Institute for the Find out about of Struggle

Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Review, March 3, 2025
Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Daria Novikov, and George Barros
March 3, 2025, 6:15pm ET
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day along the static maps provide on this record.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s 3-d management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (now not a cell tool) is strongly really useful for the use of this data-heavy instrument.
Click on right here to get right of entry to ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Those maps supplement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day through appearing a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive per month.
Notice: The information cut-off for this product was once 12:10pm ET on March 3. ISW will quilt next experiences within the March 4 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Review.
Ukrainian army intelligence indicated that about 620,000 Russian infantrymen are working in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, an build up of about 40,000 group of workers in comparison to overdue 2024. Ukrainian Primary Army Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Main Basic Vadym Skibitskyi said in an interview with RBK-Ukraine printed on March 3 that there are 620,000 Russian infantrymen in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, about 200,000 of whom are actively preventing at the frontline.[1] Skibitskyi said that there are kind of 35,000 further Rosgvardia troops protective rear spaces and that those group of workers can develop into a 2nd defensive line if essential. Skibitskyi said in November 2024 there have been about 580,000 Russian infantrymen working opposed to Ukraine (possibly each inside of Ukraine and in Kursk Oblast), and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in January 2025 that the whole Russian power grouping in Ukraine was once about 600,000 troops.[2]
Russian government reportedly exceeded their recruitment quotas in 2024 and January 2025, most probably partially because of greater monetary incentives for recruits and jail recruitment efforts which can be unsustainable within the medium- to long-term. Skibitskyi reported on March 3 that Russian government recruited 440,000 army group of workers in 2024 — 10,000 greater than their quota for the 12 months — and fulfilled their January 2025 recruitment quota through 107 %.[3] Russian Safety Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev additionally claimed in overdue December 2024 that 440,000 recruits signed army carrier contracts with the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) in 2024.[4] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree in July 2024 awarding 400,000 rubles (kind of $4,400) to someone who signed a freelance with the Russian MoD between August 1, 2024 and December 31, 2024 – greater than double the former federal award of 195,000 rubles (kind of $2,100).[5] This greater federal praise most probably contributed to Russia’s a hit recruitment force in 2024. Russian federal topics presented further top regional bonuses to people who signed army carrier contracts in overdue 2024 and early 2025, however choose federal topics have began to cut back those regional bills following the expiration of those restricted time gives, indicating that such measures aren’t sustainable indefinitely.[6] Skibitskyi said that 15 % of Russian recruits in 2024 had been folks beneath legal investigation, in jail, or serving suspended sentences and that this determine will build up to kind of 30 % in 2025. Russian officers reported in 2024 that Russia was once shutting down some prisons after Russia’s jail inhabitants considerably dropped because of the Russian jail recruitment drives.[7] Russia has just lately been increasingly more recruiting defendants in pretrial detention facilities, most probably because the pool of jail recruits has dwindled.[8] ISW continues to evaluate that greater army spending, together with vast bills and advantages to Russian servicemembers, is hurting the Russian economic system on the macro point and that the Kremlin is lowering this spending on army group of workers as a part of efforts to mitigate the affects of such tasks.[9] Russian government are not likely to maintain such top monetary incentives as a part of their recruitment drives within the medium- and long-term because the Russian economic system continues to say no.
Skibitskyi famous that Russian government have up to now adjusted their annual quotas right through the 12 months, having at the start known as for Russian government to recruit 375,000 to 380,000 group of workers in 2024 earlier than expanding this quantity to 430,000.[10] Changes to the 2024 recruitment quotas had been most probably intended to account for Russia’s greater pace of offensive operations in the previous couple of months of 2024 that resulted within the best possible casualty charges Russia skilled since early 2022.[11] Skibitskyi concluded that Russia’s recruitment plans for 2025 will “most commonly” permit the Russian army command to exchange its battlefield losses will have to the present pace of offensive operations and losses proceed.[12] Russian government will most probably have to regulate their 2025 quotas as they did in 2024 will have to they would like the present pace of offensive operations to proceed and will have to Russian forces proceed to undergo top losses whilst advancing at a slower price.[13] Russian government are not likely to generate sufficient forces to seriously build up the pace of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine within the close to long term. Endured Western army support would lend a hand Ukrainian forces inflict further losses at the Russian army that may most probably accentuate Russia’s financial and army problems and power Putin into making concessions all through significant negotiations in 2025.[14]
