Today: Dec 17, 2024

Institute for the Find out about of Struggle

Institute for the Find out about of Struggle
November 17, 2024


Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Overview, November 16, 2024
Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, and Frederick W. Kagan
November 16, 2024, 6:15pm ET
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day-to-day along the static maps provide on this record.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s 3-d management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (no longer a cellular instrument) is strongly really helpful for the usage of this data-heavy software.
Click on right here to get admission to ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Those maps supplement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day-to-day via appearing a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive per month.
Notice: The information cut-off for this product was once 11:45 am ET on November 16. ISW will duvet next reviews within the November 17 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Overview.
Ukrainian drone operations proceed to play a essential function in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and fighting Russian forces from totally exploiting Ukraine’s ongoing manpower constraints. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said all over an interview with Ukrainian media printed on November 16 that Russian forces are these days advancing alongside the frontline due partly to lowered Ukrainian morale exacerbated via delays in staffing and equipping new Ukrainian brigades and granting frontline Ukrainian defenders essential relaxation and rotation.[1] Zelensky stressed out the significance of status up new brigades to interchange and give a boost to Ukrainian forces these days serving at the frontline however famous that Russian forces additionally proceed to take vital manpower losses in trade for minimum positive aspects. Zelensky estimated that Russian forces are these days dropping between 1,500 and a couple of,000 troops according to day in Ukraine and assessed that Russian forces can’t deal with their fee of advance whilst taking losses at this scale.
Zelensky’s acknowledgement of morale problems and manpower constraints amongst frontline Ukrainian infantry means that Ukrainian drone operations are most probably taking part in an oversized function in protecting towards and causing losses on advancing Russian forces. Zelensky famous all over the interview that Russian advances have already slowed in some instructions, and Ukrainian officers have prior to now seen that Ukrainian drone operations have performed a task in slowing Russian advances to a foot tempo.[2] A Ukrainian drone operator said in August 2024 that Russian forces have been ready to advance extra effectively within the Pokrovsk route via carrying out flooring assaults in teams of 2 to 4 squaddies underneath the duvet of timber, making them tougher for Ukrainian drone operators to come across.[3] Next Ukrainian reporting steered that Russian forces started using this tactic extra extensively all over the Pokrovsk route in September and October 2024.[4] A Russian milblogger and previous Hurricane-Z trainer famous on November 16 that those small, infantry-led attacks aren’t the best tactic for expedient advances within the rural settlements and fields close to Selydove, the place Russian forces have little or no protection from Ukrainian drone operations.[5] The milblogger steered that Russian forces can these days handiest carry reinforcements and provides ahead when Ukrainian drone operators are engaged in some other space of the frontline. The milblogger famous that unspecified “issues,” most likely regarding Ukrainian drone operations or the Russian army command’s insistence on carrying out unnecessarily expensive infantry attacks, proceed to impede Russian forces’ skill to advance extra unexpectedly alongside the frontline and completely exploit Ukraine’s manpower constraints.
Ukrainian drone operations have additionally been an important in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver all over the frontline, specifically all over early Summer season 2024 when Ukrainian forces have been dealing with critical artillery shortages because of delays in Western safety help.[6] A success Ukrainian drone moves towards Russian armored automobiles within the Pokrovsk route in June 2024 will have performed a task within the Russian army command’s resolution to restrict mechanized attacks on this route.[7] Ukrainian drone operations have additionally performed a very powerful function in repelling Russian mechanized attacks in Kursk and Donetsk oblasts and close to Kupyansk.[8] Russian forces have tried to innovate and deploy more practical drone coverage programs for armored automobiles and tanks in contemporary months, however even essentially the most “a hit” Russian mechanized attacks that experience resulted in different kilometers of positive aspects have generated vital armor losses because of Ukrainian drone moves.[9] Ukraine’s demonstrated skill to strike Russian mechanized columns successfully has avoided Russian forces from carrying out mechanized breakthroughs and exploitations at scale. ISW has prior to now assessed that the Russian army command would possibly not ready to simply accept the present scale and fee of Russian automobile losses within the coming months and years given the restrictions on Russia’s protection business manufacturing, declining Soviet-era automobile stockpiles, and the Russian army’s failure to reach operationally vital territorial advances via mechanized maneuver.[10] Additional enhancements to Ukraine’s drone functions and frequently bettering integration of Ukrainian drones with flooring operations stay essential to Ukraine’s skill to protect towards advancing Russian forces and unencumber occupied territory in long run counteroffensive operations.                 
