded stipulations for finishing the warfare that quantity to Ukraine’s whole capitulation, together with the elimination of the authentic Ukrainian govt and Ukraine’s demilitarization.[3] Those calls for have no longer modified since 2021.
Ukrainian officers proceed to sign that Ukraine is operating to additional building up its drone and missile functions in toughen of this function. Zelensky mentioned on December 31 that Ukrainian missiles and drones are Ukraine’s “arguments for a simply peace.”[4] Ukrainian Top Minister Denys Shmyhal mentioned on January 3 that Ukraine plans to supply about 3,000 cruise missiles and “drone-missiles” and a minimum of 30,000 long-range drones in 2025.[5] Shmyhal mentioned that Ukraine’s protection commercial base (DIB) may also building up manufacturing capability to about $30 billion value of products and draw in $1 billion in overseas funding in 2025. The Telegraph reported on January 2 that Ukraine is operating to mass produce the “Trembita” cruise missile, which has a 90-mile fluctuate, a 40-pound payload, and prices $10,000 in line with missile to supply.[6]
Zelensky reiterated on January 2 that the Ukrainian charter and Ukrainian legislation limit Ukraine from maintaining presidential and parliamentary elections all over classes of martial legislation.[7] Zelensky mentioned that Ukrainian government will be capable to believe lifting martial legislation when the “sizzling section” of the warfare involves an finish and when Ukraine is in a “robust place” with a “robust military, a robust package deal of guns, [and] safety promises.” Ukraine’s legislation, “At the criminal regime of martial legislation,” at first handed in 2000, states that Ukrainian government can finish martial legislation “equipped that the specter of assault or threat to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity has been eradicated.”[8] Kremlin officers, together with Putin, have time and again used planned misreadings of Ukraine’s legislation and charter to say that Zelensky is an illegitimate president of Ukraine after Ukraine, adhering to the legislation and charter, didn’t cling elections beneath martial legislation in 2024.[9] The Ukrainian govt legally can’t abolish martial legislation whilst Russia continues to assault Ukraine.
Ukraine’s Major Army Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that a number of Russian ships will quickly arrive on the Port of Tartus in Syria to evacuate Russian army property to Libya. The GUR reported on January 3 that the Ivan Gren Ivan Gren-class huge touchdown send, the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class touchdown send, and the Sparta shipment send are scheduled to reach at Tartus on January 5 whilst the Sparta II shipment send and the Ivan Skobelev tanker are scheduled to reach on January 8 to switch Russian army property to an unspecified location in Libya.[10] The GUR up to now reported in mid-December 2024 that Russia had deployed the Ivan Gren, Alexander Otrakovsky, Sparta, and Sparta II from northern Russia to Syria.[11]
Key Takeaways:
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky defined the stipulations that will have to be met to push Russia to comply with a “simply peace.”
Ukrainian officers proceed to sign that Ukraine is operating to additional building up its drone and missile functions in toughen of this function.
Zelensky reiterated on January 2 that the Ukrainian Charter and Ukrainian legislation limit Ukraine from maintaining presidential and parliamentary elections all over classes of martial legislation.
Ukraine’s Major Army Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that a number of Russian ships will quickly arrive on the Port of Tartus in Syria to evacuate Russian army property to Libya.
Russian forces lately complicated close to Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.
The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) continues to toughen its legitimate “Glaz/Groza” reconnaissance and strike unit coordination tool package deal in spite of Russian squaddies’ endured reliance on different advert hoc communications techniques.
