Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Overview, November 4, 2024
Karolina Hird, Davit Gasparyan, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Fredrick W. Kagan
November 4, 2024, 6:50pm ET
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day-to-day along the static maps provide on this record.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s 3-d management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (no longer a cell instrument) is strongly really helpful for the usage of this data-heavy device.
Click on right here to get entry to ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Those maps supplement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day-to-day through appearing a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive per month.
Be aware: The knowledge cut-off for this product used to be 11:30am ET on November 4. ISW will duvet next studies within the November 5 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Overview.
Russian and pro-Kremlin actors released a data operation on November 4 to discredit incumbent Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s victory within the Moldovan presidential elections. The Moldovan Central Election Fee (CEC) showed on November 4 that Sandu received 55.35 % of the vote, defeating Kremlin-friendly opponent Alexandr Stoianoglo.[1] A lot of international leaders congratulated Sandu on November 3 and four, and world election observers in large part recommended the behavior of the elections regardless of Russian makes an attempt to sway the results opposed to Sandu.[2] Professional-Russian opposition events and officers tried to discredit Sandu’s victory, with the Moldovan Socialist birthday celebration calling her “an illegitimate president”; Kremlin-affiliated Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor telling Russian state TV channel Rossiya-24 that the Moldovan opposition has ‘proof’ of mass falsifications in want of Sandu; and pro-Kremlin former Moldovan president Igor Dodon telling Kremlin newswire TASS that Sandu handiest received on account of the Moldovan diaspora vote.[3] The Russian knowledge house, together with Russian milbloggers, echoed the phrases of the pro-Russian Moldovan opposition claiming that Moldovan elections had been managed through ‘Ecu bureaucrats’ and that Moldovans had no company in figuring out the end result of the elections.[4] ISW prior to now reported on Russia’s systematic efforts to intrude within the Moldovan election so as to derail the passage of Moldova’s Ecu Union (EU) referendum and Sandu’s victory.[5]
Georgian civil society and opposition resumed non violent demonstrations on November 4 opposed to the extremely contested October 26 Georgian parliamentary elections, calling for persevered resistance and additional investigations into large-scale vote casting irregularities. 1000’s of Georgians accrued within the middle of Tbilisi and reiterated their refusal to recognize the more and more pro-Russian Georgian Dream birthday celebration’s victory in an election marred through large-scale proof of vote casting irregularities and Russian affect.[6] The opposition defined 3 primary objectives for the protest motion: 1) proceeding efforts to assemble proof demonstrating the elections weren’t unfastened and truthful; 2) urging the world group to chorus from acknowledging the election outcomes; and three) training their proper to gather and to withstand the consequences.[7] Georgian prison entities starting from the Tbilisi Town Court docket to the Georgian Prosecutor’s Workplace have brushed aside probably the most calls for of the Georgian opposition and civil society and forged doubt on allegations of systematic voter fraud, whilst appearing some willingness to behavior investigations into claims of irregularity.[8] The opposition introduced its goal to behavior common protests whilst calling for world investigations into election falsification and the world over administered snap elections.[9]
Radio Loose Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Sistema venture launched an investigation on November 4 detailing Russia’s preliminary 2022 calls for for Ukraine’s general capitulation, additional supporting ISW’s long-standing evaluate that Russia hasn’t ever been keen to have interaction in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine on any phrases however its personal.[10] RFE/RL reported on November 4 that it acquired a draft of the treaty that Russia presented to Ukraine on March 7, 2022, entitled “Treaty at the Agreement of the Scenario in Ukraine and the Neutrality of Ukraine.” The draft report contains seven provisions, all of which quantity to Ukraine’s whole give up and disarmament and the abandonment of its sovereignty, lands, and other folks. The report requires Ukraine to scale back its military from just about 197,000 group of workers to 50,000 group of workers, which RFE/RL notes would have supposed that the Ukrainian military could be smaller than the Belarusian military, even though the Belarusian inhabitants in 2022 used to be one-fifth of the Ukrainian inhabitants. The report additionally states that Ukraine would no longer be capable to increase, produce, purchase, or deploy missile programs with a spread of greater than 250 kilometers; that Ukraine must acknowledge occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as impartial Donetsk and Luhansk Other folks’s Republics (DNR and LNR) and cede portions of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts that Ukraine nonetheless managed in March 2022; that Ukraine must decide to the monetary prices of rebuilding portions of the Donbas that Russia had destroyed following its preliminary 2014 invasion; that Ukraine and the world group would raise all sanctions and cancel all court cases that have been levied opposed to Russian since 2014; that Ukraine would grant the Russian language the standing of a “state language” and repair all belongings rights of the Kremlin-controlled Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate; and that Ukraine would re-legalize Soviet and communist symbols.[11] In essence, Moscow used to be asking Ukraine to willingly surrender its navy, its offensive and defensive features, its land, a good portion of its inhabitants and financial capability, and stop protective its language, historical past, and tradition.