Zelensky emphasised that Ukraine will have to input any long run negotiations from a place of energy as Russian President Vladimir Putin isn’t fascinated about a negotiated agreement — regardless of the negotiating platform or mediator — that leads to anything else not up to Ukrainian capitulation. Zelensky said that Ukraine will have to be “bolstered via some essential parts” to barter with Putin, emphasizing that Ukraine can’t input negotiations from a place of weak spot.[11] Zelensky said that Putin does no longer need peace however would nonetheless be keen to return to the negotiating desk as a way to cut back Russia’s diplomatic isolation and to safe concessions and Ukraine’s capitulation. Zelensky said that it will be important that any negotiation platform and doable meditators needless to say Russia violated Ukrainian territorial integrity and world regulation via invading Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 and remarked that his conversations with US President-elect Donald Trump display that Trump is “at the aspect of supporting Ukraine” and has listened to Ukraine’s place. Zelensky concluded that Ukraine will have to do the whole thing to finish the warfare via diplomatic approach in 2025. ISW not too long ago assessed that the Kremlin is making an attempt to dictate the phrases of any doable “peace” negotiations with Ukraine prematurely of US President-elect Donald Trump’s inauguration.[12] The Kremlin has persistently demonstrated that it’s unwilling to compromise at the phrases of any imaginable negotiations whilst strongly indicating that the Kremlin’s longstanding purpose of whole Ukrainian capitulation stays unchanged.[13] Any long run negotiations, regardless of the platform or mediator, would require Ukraine to go into talks from a place of energy that forces Putin to switch his calculus, interact in excellent religion talks, and settle for compromises.
Russian forces are innovating their long-range strike programs to incorporate decoy Shahed drones and Shahed drones with thermobaric warheads, more likely to confuse and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses and building up the damages of long-range moves. The Related Press (AP) reported on November 16 that Russia’s Alabuga Particular Financial Zone (SEZ), which assembles Iranian-provided Shahed drones, has been generating “masses” of decoy drones and not too long ago started generating drones with thermobaric warheads.[14] A Ukrainian army and electronics skilled instructed the AP that greater than part of the long-range strike drones that Russia has introduced at Ukraine not too long ago were decoys. Appearing Head of the Ukrainian Air Drive Press Place of job Colonel Yuriy Ihnat instructed the AP that the decoy drones are indistinguishable from armed Shahed drones on Ukrainian radar programs, forcing Ukrainian forces to deplete firepower and use digital struggle (EW) mechanisms to down them. The AP famous that Russian forces try to benefit from exhausted Ukrainian air defenses to get extra tough guns, akin to cruise and ballistic missiles, via Ukraine’s air protection umbrella. The AP additionally famous that the decoy drones additionally permit Russian forces to find Ukrainian air protection places sooner than Ukrainian air defenses and EW down the decoys, however that Russia is the usage of different digital elements, together with Ukrainian SIM playing cards and Starlink programs, to make the drone variants extra immune to jamming. The Ukrainian Air Drive has an increasing number of been reporting that Russian forces are launching strike drones of an unknown kind — most probably regarding the decoy drones — all over common in a single day drone and missile moves on Ukraine.[15] The Ukrainian Air Forces has additionally been noting that expanding numbers of drones have turn into “misplaced” in Ukrainian airspace, most probably because of Ukrainian EW countermeasures — suggesting that Ukrainian forces were a hit in adapting their EW to down the brand new Russian decoy drones. Decoy drones are affordable, on the other hand, and the longer they continue to be airborne in Ukrainian airspace, the extra the decoys can distract Ukrainian air defenses and supply concentrated on for long run Russian moves. Ihnat reported that Russian forces didn’t use any decoy drones in a single day on November 14-15 — the primary example in weeks.[16]
The Ukrainian army and electronics skilled said that the thermobaric drones, which Russian forces started fielding in Summer season 2024, account for between 3 and 5 p.c of the long-range strike drones Russia has been launching at Ukraine not too long ago.[17] Ukrainian military-focused resources not too long ago reported that the thermobaric warheads on Shahed drones have 50 to 52 kilogram warheads and that Russian forces are equipping Shahed variants with levels as much as 140 kilometers longer with the warheads.[18] A guns skilled instructed the AP that thermobaric drones are specifically efficient towards constructions and may just purpose vital harm to Ukraine’s energy crops, which might be specifically essential to keeping up Ukraine’s protection business base (DIB) and heating the rustic.[19] The Kremlin will most probably proceed to innovate its long-range strike drones in an try to bypass Ukrainian air defenses and would possibly an increasing number of use decoy drones and drones with better or extra bad payloads to extend the effectiveness of its long-range moves towards Ukraine forward of and all over the iciness.