We don’t record intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of those actions are well-covered in Western media and do indirectly have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We can proceed to judge and record at the results of those legal actions at the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on struggle in Ukrainian city spaces. We completely condemn Russian violations of the rules of armed struggle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity despite the fact that we don’t describe them in those studies.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian Major Effort – Japanese Ukraine (created from 3 subordinate major efforts)
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the global border with Belgorod Oblast and way to inside of tube artillery fluctuate of Kharkiv Town
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
Russian Mobilization and Pressure Era Efforts
Russian Technological Variations
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces
Vital Task in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Ukrainian and Russian forces endured struggle engagements in Ukraine’s salient in Kursk Oblast on January 3, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complicated to northeastern Leonidovo and northerly Aleksandriya (each southeast of Korenevo).[12] ISW has no longer seen affirmation of those claims, then again. Russian milbloggers claimed that preventing is ongoing southeast of Korenevo close to Leonidovo, Aleksandriya, Viktorovka, Nikolaevo-Darino, and Kruglenkoye and south of Sudzha close to Kurilovka.[13] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have no longer been in a position to completely clutch the initiative in Kursk Oblast.[14] Drone operators of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (seventh VDV Department), components of the “Tigr” Volunteer Detachment (Russian Military Battle Reserve [BARS]), reconnaissance components of the “Anvar Spetsnaz” detachment (perhaps regarding the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment), and components of the “Veterany” Attack Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly running in Kursk Oblast.[15]
A Russian court docket lately ordered Russian web era and telecommunications corporate Yandex to take away or blur maps and images of considered one of Russia’s biggest oil refineries because of Ukrainian drone moves at the facility.[16] Russian opposition shops Astra and Mediazona reported that the ability, which the court docket paperwork discussed most effective via cope with, is Rosneft’s Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast.[17] Ukrainian forces struck the Ryazan facility, which gives the Russian army, in March, Would possibly, and July 2024, with one supply reporting a strike in August that ISW has been not able to verify.[18] The court docket’s order represents the primary judicial transfer to obfuscate details about strategically vital protection business amenities after a success Ukrainian moves.[19]
Russian Major Effort – Japanese Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the global border with Belgorod Oblast and way to inside of tube artillery fluctuate of Kharkiv Town)
Russian forces endured offensive operations close to Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv Town) on January 2 and three however didn’t make any showed advances.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 3 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked 4 occasions close to Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv Town).[21] Ukraine’s Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Vadym Mysnyk reported on January 3 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance teams are most commonly running all over deficient climate stipulations within the border spaces of northern Ukraine with drone and artillery toughen.[22] Mysnyk added that the Russian sabotage teams running within the space have considerably diminished ranges of coaching.
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northerly Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces endured offensive operations alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on January 3 however didn’t make any showed advances. A Russian milblogger endured to say on January 3 that Russian forces crossed the Zherebets River and complicated to Ivanivka (northwest of Kreminna), however ISW has nonetheless no longer seen affirmation of this declare.[23] Russian forces endured floor assaults north of Kupyansk close to Zapadne and Dvorichna; southeast of Kupyansk close to Zahryzove and Lozova; west of Svatove close to Nadiya and Kruhlyakivka; northwest of Kreminna close to Makiivka, Terny, and Cherneshchyna; and southwest of Kreminna close to Hryhorivka and within the Serebryanske woodland space on January 2 and three.[24]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces endured offensive operations northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka on January 2 and three however didn’t make any showed advances.[25]
Russian forces endured offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar course on January 3 however didn’t make any showed advances. Russian forces attacked inside of and close to Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar close to Bila Hora, Predtechyne, and Stupochky on January 2 and three.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 3 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar.[27] Drone operators of the Russian seventh Army Base (forty ninth Mixed Palms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly running close to Chasiv Yar.[28]
Russian forces endured offensive operations within the Toretsk course on January 3 however didn’t make any showed advances. Russian forces attacked inside of Toretsk, northeast of Toretsk close to Dyliivka, west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka, and south of Toretsk close to Niu York on January 2 and three.[29] The commander of a Ukrainian mortar battery running within the Toretsk course mentioned that Russian forces are disguising themselves the usage of civilian clothes with a view to bypass Ukrainian frontline positions – a warfare crime, if showed.[30] An officer in a Ukrainian brigade running within the Toretsk course mentioned that Russian forces are the usage of infantry teams created from two to twenty squaddies and are expanding the usage of drones with fiber optic cables which might be immune to Ukrainian digital war (EW) countermeasures.[31] The officer mentioned that Russian forces are bettering and lengthening the levels of the fiber optic cable drones and that the drones these days have a variety of over 10 kilometers. A Ukrainian brigade running within the Toretsk course reported that Russian forces are most commonly the usage of infantry to habits attack operations and wish to assault in dangerous climate.[32] Drone operators of the Russian ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously the first Donetsk Other folks’s Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly running within the Toretsk course.[33]
