Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluate, February 1, 2025
Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
February 1, 2025, 3pm ET
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day along the static maps provide on this record.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s three-D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (no longer a cell software) is strongly really useful for the use of this data-heavy software.
Click on right here to get right of entry to ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Those maps supplement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day via appearing a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive per thirty days.
Be aware: The information cut-off for this product used to be 11:30am ET on February 1. ISW will duvet next experiences within the February 2 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluate.
Russian forces carried out a large-scale collection of drone and missile moves in opposition to Ukraine at the evening of January 31 to February 1. The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Russian forces released seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and occupied Crimea; seven Iskander-Ok cruise missiles from occupied Crimea and Donetsk Oblast; 8 Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 airplane; 8 Kh-101/55 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers; 10 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from tactical airplane over Voronezh Oblast; two Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles from the Black Sea; and 123 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 56 Shahed and decoy drones; that 61 drones have been “misplaced,” most likely because of Ukrainian digital conflict (EW) interference; and that Ukrainian countermeasures averted an unspecified however important collection of Russian missiles from attaining their goals. The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Russian ballistic missiles had a better luck price, and ISW continues to evaluate that Russian forces are most likely leveraging ballistic missiles in strike applications since Ukraine simplest has a couple of air protection programs appropriate for intercepting such missiles.[2] Ukrainian officers, together with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, reported {that a} Russian Kh-22 missile struck a residential development in Poltava Town; that Russian ballistic missiles struck the historic middle of Odesa Town, and broken a United Countries Tutorial, Clinical and Cultural Group (UNESCO) secure development; and that drones broken residential spaces, warehouses, and personal assets in Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts.[3] The Norwegian Ministry of Overseas Affairs showed that Russian forces struck a space close to the place Norwegian diplomats have been staying in Odesa Town.[4] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russia’s in a single day moves focused Ukrainian fuel and effort amenities that enhance the Ukrainian protection commercial base (DIB).[5]
A contemporary Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian naval drone means that Russian forces have evolved a brand new option to offset Ukrainian features within the Black Sea. The Russian MoD reported on February 1 that Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) used a drone to wreck a Ukrainian naval drone within the Black Sea.[6] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian BSF released a Kronshtadt Orion missile-capable drone from an unspecified naval asset and that this strike is also the primary documented case of Russian forces leveraging a naval asset to deploy drones able to destroying Ukrainian naval drones.[7] Any other Russian milblogger known as on Russian government to extend the manufacturing of guns very similar to the drone-launched X-UAV missiles (TKB-1030) to successfully struggle Ukrainian forces’ naval drone features as it’s now too dangerous for Russia to function helicopters close to the Black Sea.[8] Ukrainian forces have demonstrated their talent to down Russian Mi-8 helicopters running over the Black Sea the use of missiles released from Magura V5 naval strike drones, and the February 1 BSF strike means that Russian forces have evolved a brand new means to take a look at to offset this Ukrainian naval drone adaptation.[9]
Key Takeaways:
Russian forces carried out a large-scale collection of drone and missile moves in opposition to Ukraine at the evening of January 31 to February 1.
A contemporary Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian naval drone means that Russian forces have evolved a brand new option to offset Ukrainian features within the Black Sea.
Ukrainian forces not too long ago complex close to Toretsk, and Russian forces not too long ago complex close to Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
We don’t record intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of those actions are well-covered in Western media and do indirectly have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We can proceed to guage and record at the results of those prison actions at the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on struggle in Ukrainian city spaces. We completely condemn Russian violations of the regulations of armed war and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity even supposing we don’t describe them in those experiences.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian Major Effort – Jap Ukraine (made out of 3 subordinate primary efforts)
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and option to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
Russian Mobilization and Power Era Efforts
Russian Technological Diversifications
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces
Vital Job in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian forces endured offensive operations within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 1 however didn’t make any showed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complex close to Guyevo (south of Sudzha), Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha), and Nikolayevo-Darino (east of Sudzha); 400 meters close to Kurilovka; and greater than 150 meters in Makhnovka (each south of Sudzha), however ISW has no longer noticed affirmation of those claims.[10] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade running in Kursk Oblast mentioned that Russian forces are expanding guided go with the flow bomb moves in opposition to Kursk Oblast.[11] The spokesperson mentioned that Ukrainian forces not too long ago destroyed about 19 Russian heavy and light-weight armored cars throughout an unsuccessful Russian assault, and then Russian forces switched to attacking in small infantry teams. Components of the Russian BARS-Kursk volunteer detachment are reportedly running in Korenevsky Raion; parts of the “Pyatnashka” Global Volunteer Brigade are reportedly running in Kursk Oblast; parts of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Kashtan” Detachment are reportedly running close to Berdin (northeast of Sudzha); and parts of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly running close to Nikolayevo-Darino.[12]