North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has ordered North Korean protection business enterprises to start serial manufacturing of most probably tactical strike drones – an instance of ways expanding Russian-North Korean army cooperation permits North Korea to be told from Russia’s warfare in Ukraine. North Korean state information outlet KCNA reported on November 15 that Kim oversaw a examine of “different kinds” of North Korean-produced strike drones and ordered the North Korean protection business base (DIB) to start mass manufacturing of those drones “as early as imaginable.”[20] Kim emphasised that strike drones have had notable affects in each “large and small” conflicts and said that North Korea is specializing in combining unmanned programs with operational plans and rules of warfare in its army coverage. A Russian milblogger commented on blurred photographs of the drones from North Korean media and steered that the drones appear to be the Russian “Lancet” tactical strike drones.[21] ISW can’t independently examine the level to which the North Korean drones could also be according to Russian Lancets. It’s these days unclear if North Korea intends to export any of those new strike drones to Russia or different international locations after starting serial manufacturing. North Korea will most probably proceed to be told courses from Russia’s warfare in Ukraine because it will increase its army cooperation with Russia, thereby expanding its personal army functions and the credibility of its risk to the Asia Pacific area.[22]
The Russian army command reportedly arrested and got rid of a number of commanders throughout the Russian third Mixed Fingers Military [CAA] following misguided reviews they made about alleged Russian advances close to Bilohorivka and repeated outcries from the Russian milblogger neighborhood. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 16 that Russian government arrested the commander of the third CAA (previously second Luhansk Other people’s Republic Military Corps [LNR AC]), the third CAA’s leader of body of workers, and the commander of the third CAA’s seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade following popular Russian milblogger lawsuits about Russian officials filing mistaken reviews to their superiors and making plans “incomprehensible” attacks close to Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[23] The milblogger claimed that Russian government additionally got rid of the commanders of unspecified battalions and are analyzing the sixth and 123rd motorized rifle brigades (either one of the third CAA). Any other Russian supply moreover claimed that Russian government arrested the commander of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade for concealing losses and the “actual state of affairs” within the Siversk route from the Russian army command.[24] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that “the device is inert” and that there was once no response to Russian milbloggers’ preliminary lawsuits about false reviews of Russian advances within the Siversk route.[25] The milblogger claimed that the Russian army command was acutely aware of the issue when higher-ups sought after to discuss with Bilohorivka underneath the influence that Russian forces had seized the agreement and that the agreement was once within the Russian close to rear given the alleged Russian seizures of Serebryanka and Hryhorivka (each west of Bilohorivka). The milblogger claimed that frontline Russian commanders had prior to now attempted to degree interviews with Russian warfare correspondents as a way to corroborate the commanders’ false reviews. ISW prior to now seen reviews from July 2024 that Primary Basic Alexei Kolesnikov is the commander of the third CAA.[26] Russian command screw ups and the pervasive Russian army tradition of exaggerating battlefield successes close to Bilohorivka has turn into some extent of neuralgia for the Russian milblogger neighborhood not too long ago, specifically as Russian forces have time and again wasted manpower and armored automobiles on unsuccessful makes an attempt to take the agreement since no less than Might 2022.[27] ISW additionally seen geolocated photos printed on November 8 indicating that Ukrainian forces not too long ago regained misplaced positions in northern Bilohorivka — additional demonstrating the importance of frontline Russian commanders’ false reviews to the Russian army command about Russian successes within the space. The Kremlin has prior to now demonstrated its sensitivity to the ultranationalist Russian milblogger neighborhood and answered to their criticisms, even though it’s unclear if the Russian army command arrested and got rid of the third CAA commanders according to the Russian milbloggers’ repeated outcries about problems close to Bilohorivka.[28]
Key Takeaways:
Ukrainian drone operations proceed to play a essential function in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and fighting Russian forces from totally exploiting Ukraine’s ongoing manpower constraints.