Russian forces proceed to innovate their strike programs and leverage higher numbers of Shahed and decoy drones in an try to penetrate Ukraine’s air protection umbrella. Skibitskyi said that Russian forces release missiles from a number of other instructions and these days release 150 to 200 drones all through a unmarried in a single day strike collection.[15] Skibitskyi famous that Russian forces up to now introduced missiles from a unmarried path and used a mean of 20 to 30 drones in one in a single day strike collection. Skibitskyi reported that Russian forces change launching missiles and drones in an effort to weigh down Ukrainian air protection programs. Skibitskyi famous that Russian forces start launching drones within the night such that the drones achieve Ukraine at round 2300, and that moves proceed till the morning. ISW noticed experiences that that Russian forces started launching between 80 and 100 (or extra) Shahed and decoy drones as a part of their higher strike programs in October and November 2024 and feature been launching between 100 to 200 (or extra) Shahed and decoy drones in February 2025.[16] Russian forces perhaps use vast numbers of Shahed and decoy drones to stumble on and weigh down Ukrainian air protection and cell hearth teams. Expanding numbers of drones in in a single day Russian strike programs point out that Russia is most probably now not these days going through home Shahed or decoy drone manufacturing constraints or constraints in Iranian-provided elements to make Shahed drones. It stays unclear whether or not Russia will be capable of produce or supply a enough choice of elements to steer clear of drone manufacturing constraints within the long-term, on the other hand.
Russian missile manufacturing has reportedly now not considerably greater, however Russian forces seem to be prioritizing manufacturing of missile and drone variants which can be simpler opposed to Ukrainian air defenses. Skibitskyi said that Russia has marginally greater its missile manufacturing through an element of one.2 to at least one.5 right through 2024 and is “redistributing” its manufacturing functions.[17] Skibitskyi said that Russian forces are generating extra Kh-101 cruise missiles and less of the fewer efficient Kalibr cruise missiles and intend to supply extra Kinzhal and Iskander-M ballistic missiles within the close to long term. Russian forces hardly used Kalibr cruise missiles in strike programs opposed to Ukraine in January or February 2025 and proceed to principally use Kalibr missiles to pad higher strike programs and weigh down Ukrainian air defenses.[18]
The GUR reported on February 18 that Russia is modernizing and lengthening its manufacturing of Shahed-136 drones and generating a brand new Geran-3 drone variant.[19] The GUR reported that Russia has provided some new Shahed-136 (“Geran-2”) drones with a brand new form of warhead weighing 90 kilograms, moved the drones’ navigation and tool programs from the nostril to the tail, and put in an extra ballast to lend a hand with the drones’ balance. The GUR reported that Russia is increasingly more depending on elements manufactured in Russia, the Other folks’s Republic of China (PRC), and Iran to supply and bring together Shahed drones. The GUR reported that the Geran-3 drone is an analogue to the Shahed-238 and will fly at a velocity of as much as 550 to 600 kilometers consistent with hour and has a variety of two,500 kilometers. ISW up to now assessed that Russia most probably supposed to additional build up its manufacturing and use of Shahed drones and different Shahed-variants following the signing of the Russian-Iranian Complete Strategic Partnership Settlement in January 2025.[20]
Key Takeaways:
Ukrainian army intelligence indicated that about 620,000 Russian infantrymen are working in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, an build up of about 40,000 group of workers in comparison to overdue 2024.
Russian government reportedly exceeded their recruitment quotas in 2024 and January 2025, most probably partially because of greater monetary incentives for recruits and jail recruitment efforts which can be unsustainable within the medium- to long-term.
Russian forces proceed to innovate their strike programs and leverage higher numbers of Shahed and decoy drones in an try to penetrate Ukraine’s air protection umbrella.
Russian missile manufacturing has reportedly now not considerably greater, however Russian forces seem to be prioritizing manufacturing of missile and drone variants which can be simpler opposed to Ukrainian air defenses.
Ukrainian forces just lately complicated close to Pokrovsk, and Russian forces just lately complicated close to Velyka Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.
The Kremlin continues to advertise its “Time of Heroes” veterans’ program as a part of efforts to militarize the Russian executive and society.