Russian Major Effort – Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and option to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town)
Russian forces endured restricted offensive operations close to Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv Town) on January 31 and February 1.[13] The Ukrainian Normal Body of workers printed a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces not too long ago complex to northern Zelene (north of Kharkiv Town).[14]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northerly Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces endured offensive operations within the Kupyansk course on February 1. The Ukrainian Normal Body of workers printed a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces not too long ago complex west of Orlyanka (east of Kupyansk).[15] A Russian supply claimed that Russian forces seized Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk), however ISW has no longer noticed affirmation of this declare.[16] Russian forces carried out offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and alongside the world border close to Topoli; north of Kupyansk close to Dvorichna; east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka and Stepova Novoselivka; and south of Kupyansk close to Hlushkivka on January 31 and February 1.[17] A Russian supply claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked close to Dvorichna.[18] A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade running within the Kupyansk course mentioned that Russian infantry attacked in teams of 2 to 30 staff.[19] The spokesperson mentioned that Russian forces first assault with much less educated infantry who determine Ukrainian firing positions, and then higher educated infantry assault on Ukrainian forces’ flanks. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces deal with positions at the northern and western outskirts of Novomlynsk (northeast of Kupyansk and Dvorichna).[20] Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets mentioned that Ukrainian forces additionally deal with positions in northern Zapadne (north of Kupyansk and southwest of Dvorichna).[21] Mashovets mentioned that parts of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Department (sixth Mixed Palms Military [CAA], Leningrad Army District [LMD]), bolstered via parts of the Russian Volunteer Corps, are running close to Dvorichna and Zapadne.
Russian forces endured offensive operations within the Borova course on February 1 however didn’t make any showed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complex west of Makiivka (southeast of Borova), however ISW has no longer noticed affirmation of this declare.[22] Russian forces carried out offensive operations northeast of Borova close to Zahyrzove, Lovoza, Bohuslavka, and Pishchane and southeast of Borova close to Novoyehorivka and Makiivka and against Novomykhailivka on January 31 and February 1.[23] Mashovets mentioned that parts of the Russian second Motorized Rifle Department and forty seventh Tank Department (either one of the first Guards Tank Military [GTA], Moscow Army District [MMD]) are running close to Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[24] A Russian milblogger endured to say that the Russian MoD’s January 20 declare that Russian forces seized Novoyehorivka is wrong and inflicting useless losses amongst parts of the 84th Reconnaissance Battalion (twentieth CAA, MMD) that proceed to assault the agreement.[25]
Russian forces endured offensive operations within the Lyman course on February 1 however didn’t make any showed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complex west of Terny (west of Lyman), Ivanivka, and Novosadove (each northwest of Lyman), however ISW has no longer noticed affirmation of this declare.[26] Russian forces carried out offensive operations northeast of Lyman close to Terny, Yampolivka and Kolodyazi and against Zelena Dolyne and west of Lyman close to Torske on January 31 and February 1.[27] Components of the Russian sixteenth Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Normal Body of workers’s Major Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly running close to the Serebryanske wooded area house east of Lyman.[28]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces endured offensive operations within the Siversk course on February 1 however didn’t advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka, east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk close to Spirne on January 31 and February 1.[29] Ukraine’s Khortytsia Staff of Forces reported on February 1 that Russian forces carried out a mechanized attack of an unspecified echelon close to Verkhnokamyanske and that Ukrainian forces broken two armored preventing cars concerned within the attack.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 1 that tough terrain and Ukrainian defenses are slowing Russian advances in Bilohorivka.[31] Ukrainian Luhansk Staff of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets mentioned on February 1 that Russian forces running within the Siversk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk instructions deal with the tactical reserves had to behavior rotations.[32]
Russian forces not too long ago complex south of Chasiv Yar amid endured offensive operations within the house on February 1. Geolocated pictures printed on January 31 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago complex south of Chasiv Yar.[33] Russian forces carried out floor assaults close to Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar close to Block-9 mine, Stupochky, Bila Hora, and Predtechyne on January 31 and February 1.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within the Pivnichnyi Microraion (northern Chasiv Yar).[35] Components of the Russian “Pyatnashka” Global Volunteer Brigade; 88th “Hispaniola” Volunteer Brigade and Sever-V Brigade (either one of the Russian Volunteer Corps); third Airborne (VDV) Battalion and 1065th VDV Artillery Regiment (either one of the 98th VDV Department) are reportedly running in and close to Chasiv Yar.[36]
Ukrainian forces not too long ago complex in northern Toretsk amid endured offensive operations within the house on February 1. Geolocated pictures printed on February 31 signifies that Ukrainian forces not too long ago complex in northern Toretsk.[37] The Russian MoD claimed on January 31 that parts of the Russian one hundred and first Separate Rifle Regiment (most likely 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, previously 1st Donetsk Other folks’s Republic Military Corps [DNR AC], Southern Army District [SMD]) seized Krymske (north of Toretsk).[38] ISW these days does no longer assess that Russian forces have complex in Krymske, alternatively. Russian forces endured attacking close to Toretsk and Krymske on January 31 and February 1.[39] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade running within the Toretsk course mentioned on February 1 that the Russian command most commonly deploys mobilized staff from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to assault within the house.[40] The officer famous that Russian forces every so often devote well-equipped and educated attack teams from different unspecified spaces of the frontline to attack operations within the Toretsk course.