Zelensky emphasised that Ukraine will have to input any long run negotiations from a place of energy as Russian President Vladimir Putin isn’t fascinated about a negotiated agreement – regardless of the negotiating platform or mediator – that leads to anything else not up to Ukrainian capitulation.
Russian forces are innovating their long-range strike programs to incorporate decoy Shahed drones and Shahed drones with thermobaric warheads, more likely to confuse and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses and building up the damages of long-range moves.
North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has ordered North Korean protection business enterprises to start serial manufacturing of most probably tactical strike drones – an instance of ways expanding Russian-North Korean army cooperation permits North Korea to be told from Russia’s warfare in Ukraine.
The Russian army command reportedly arrested and got rid of a number of commanders throughout the Russian third Mixed Fingers Military [CAA] following misguided reviews they made about alleged Russian advances close to Bilohorivka and repeated outcries from the Russian milblogger neighborhood.
Russian forces not too long ago complex close to Svatove, Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported that the Russian Central Financial institution has not too long ago issued considerably extra mortgage deferments (credit score vacations) for Russian army body of workers, indicating that Russian army recruitment charges will have greater.
Institute for the Find out about of Struggle
We don’t record intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of those actions are well-covered in Western media and do indirectly impact the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We can proceed to judge and record at the results of those felony actions at the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on battle in Ukrainian city spaces. We completely condemn Russian violations of the regulations of armed warfare and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity even if we don’t describe them in those reviews. 
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian Primary Effort – Jap Ukraine (produced from 3 subordinate major efforts)
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and technique to inside of tube artillery fluctuate of Kharkiv Town
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #3 – Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
Russian Mobilization and Drive Era Efforts
Russian Technological Diversifications
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces
Important Job in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian forces persevered attacks in the primary Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on November 15 and 16 however didn’t make showed advances.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are pushing Ukrainian forces from positions close to Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha) and Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha).[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked southeast of Korenevo close to Darino and Novoivanovka and east of Korenevo close to Olgovka.[31] Ukrainian Flooring Forces Commander Lieutenant Basic Oleksandr Pavlyuk said that Ukrainian forces broken and destroyed 17 Russian armored automobiles and tanks all over a contemporary Russian mechanized attack in an unspecified space of Kursk Oblast, most likely regarding the November 12 multi-wave battalion-sized mechanized attack close to Novoivanovka.[32] Parts of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Department) are reportedly running southeast of Korenevo, and parts of the Chechen “Zapad-Akhmat” Battalion are reportedly running within the Kursk route.[33]

Russian Primary Effort – Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and technique to inside of tube artillery fluctuate of Kharkiv Town)
Geolocated photos printed on November 16 presentations Ukrainian drone operators destroying the flags that Russian forces put on a bridge around the Sudost River connecting Hremyach and Kolos (each about 1.5 kilometers south of the world border) in northern Chernihiv Oblast on November 15, indicating that Russian forces most probably don’t have enduring positions close to the bridge.[34] A most probably Russian sabotage and reconnaissance staff carried out a restricted incursion around the world border into Chernihiv Oblast on November 15, however there are these days no indications that Russian forces have established a long-lasting presence within the space.[35]
Russian forces persevered offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 15 and 16 however didn’t make any showed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized everything of Sotnytskyi Kozachok (northwest of Kharkiv Town) on November 16 after Russian sabotage and reconnaissance teams briefly complex into the agreement in July 2024.[36] ISW has no longer seen visible affirmation that Russian forces have seized Sotnytskyi Kozachok, on the other hand. Russian forces carried out offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv Town close to Vovchansk and north of Kharkiv Town close to Vysoka Yaruha and Strilecha.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are carrying out preparatory artillery moves towards Ukrainian positions west of Strilecha sooner than intensifying attacks within the space.[38]

Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northerly Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces not too long ago marginally complex west of Svatove and Kreminna amid persevered offensive operations alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 16. Geolocated photos printed on November 15 and 16 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago marginally complex in southern Vyshneve (west of Svatove) and central Terny (west of Kreminna).[39] A Ukrainian army unit preventing within the Kupyansk route said that Ukrainian forces captured a number of Russian servicemembers running in Kupyansk, and a Ukrainian outlet reported that Ukrainian forces driven Russian forces from positions within the town.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces persevered to advance close to Kupyansk, on the other hand, together with close to the sugar manufacturing unit in japanese Kupyansk, north of Kupyansk in opposition to Holubivka, and south of Kupyansk in opposition to Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[41] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complex into the commercial heart of Kupyansk and that preventing is ongoing within the heart of the agreement, however ISW has no longer seen affirmation of those extra maximalist claims.[42] Russian forces persevered attacks east of Kupyansk close to Pishchane; southeast of Kupyansk close to Kolisnykivka, Kruhlyakivka, Zahryzove, and Berestove; west of Svatove close to Kopanky and Nadiya; southwest of Svatove close to Tverdokhlibove, Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, Cherneshchyna, and Makiivka; and west of Kreminna close to Terny and Torske on November 15 and 16.[43] Parts of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Department (twentieth Mixed Fingers Military [CAA], Moscow Army District [MMD]) are reportedly running close to Nevske.[44]

Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces carried out offensive operations close to Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) and Vyimka (southeast of Siversk) on November 15 and 16 however didn’t advance.[45] Parts of the Russian thirty ninth Radiation, Chemical, and Organic Coverage Regiment (third Mixed Fingers Military [CAA], previously the second Luhansk Other people’s Republic Military Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly carrying out TOS-1A thermobaric artillery moves close to Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[46]
Russian forces not too long ago complex within the Chasiv Yar route amid persevered offensive operations within the space on November 16. Geolocated photos printed on November 15 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago complex as much as Dubrovskyi Side road alongside a slim salient in central Chasiv Yar.[47] Russian forces carried out offensive operations south of Chasiv Yar close to Bila Hora on November 16.[48] Parts of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Department and “Sever-V” Brigade and drone operators of the “Okhotnik” (Hunter) Spetsnaz Detachment (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk Other people’s Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly running close to Chasiv Yar.[49]

Russian forces not too long ago complex within the Toretsk route amid persevered offensive operations within the space on November 16. Geolocated photos printed on November 15 and 16 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago complex alongside Naberezhna Side road and as much as Promeneva Side road in southern Toretsk.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces additionally complex as much as Havrilova Side road in northeastern Toretsk and seized Krymske (northeast of Toretsk), however ISW has no longer seen affirmation of those claims.[51] Russian forces carried out offensive operations close to Toretsk, north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka, and west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka on November 15 and 16.[52]

Russian forces not too long ago complex within the Pokrovsk route amid persevered offensive operations within the space on November 16. Geolocated photos printed on November 16 presentations a Russian flag flying in western Hryhorivka (southeast of Pokrovsk and west of Selydove), indicating that Russian forces not too long ago seized the agreement.[53] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Hryhorivka, and Russian resources claimed that parts of the “Black Hussars” detachment of the Russian fifteenth Motorized Rifle Brigade (second CAA, Central Army District [CMD]) seized the agreement.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces additionally complex close to Novooleksiivka, Pustynka, and Yurivka (all west of Selydove), however ISW has no longer seen affirmation of those claims.[55]  Russian forces carried out offensive operations east of Pokrovsk close to Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Krutyi Yar and southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka, Petrivka, Novooleksiivka, and Pustynka on November 15 and 16.[56] Parts of the Russian eleventh Air Drive and Air Protection Military (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Jap Army District [EMD]) are reportedly running close to Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk).[57]