We don’t record intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of those actions are well-covered in Western media and do indirectly impact the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We can proceed to guage and record at the results of those legal actions at the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and in particular on wrestle in Ukrainian city spaces. We totally condemn Russian violations of the regulations of armed warfare and the Geneva Conventions and crimes opposed to humanity although we don’t describe them in those experiences.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian Primary Effort — Jap Ukraine (created from 3 subordinate primary efforts)
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces again from the global border with Belgorod Oblast and way to inside of tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #2 — Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #3 — Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
Russian Mobilization and Drive Era Efforts
Russian Technological Variations
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces
Important Job in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian forces just lately complicated in Kursk Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated photos printed on March 2 signifies that Russian forces just lately complicated in northern Novaya Sorochina (northwest of Sudzha).[21]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complicated north of Lebedevka and 1.5 kilometers close to Malaya Loknya (each northwest of Sudzha).[22]
Russian forces performed offensive operations close to Malaya Loknya and Lebedevka.[23] A Ukrainian brigade working in Kursk Oblast reported on March 3 that Russian forces unsuccessfully performed an a minimum of bolstered platoon-sized mechanized attack in two waves and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 4 tanks and one armored group of workers service.[24]
Order of Struggle: Components of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Department are reportedly working in Sudzhansky Raion; components of the 83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly working close to Malaya Loknya; components of the first battalion of the ninth Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Department, eleventh Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are reportedly working in Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha); components of the a hundred and fifty fifth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly working in Nikolskiy (northwest of Sudzha); and components of the 1434th “Akhmat-Chechnya” Regiment are reportedly working close to Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha).[25]

Russian forces proceed to assault close to the global border in Sumy Oblast on March 3.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers persisted to say that Russian forces seized Zhuravka (simply alongside the global border) and complicated into Novenke (east of Zhuravka).[26]
Ukraine’s State Border Carrier Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko said on March 3 that Russian forces are seeking to spoil throughout the global border into Ukraine and bring to an end Ukrainian logistics routes.[27] Demchenko said that Russian forces are attacking towards Novenke however aren’t engaging in large-scale attacks within the space.
Order of Struggle: Components of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly working close to Zhuravka and Basivka (south of Novenke).[28]
Russian Primary Effort — Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the global border with Belgorod Oblast and way to inside of tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town)
Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Kharkiv path on March 3 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces performed offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv Town close to Vovchansk and towards Bochkove on March 2 and three.[29]

Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northerly Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Kupyansk path on March 3 however didn’t advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 3 that Russian forces are clearing portions of Holubivka.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complicated to the outskirts of Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk) and are making an attempt to interdict the Ukrainian flooring line of verbal exchange (GLOC) alongside the Kupyansk-Velykyi Burluk freeway and set stipulations to assault Kupyansk from the northwest.[31] Any other Russian milblogger claimed on March 2 that Russian forces’ primary actions are within the path of Kamianka (southwest of Topoli).[32]
Russian forces performed offensive operations within the path of Petropavlivka (west of Kupyansk) on March 2 and three.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are consolidating positions round Kalynove (each northeast of Kupyansk) and implementing their positions northeast of Kupyansk close to Topoli. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to Fyholivka and Dvorichna (each northeast of Kupyansk).[34]
The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment working within the Kupyansk path said on March 3 that probably the most unhealthy space of the frontline within the space is close to Kruhlyakivka (southeast of Kupyansk), the place Russian forces lower via Ukrainian defenses and established a bridgehead around the Oskil River.[35] The commander added that probably the most intense preventing is these days within the neighborhood of Dvorichna.
Order of Struggle: Components of the Russian sixteenth Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Basic Team of workers’s Primary Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly working close to Zapadne.[36]
Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Borova path on March 3 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces performed offensive operations northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove, Lozova, and Nova Kruhlyakivka on March 2 and three.[37]
Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Lyman path on March 3 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces persisted flooring assaults north of Lyman against Nove and Novomykhailivka and northeast of Lyman close to Novolyubivka and Yampolivka on March 2 and three.[38]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Lyman path said that Russian forces proceed engaging in squad-sized infantry attacks and that two devices behavior an attack opposed to one place with a 3rd squad arriving later to consolidate the development.[39] The spokesperson said that Russian forces are engaging in fewer drones moves within the Lyman path.
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Siversk path on March 3 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces performed offensive operations northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka and east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske on March 3.[40]
Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar path on March 3 however didn’t make any showed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complicated to Dniprovska Boulevard inside of Chasiv Yar.[41]
Russian forces performed offensive operations close to Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar close to Hryhorivka; and south of Chasiv Yar close to Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Oleksandro-Shultyne on March 2 and three.[42]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones are complicating Russian advances inside of Chasiv Yar.[43] Any other Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian digital battle (EW) interference is inflicting Russian rockets to pass over their goals close to Kostyantynivka.[44]
Order of Struggle: Components of the Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz and 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Department) are reportedly working inside of Chasiv Yar.[45]

Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Toretsk path on March 3 however didn’t advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complicated northwest of Krymske (north of Toretsk) and north of Druzhba (east of Toretsk).[46]
Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk and west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka on March 2 and three.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to Toretsk from Shcherbynivka and from north of Toretska Mine (in northern Toretsk).[48]
The commander of a Ukrainian battalion working within the Toretsk path said that Russian forces are making an attempt to envelop Toretsk through attacking settlements at the agreement’s flanks.[49] the commander additionally said that Russian forces are making an attempt to advance on foot and with armored cars, civilian automobiles, bikes, and electrical scooters.
Order of Struggle: Drone operators of the Russian 381st Artillery Regiment (one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Department, eighth Blended Fingers Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) and artillery components of the 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth CAA) are reportedly hanging goals close to Shcherbynivka.[50] ISW has just lately noticed experiences of Russian forces redeploying components of the eighth CAA from the Kurakhove path to the Toretsk path, and that is the primary record of the 381st Artillery Regiment working within the space that ISW has noticed.[51] Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 3 that components of the eighth CAA have begun taking part in wrestle operations within the Toretsk and Kostyantynivka instructions.[52]

Ukrainian forces just lately complicated within the Pokrovsk path.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated photos printed on March 2 signifies that Ukrainian forces just lately complicated within the fields southeast of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[53]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complicated northeast of Dachenske (south of Pokrovsk) and complicated one kilometer south of Zaporizhzhia (southwest of Pokrovsk).[54]
Russian forces persisted offensive operations close to Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk close to Oleksandropil; east of Pokrovsk close to Vodyane Druhe, Tarasivka, and Promin; south of Pokrovsk close to Dachenske, Zvirove, and Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Kotlyne, Udachne, Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, and Uspenivka on March 2 and three.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that the depth of Ukrainian counterattacks close to Udachne and Kotlyne is reducing.[56]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian Nationwide Guard brigade working within the Pokrovsk path reported that Russian forces are deploying reserves in wrestle operations on this path.[57] The spokesperson said that Russian forces are principally depending on infantry attacks supported through mild armored cars, drones, and artillery to advance within the Pokrovsk path. Ukrainian Khortytsia Crew of Forces Spokesperson Main Viktor Trehubov said that the Russian army has accrued as much as a blended fingers navy’s value of group of workers (as much as 100,000 troops) within the Pokrovsk path and are shedding kind of as many tanks in a single month within the Pokrovsk path as some Ecu armies have in carrier in general.[58]

Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Kurakhove path on March 3 however didn’t advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complicated north of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove).[59]
Russian forces performed offensive operations west of Kurakhove close to Andriivka, Ulakly, and Kostyantynopil on March 2 and three.[60]
Order of Struggle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Basic Team of workers’s Primary Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly working close to Kostyantynopil, and components of the 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (sixth Motorized Rifle Department, third Military Corps [AC]) are reportedly close to Yelyzavetivka (south of Kurakhove within the Russian close to rear).[61]