Russian forces lately complicated within the Pokrovsk course amid endured offensive operations within the space on January 3. Geolocated photos revealed on January 3 signifies that Russian forces lately complicated north of Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and alongside the T-05-15 Pokrovsk-Novotroitske freeway northeast of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complicated to Zvirove (southeast of Pokrovsk), northwest of Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk), one kilometer north of Vovkove (southwest of Pokrovsk), and against Nadezhdynka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[35] ISW has no longer seen affirmation of those claims, then again. Russian forces carried out offensive operations close to Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk close to Vodyane Druhe, Baranivka, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Dachenske, Shevchenko, Zelene, and Novyi Trud; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Pishchane, Zvirove, Solone, Kotlyne, Uspenivka, and Novovasylivka on January 2 and three.[36] Parts of the Russian “Vega” Spetsnaz Detachment (twenty fourth Spetsnaz Brigade, Major Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Basic Team of workers [GRU]) are reportedly running within the Pokrovsk course.[37]
Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets mentioned that the Russian army command is redeploying components of the forty first CAA (Central Army District [CMD]) from east of Pokrovsk to the realm of duty (AoR) of the second CAA (CMD) south and southwest of Pokrovsk.[38] Mashovets mentioned that components of the 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Department, second CAA) and components of the fifty fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty first CAA) are attacking against Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) with a view to reduce the T-04-06 Pokrovsk-Mezhove freeway. Mashovets mentioned that components of the ninetieth Tank Department (forty first CAA) are concentrated south of Pokrovsk, with components of its eightieth and 239th tank regiments and 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment attacking alongside the Novovasylivka-Novoyelizavetivka line against Uspenivka (west of Novovasylivka) and Nadezhdynka (west of Novoyelizavetivka). Mashovets’ statements counsel that the Russian army command is that specialize in the spaces south and southwest of Pokrovsk, versus east of Pokrovsk. That is in keeping with ISW’s review that Russian forces is also a minimum of quickly moving their focal point from the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the east and west to creating opportunistic advances west against the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[39]
Russian forces reportedly lately complicated close to Kurakhove amid endured offensive operations within the space on January 3. Mashovets mentioned that Ukrainian forces most probably lately totally withdrew from the Kurakhivske Thermal Energy Plant (TPP) west of Kurakhove and that Russian forces have seized Shevchenko (northwest of Kurakhove).[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Slovyanka (northwest of Kurakhove), however ISW has no longer seen affirmation of this declare.[41] Russian forces carried out offensive operations close to Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove close to Slovyanka, Petropavlivka and Shevchenko; and west of Kurakhove close to Dachne on January 2 and three.[42] Mashovets mentioned that components of the Russian fifth and a hundred and tenth motorized rifle brigades (each 51st CAA, SMD), sixth Tank Regiment, 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 67th Rifle Regiment (all ninetieth Tank Department) are attacking north of the Vovcha River within the Shevchenko-Andriivka, Sontsivka-Petropavlivka, and Zorya-Slovyanka instructions (all northwest of Kurakhove).[43] Mashovets mentioned that components of the twentieth and one hundred and fiftieth motorized rifle divisions (each eighth CAA, SMD) are running close to Maksymilyanivka (east of Kurakhove), Dalne (south of Kurakhove), and Uspenivka (south of Kurakhove). Mashovets mentioned that components of the fifth and a hundred and tenth motorized rifle brigades (51st CAA) also are running close to Dalne. Parts of the Russian ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly running close to Sontsivka (northwest of Kurakhove), and components of the 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth CAA) are reportedly running within the Kurakhove course.[44]
Russian forces lately complicated northwest of Vuhledar amid endured offensive operations within the space on January 3. Geolocated photos revealed on January 2 presentations that Russian forces lately complicated in fields south of Rozlyv (northwest of Vuhledar).[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complicated 600 meters against Andriivka (northwest of Vuhledar and west of Kurakhove), however ISW has no longer seen affirmation of this declare.[46] Russian forces endured offensive operations northwest of Vuhledar close to Yantarne, Kostyantynopil, Kostyantynopolske, and Rozlyv on January 2 and three.[47] Mashovets mentioned that components of the thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, EMD) and thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Military Corps [AC], EMD), bolstered via components of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) and 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (fifth CAA, EMD), are attacking close to the Sukhi Yaly River.[48] Attack components of the Russian fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade and one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Department, supported via artillery components of the 238th Artillery Brigade, are reportedly running close to Ulakly (northwest of Vuhledar and west of Kurakhove).[49]
Russian forces endured offensive operations close to Velyka Novosilka on January 3 however didn’t make any showed advances. Russian forces carried out offensive operations close to Velyka Novosilka itself, southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Vremivka, and west of Velyka Novosilka close to Novosilka on January 2 and three.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 3 that Ukrainian forces periodically habits counterattacks close to Velyka Novosilka.[51] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade running within the Vremivka course reported on January 3 that Russian forces are essentially involved in disrupting Ukrainian floor traces of conversation (GLOCs) supplying forces within the Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka instructions.[52] The spokesperson added that small Russian infantry teams are coming into contested “grey zones” to check out to advance to Ukrainian positions.