Russian forces not too long ago complex within the Kurakhove route amid persevered offensive operations within the space on November 16. Geolocated photos printed on November 16 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago seized Voznesenka (north of Kurakhove) and the fields northeast of the agreement.[58] Russian resources claimed that Russian forces additionally complex south of Novoselydivka (north of Kurakhove), in opposition to Berestky (simply north of Kurakhove around the Kurakhivske Reservoir), and into central Kurakhove.[59] ISW has no longer seen affirmation of those claims, on the other hand. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on November 15 that knowledge that Russian forces had seized Novoselydivka is unconfirmed.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are amassing body of workers to hurricane Berestky.[61] Russian forces carried out offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove close to Sontsivka, Novodmytrivka, and Zorya; north of Kurakhove close to Illinka, Berestky, Novoselydivka, and Voznesenka; close to Kurakhove itself; southeast of Kurakhove close to Maskymilyanivka; and south of Kurakhove close to Dalne on November 15 and 16.[62] Drone operators of the “Kaira” Detachment (thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade, 68th AC, EMD) are reportedly running within the Kurakhove route.[63]
Russian forces are reportedly deploying apparatus from rear spaces within the Zaporizhia route to the Kurakhove route. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Consultant Petro Andryushchenko said on November 16 that Russian forces are an increasing number of transporting apparatus, together with tanks, infantry preventing automobiles, armored body of workers carriers, and vehicles wearing ammunition, from the Berdyansk or Polohy instructions via occupied Mariupol in opposition to Volnovakha (kind of 22 kilometers southeast of Vuhledar) for offensive operations within the Kurakhove route.[64] Andryushchenko famous that Russian forces have no longer undertaken this stage of shipping process in Mariupol for a minimum of a yr and part (since about Spring 2023) and that many of the Russian apparatus shifting to Mariupol or Hranitne (simply north of Mariupol) got here from Russia, no longer from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian and Ukrainian resources have not too long ago reported on a imaginable building up in Russian offensive operations within the Zaporizhia route, however ISW has no longer seen affirmation that Russian forces had redeployed forces to the Zaporizhia route from different sectors of the frontline nor different indications suggesting an forthcoming Russian offensive operation in Zaporizhia Oblast.[65] Reported large-scale Russian apparatus deployments from the Zaporizhia route can be a counterindicator of a reported imaginable intensification in Russian process within the Zaporizhia route.
Russian forces reportedly complex within the Vuhledar route on November 16, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complex north of Antonivka (northeast of Vuhledar), however ISW has no longer seen affirmation of this declare.[66] A Russian supply claimed that Russian positions alongside the O0510 (Shakhtarske-Kurahove) freeway are not up to one kilometer from the C051104 (Kostantynivka-Zelenivka) freeway west of Uspenivka (north of Vuhledar), however ISW these days assesses that Russian forces close to the O0510 freeway are running kind of 7.5 kilometers clear of the C051104 freeway.[67] Russian forces carried out offensive operations northeast of Vuhledar close to Katerynivka, Antonivka, Illinka, and Romanivka and northwest of Vuhledar close to Sukhi Yaly and Trudove on November 15 and 16.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to Trudove.[69] Parts of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Basic Personnel’s Primary Army Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) and the 69th Masking Brigade (thirty fifth CAA, EMD) are reportedly running within the south Donetsk (Kurakhove-Vuhledar) route; parts of the thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) are reportedly running close to Yelizavetivka (northeast of Vuhledar) and Trudove; parts of the thirty third Motorized Rifle Regiment (twentieth Motorized Rifle Department, eighth CAA, Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly running close to Illinka; and parts of the fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) are reportedly running within the Shakhtarske route (northwest of Vuhledar).[70]

Russian forces persevered offensive operations within the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border space on November 16, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Makarivka (south of Velyka Novosilka), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complex in opposition to Novodarivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka), however ISW has no longer seen affirmation of those claims.[71] A Russian supply claimed that parts of the Russian sixtieth Motorized Rifle Brigade (fifth CAA, EMD) deal with positions in maximum of Makarivka however that Russian forces nonetheless wish to transparent the northern a part of the agreement.[72] Russian forces carried out offensive operations southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Novodarivka and Rivnopil on November 15 and 16.[73] Russian resources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in unspecified spaces within the Vremikva route.[74] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade running within the Vremivka route reported on November 15 that Russian forces are seeking to snatch everything of southern Donetsk Oblast and advance northward.[75]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Take care of frontline positions and safe rear spaces towards Ukrainian moves)