Russian forces not too long ago complex within the Pokrovsk course amid endured offensive operations within the house on February 1. Geolocated pictures printed on January 30 and 31 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago marginally complex northwest of Kotlyne (west of Pokrovsk) and not too long ago complex at the northern outskirts of Nadiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[41] Russian forces endured attacking Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk close to Zelene Pole, Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Novotoretske, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Sribne, Udachne, Uspenivka, Zvirove, Novooleksandrivka, and Kotlyarivka on January 31 and February 1.[42] Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets mentioned that parts of the 228th and 428th motorized rifle regiments, and sixth and eightieth tank regiments (90 Tank Department, forty first Mixed Palms Military [CAA], Central Army District [CMD]) are running within the Nadiivka-Novoandriivka house.[43]
Russian forces not too long ago complex within the Kurakhove course amid endured offensive operations within the house on February 1. Geolocated pictures printed on January 31 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago complex south of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[44] Russian forces endured attacking west of Kurakhove close to Dachne, Ulakly, Andriivka, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove close to Rozdolne and Zelenivka on January 31 and February 1.[45] Mashovets mentioned that most likely parts of the Russian 67th Rifle Regiment or 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (either one of the ninetieth Tank Department) are attacking Andriivka from the northeast and that parts of the one hundred and tenth and 114th motorized rifle brigade (51st CAA) are attacking Andriivka from Shevchenko (simply east of Andriivka).[46] Mashovets mentioned that parts of the Russian thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, Jap Army District [EMD]) and thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Military Corps, EMD) are attacking Dachne from the Zelenivka-Yantarne house (southwest of Kurakhove) and parts of the 20 th and one hundred and fiftieth motorized rifle divisions (eighth CAA, SMD) are attacking Dachne from the east.
The Ukrainian Normal Body of workers printed a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces seized Velyka Novosilka.[47] Russian forces endured offensive operations west of Velyka Novosilka close to Novosilka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Novopil on January 31 and February 1.[48] Components of the Russian third Battalion of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Department, fifth CAA, EMD) are reportedly running close to Velyka Novosilka.[49] Mashovets mentioned that parts of the Russian fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are reportedly running within the spaces north via southwest of Velyka Novosilka.[50]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Take care of frontline positions and protected rear spaces in opposition to Ukrainian moves)
The Ukrainian Normal Body of workers printed a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces not too long ago complex northeast of Hulyaipole close to Olhivske, southeast of Hulyaipole close to Stepanivka, south of Hulyaipole close to Dorozhnyanka, and southwest of Hulyaipole close to Zahirne.[51]
Russian forces not too long ago complex north of Robotyne amid endured offensive operations within the Zaporizhia course on February 1. The Ukrainian Normal Body of workers printed a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces not too long ago complex south of Mala Tokmachka (north of Robotyne).[52] Russian forces attacked north of Robotyne close to Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne close to Shcherbaky and Nesteryanka on January 31 and February 1.[53] Drone operators of the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Mixed Palms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) reportedly proceed to strike Ukrainian positions within the Zaporizhia course.[54]
Russian forces endured restricted offensive operations within the Dnipro course on January 31 and February 1 however didn’t advance.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and at the frontline)
See topline textual content.
Russian Mobilization and Power Era Efforts (Russian goal: Enlarge struggle energy with out engaging in basic mobilization)
Not anything important to record.
Russian Technological Diversifications (Russian goal: Introduce technological inventions to optimize programs to be used in Ukraine)
Russian milbloggers proceed to whinge about issues of Russian armored cars. A Russian milblogger complained on February 1 that the Russian army is suffering to move infantry in frontline spaces on armored cars and that Russian forces are struggling top losses throughout delivery — most likely because of Ukrainian drone moves.[55] The milblogger criticized the Russian MoD’s unwillingness in earlier many years to innovate armored cars and known as for Russia to expand an analog to america M113 armored staff service.[56]
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed spaces; forcibly combine Ukrainian voters into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance programs)
ISW isn’t publishing protection of actions in Russian-occupied spaces as of late.
Vital task in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Not anything important to record.
Be aware: ISW does no longer obtain any categorized subject matter from any supply, makes use of simplest publicly to be had knowledge, and attracts broadly on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially to be had satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial records as the foundation for those experiences. References to all assets used are equipped within the endnotes of each and every replace.
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[45] ttps://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl ; ; ; ; ; ;
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