Russian forces just lately complicated close to Velyka Novosilka.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated photos printed on March 3 signifies that Russian forces just lately complicated in southeastern Pryvilne (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[62]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Pryvilne and complicated north and northwest of Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[63]
Russian forces performed offensive operations north of Velyka Novosilka close to Skudne and Dniproenerhiya and northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Pryvilne and Vilne Pole on March 2 and three.[64]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian goal: Care for frontline positions and protected rear spaces opposed to Ukrainian moves)
Russian forces persisted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 3 however didn’t advance.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complicated towards Mali Shcherbaky (northwest of Robotyne).[65]
Russian forces performed offensive operations northwest of Robotyne close to Pyatykhatky and towards Stepove and Nesteryanka and north of Robotyne close to Novodanylivka on March 2 and three.[66]
Order of Struggle: Components of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (seventh VDV Department) are reportedly working within the Zaporizhia path.[67]

Global Atomic Power Company (IAEA) Secretary Basic Rafael Mariano Grossi said on March 3 that he mentioned a up to date rotation of IAEA observers to the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP) with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Overseas Minister Andriy Sybiha.[68] Grossi said that the observers needed to shuttle via Russian-occupied spaces as an “bizarre circumstance” because of the shortcoming for the observers to rotate via Ukrainian-controlled territory safely. Russian state atomic power company Rosatom claimed on March 1 {that a} staff of IAEA observers just lately arrived on the ZNPP as a part of a not on time rotation and that the crowd traveled via “Russian territory” (occupied Ukrainian territory) to get to the ZNPP for the primary time.[69]
Russian forces persisted flooring assaults in unspecified spaces within the Dnipro path in Kherson Oblast on March 2 and three however didn’t make showed advances.[70]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Function: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and at the frontline)
Russian forces performed a sequence of drone moves opposed to Ukraine at the evening of March 2 to three. The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Russian forces introduced 83 Shahed and decoy drones from the instructions of Oryol and Kursk towns; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[71] The Ukrainian Air Drive reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 46 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and that 31 decoy drones had been “misplaced,” most probably because of Ukrainian digital battle (EW) interference. Ukrainian officers reported that Russian drones struck Kharkiv, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.[72]
Ukrainian army officers showed on March 3 that Russian forces performed a strike the use of an Iskander-M ballistic missile with a cluster munition opposed to a Ukrainian coaching flooring in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on March 1.[73]
Russian Mobilization and Drive Era Efforts (Russian goal: Increase wrestle energy with out engaging in basic mobilization)
The Kremlin continues to advertise its “Time of Heroes” veterans’ program as a part of efforts to militarize the Russian executive and society. The Time of Heroes program introduced on March 3 that its player Anton Shorokhov was the Russian Presidential Management’s Head Guide for Tracking Research of Social Processes.[74] The Time of Heroes introduced that 27 of the 83 contributors in its top quality gained federal- and regional-level executive appointments as of March 1.[75] Yevgeny Poddubny, a Kremlin-coopted and Kremlin–awarded milblogger, said that he’s a member of the Time of Heroes Public Council and claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will pay non-public consideration to this program and has a “particular perspective” against Russian veterans of the struggle in Ukraine.[76]
The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) introduced that Russia effectively introduced the Soyuz-2.1b satellite tv for pc into house from Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk Oblast.[77]
Russian Technological Variations (Russian goal: Introduce technological inventions to optimize programs to be used in Ukraine)
Not anything vital to record.
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed spaces; forcibly combine Ukrainian electorate into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance programs)
ISW isn’t publishing protection of actions in Russian-occupied spaces lately.
Important process in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and extra combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Not anything vital to record.
Notice: ISW does now not obtain any categorized subject matter from any supply, makes use of best publicly to be had knowledge, and attracts widely on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially to be had satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the foundation for those experiences. References to all resources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.

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[41] https:// t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24748
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Author: OpenAI