Russian forces persevered attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast close to Novoandriivka (northwest of Robotyne) on November 15 and 16, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline.[76] Russian resources claimed on November 15 and 16 that Russian forces complex kind of part a kilometer from Robotyne in opposition to Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne), however ISW has no longer seen visible affirmation of those claims.[77] Drone operators of the Russian BARS-3 “Rodina” Battalion (Russian Fight Military Reserve) reportedly proceed to perform within the Zaporizhia route.[78]

Positional preventing persevered within the Dnipro route in east (left) financial institution Kherson Oblast on November 16, however there have been no adjustments to the frontline. Parts of the Russian 1445th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly a mobilized unit) and forty fifth Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Basic Personnel’s Primary Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly running within the Kherson route.[79] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command printed geolocated photos on November 16 appearing a Ukrainian strike on a Russian command publish in occupied Chelburda (north of Radensk and east of Kherson Town).[80]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Purpose: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and at the frontline)
Russian forces carried out a sequence of drone and missile moves towards Ukraine in a single day on November 15-16. The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Russian forces struck Kharkiv Oblast with an S-300 air protection missile and introduced 83 Shahed drones and “unspecified” strike drones (most likely regarding decoy drones) from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and Kursk and Oryol oblasts.[81] The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Ukrainian forces downed 53 Russian drones over Cherkasy, Odesa, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Mykolaiv, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv and Khmelnytskyi oblasts and that unspecified Ukrainian countermeasures brought about 30 Russian drones to turn into “misplaced.”[82] Kyiv Town Management Head Serhiy Popko said that falling drone particles broken a residential development in Kyiv Town, and Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov said that Shahed moves broken essential infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia Town.[83]
Russian Mobilization and Drive Era Efforts (Russian goal: Make bigger battle energy with out carrying out basic mobilization)
Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported that the Russian Central Financial institution has not too long ago issued considerably extra mortgage deferments (credit score vacations) for Russian army body of workers, indicating that Russian army recruitment charges will have greater.[84] Mediazona reported, bringing up Central Financial institution information, that the financial institution issued just about 54,200 new credit score vacations for Russian contract and mobilized body of workers in July-September 2024 after having issued fewer than 30,000 credit score vacations to army body of workers in July-September 2023.[85] Russian government handed a regulation in early 2023 permitting banks to provide deferments on mortgage bills to Russian army body of workers preventing in Ukraine, most probably as a monetary incentive to inspire army carrier.[86] The numerous building up in credit score vacations issued to Russian army body of workers comes amid indications that the Kremlin is fascinated with Russia’s long-term financial steadiness and efforts to chop the short- and long-term prices of the warfare via decreasing positive advantages to Russian squaddies who fought in Ukraine.[87]
The Russian milblogger Telegram channel 13th, which has been closely essential of the Russian MoD’s and Kremlin’s behavior of the warfare in Ukraine, claimed on November 15 {that a} Russian courtroom licensed its major administrator Yegor Guzenko to struggle in Ukraine in lieu of jailtime.[88] Russian government reportedly arrested Guzenko on October 5 in Stavropol Krai both for violating a previous area arrest or because of an altercation with Russian police, and the fees towards Guzenko stay unclear.[89] Russian outlet Baza reported on October 10, bringing up its personal resources, that Guzenko refused to signal an army carrier contract when government detained him as a result of he “was once extra wanted at the knowledge entrance” however that Guzenko would possibly alternate his thoughts.[90] The 13th Telegram channel has persevered to closely criticize Russian government since Guzenko’s arrest, specifically Stavropol Krai government, and said on November 15 that the channel will put up a sequence of interviews with Guzenko to “break the ones canines who lied and slandered” Guzenko whilst Guzenko was once in jail.[91]
A Russian insider supply claimed on November 15 that Russian Protection Minister Andrei Belousov licensed a coaching direction on “Geostrategy of Fashionable Society” for senior Russian army officials underneath the steering of Russian state tv host and propagandist Vladimir Solovyov.[92] ISW is not able to substantiate this declare.