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Take care of frontline positions and protected rear spaces in opposition to Ukrainian moves)
Russian forces endured offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast however didn’t make any showed advances on January 3. Russian forces carried out offensive operations northeast of Robotyne close to Bilohirya and northwest of Robotyne close to Novoandriivka on January 2 and three.[53] Geolocated photos revealed on January 3 reportedly presentations drone operators of the Russian seventieth Motorized Rifle Regiment (forty second Motorized Rifle Department, 58th Mixed Palms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) putting Ukrainian forces in jap Bilohirya.[54] Drone operators of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Department (seventh VDV Department) are reportedly running within the Orikhiv course (north of Robotyne).[55]
Russian forces endured assaults within the Dnipro course together with close to Kozatskyi Island (east of Kherson Town) on January 2 and three.[56] Drone operators of the Russian eightieth Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) reportedly proceed running within the Kherson course.[57]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Purpose: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and at the frontline)
Russian forces carried out a sequence of drone moves in opposition to Ukraine at the evening of January 2 to three. The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Russian forces introduced 93 Shahed and different strike and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast and Bryansk and Oryol oblasts.[58] The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Ukrainian forces downed 60 Shahed and different drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; that Ukrainian countermeasures led to 26 decoy drones to turn out to be “in the neighborhood misplaced” and that one drone remained in Ukrainian airspace as of 0900 native time. The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Russian drones struck a number of personal enterprises and home complexes in Donetsk and Chernihiv oblasts and that particles from downed drones broken residential properties and civilian automobiles in Kyiv Oblast. Ukrainian officers mentioned that Russian moves additionally broken residential spaces at the outskirts of Chernihiv Town and the non-public sector of Sumy Town.[59] Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk reported that the Russian strike in opposition to Kyiv Town on January 1 broken administrative structures of the Verkhovna Rada.[60]
The Hajun Challenge, an unbiased Belarusian tracking crew, reported on January 3 {that a} general of 395 Russian drones entered Belarusian airspace in 2024.[61] The Hajun Challenge mentioned that 145 Russian drones entered Belarusian airspace all over December 2024 by myself, of which 36 returned to Ukrainian and Russian airspace and 109 went lacking. The Hajun Challenge added that air defenses downed 10 Shahed drones over Latvian and Belarusian airspace in 2024.
Russian Mobilization and Pressure Era Efforts (Russian goal: Increase struggle energy with out engaging in basic mobilization)
The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) continues to toughen its legitimate “Glaz/Groza” reconnaissance and strike unit coordination tool package deal in spite of Russian squaddies’ endured reliance on different advert hoc communications techniques. Russian MoD-run tv community TV Zvezda broadcasted Russian squaddies on the Mikhailovsky Army Artillery Academy in St. Petersburg coaching at the “Glaz/Groza” struggle operations coordination tool, which gives arranged command and management (C2) purposes to Russian devices at the frontline.[62] Russian forces have in large part trusted advert hoc communications techniques to coordinate struggle operations in Ukraine by way of social media messaging packages, and a former Russian Typhoon-Z trainer and milblogger up to now claimed that the Russian MoD has no longer presented its legitimate “Glaz/Groza” software at a large sufficient scale for Russian forces to undertake.[63]
Russian squaddies proceed to whinge that Russian army commanders are abusing squaddies and hiding top casualty charges. Russian opposition shops Astra and Mobilization Information reported on January 3 that Russian officials of army unit 29593 (both the 1440th Motorized Rifle Regiment or the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment [reportedly of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps]) are confiscating the non-public telephones of squaddies and forcing injured squaddies to pay their platoon commanders 20,000 to 50,000 rubles (about $181 to $452) with a view to obtain remedy at hospitals.[64] The opposition shops reported that the Russian command of the unit will have transferred injured squaddies to “unit 44744” – that could be a pretend unit – with a view to cover the top casualty charges of unit 29593.[65] ISW has seen prior studies of Russian officials bodily abusing subordinates and extorting them for cash, most probably because of deficient command coaching and self-discipline.[66]
Russian Technological Variations (Russian goal: Introduce technological inventions to optimize techniques to be used in Ukraine)
Not anything vital to record.
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed spaces; forcibly combine Ukrainian voters into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance techniques)
ISW isn’t reporting on actions in Russian-occupied spaces as of late.
Vital task in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Not anything vital to record.
Notice: ISW does no longer obtain any labeled subject material from any supply, makes use of most effective publicly to be had data, and attracts broadly on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially to be had satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial records as the foundation for those studies. References to all resources used are equipped within the endnotes of each and every replace.
[1] dot media/916671-pro-trampa-mir-nato-ta-es-golovni-tezi-zelenskogo-v-intervu-telemarafonu/;
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[59] ; ; ; ; dot media/chernihiv/917333-u-cernigovi-buli-cutni-vibuhi-so-vidomo/ ; ; ; ; ; dot com.ua/2025/01/03/vorozha-aviacziya-zavdala-udaru-po-sumah/
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[61] ; dot media/917353-za-2024-rik-do-bilorusi-zaletilo-395-rosijskih-droniv-belaruski-gaun/
[62] dot ua/united kingdom/information/rosijska-armiya-vprovadzhuye-taktychnu-systemu-glaz-groza/; dot ru/video/films-online/202412141059-2LC72.html/202412201151-MCD4Q.html;
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[64] dot com/wall-119368900_246954; dot ua/ru/suppose/boi-ukrainskoj-armii-protiv-rossijan-na-vostoke-novye-vyzovy-i-uhrozy-989459.html
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