Russian Technological Diversifications (Russian goal: Introduce technological inventions to optimize programs to be used in Ukraine)
Not anything vital to record.
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed spaces; forcibly combine Ukrainian electorate into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance programs)
ISW isn’t publishing protection of actions in Russian-occupied spaces lately.
Important process in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and extra combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Team process in Belarus)
Not anything vital to record.
Notice: ISW does no longer obtain any categorized subject material from any supply, makes use of handiest publicly to be had knowledge, and attracts widely on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially to be had satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the root for those reviews. References to all resources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] dot media/881199-mi-povinni-zrobiti-vse-sob-nastupnogo-roku-vijna-zakincilas-ekskluzivne-intervu-prezidenta-zelenskogo/ ; dot media/881325-zelenskij-pro-prosuvanna-rosian-na-fronti/ ; dot media/881327-zelenskij-putin-ne-hoce-miru-ale-peregovori-jomu-mozut-buti-vigidni/
[2] dot media/881199-mi-povinni-zrobiti-vse-sob-nastupnogo-roku-vijna-zakincilas-ekskluzivne-intervu-prezidenta-zelenskogo/ ; dot media/881325-zelenskij-pro-prosuvanna-rosian-na-fronti/ ; dot media/881327-zelenskij-putin-ne-hoce-miru-ale-peregovori-jomu-mozut-buti-vigidni/
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[18] dot ua/united kingdom/information/u-shahed-vyyavyly-novu-termobarychnu-bojovu-chastynu/; dot com/weapon_and_tech/termobarichna_bojova_chastina_shahediv_scho_tse_i_chomu_do_pravila_dvoh_stin_neobhidno_dodati_sche_odne-17119.html
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[20] dot com.kp/weblog?web page=innovative&blogid=6736d97a66968905a755d005; dot org/newstream/1731669020-884242398/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-guides-performance-test-of-suicide-attack-drones-of-various-types/; dot kp/kp/article/q/d3dab771a838053e59591fb203471d5a.kcmsf
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[33] (Kursk route); (southeast of Korenevo)
[34] .com dot ua/2024/11/16/na-chernigivshhyni-znyshhyly-rosijskyj-trykolor-vstanovlenyj-vorozhoyu-drg/ ;
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[40] ; dot ua/united kingdom/information/proryv-okupantiv-u-kup-yansk-zavershyvsya-yihnoyu-likvidatsiyeyu-abo-polonom/
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[64] dot com.ua/2024/11/16/okupanty-pochaly-zavozyty-vijskovu-tehniku-na-kurahivskyj-napryamok-nezvychnym-marshrutom/;
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[75] ; .com dot ua/2024/11/15/krov-v-obmin-na-terytoriyi-taktyka-rosiyan-povnistyu-analogichna-radyanskij/
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[77] dot ru/20241116/svo-1984127858.html
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[79] dot org/mobi-in-russia-2
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[84] dot media/information/2024/11/15/krediti
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[88] ; ; dot io/information/2024/11/15/sud-priostanovil-ugolovnoe-delo-o-nasilii-protiv-politseyskogo-protiv-z-blogera-egora-guzenko-trinadtsatyy-potomu-chto-on-podpisal-kontrakt-s-minoborony; ; ; ; ;
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Author: OpenAI

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