The Kremlin has been incessant in its claims that it got down to negotiate in March 2022 (after illegally invading Ukraine) however that it used to be Ukraine and the collective West that destroyed the possibility of negotiations.[12] The RFE/RL investigation helps ISW’s long-standing evaluate that this used to be by no means the case, alternatively, and that Russia by no means supposed to barter in nice religion with Ukraine.[13] Russia introduced outrageous calls for calling for Ukraine to give up its safety and sovereignty, understanding that Ukraine would (rightly) refuse to take action, after which blamed Ukraine for the intended “failure” of negotiations. ISW continues to evaluate that Russia has built a story round the concept that of negotiations that it’s the usage of so that you could inspire the West to make concessions on Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the RFE/RL investigation emphasizes that Russia’s “diplomatic” engagements with Ukraine and the West because the full-scale invasion have at all times been orientated round this damaging goal.[14]
Russian drone and missile moves opposed to Ukrainian power infrastructure in Summer time 2024 reportedly considerably impacted Ukrainian electric era capability in comparison to March 2024, although it’s unclear whether or not Russia have been in a position to inflict important additional injury at the Ukrainian power grid since. Ukrainian power mavens informed Politico in an editorial printed on November 4 that Ukrainian energy era capability lowered through over 9 gigawatts between March 2024 and Summer time 2024 after Russian forces released greater than 200 missiles and drones at Ukraine’s energy manufacturing amenities in overdue August 2024.[15] Mavens estimated that Ukrainian energy manufacturing amenities generated 37.6 gigawatts of electrical energy in early 2022, most probably relating to the duration previous to the beginning of the Russian drone and missile marketing campaign focused on Ukrainian power infrastructure in October 2022; 18.3 gigawatts in April 2023; 21.4 gigawatts in March 2024; and 12.1 gigawatts in Summer time 2024. Politico famous that the level of the wear and tear that Russian moves inflicted on Ukrainian energy manufacturing amenities in August 2024 is unknown, and the information does no longer constitute Ukraine’s maximum up to date power era capability as of November 2024. A Ukrainian power professional informed Politico that Ukraine wishes further air protection programs to offer protection to its power infrastructure. Artur Lorkowski, Director of The Power Group (a world group that manages Ukraine’s power procurement), additionally said that repairing broken Ukrainian power infrastructure might require an important period of time as a result of it may take as much as three hundred and sixty five days for Ukraine to search out and reinstall specialised apparatus like auto transformers.
The Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the distinguished Rybar Telegram channel and social media venture tried to falsely painting himself as a non-Kremlin actor within the Western media and showed the Kremlin’s efforts to ascertain “media colleges” in a foreign country. In an interview with the Washington Submit printed on November 4, Rybar founder and director Mikhail Zvinchuk commented on the United States Division of State (DoS) program Rewards for Justice’s praise be offering for details about the whereabouts of 9 Rybar workers reportedly desirous about interfering with US elections.[16] Zvinchuk denied studies of his and Rybar’s election interference and used the chance to falsely painting Rybar as a “assume tank” this is desirous about “protecting [Russia’s] informational borders.” Zvinchuk additionally claimed that Rybar has an arranged “international” community consisting of over 250 channels in 28 languages and showed that Rybar is opening “media colleges” in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Kyrgyzstan. Rybar reportedly has 60 workers and has taught a category on the Moscow State Institute of Global Family members (MGIMO). Zvinchuk additionally seized on a query about Rybar’s earlier look at the investigation record for “discrediting” the Russian navy in an try to painting Rybar workers as “patriots” who infrequently name out issues in Russia. Zvinchuk’s efforts to misrepresent Rybar as a Western-style assume tank this is infrequently essential of Russia is most probably a part of the Kremlin’s wider effort to infiltrate Western and world media by way of new online-based assets comparable to Rybar. The Kremlin holds important energy over the Russian knowledge house and civil society, and Rybar’s large-scale operations in Russia and in a foreign country most probably would no longer be imaginable with out Kremlin’s direct investment. Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) significantly awarded Rybar with a number of state honors, and Rewards for Justice famous that Russian state protection conglomerate Rostec recently budget the channel.[17]
Russian government arrested Rosgvardia’s Deputy Head of Logistics Main Common Mirza Mirzaev for bribery on November 3.[18] Russian government have significantly arrested a number of high-ranking Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) officers on bribery fees after Russian President Vladimir Putin changed then Russian Protection Minister Sergei Shoigu and moved him to the location of Safety Council Secretary in Might 2024.[19] A Russian insider supply speculated that arrests of senior safety officers might unfold out of doors of the Russian MoD to Rosgvardia (which operates one at a time of the Russian MoD) following Mirzaev’s arrest.[20] The supply claimed that Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov has maintained a “relatively nice popularity and robust place” in Russia’s safety equipment however famous that Mirzaev’s arrest might result in further Rosgvardia arrests and cut back Zolotov’s affect.
Key Takeaways:
Russian and pro-Kremlin actors released a data operation on November 4 to discredit incumbent Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s victory within the Moldovan presidential elections.
Georgian civil society and opposition resumed non violent demonstrations on November 4 opposed to the extremely contested October 26 Georgian parliamentary elections, calling for persevered resistance and additional investigations into large-scale vote casting irregularities.
Radio Loose Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Sistema venture launched an investigation on November 4 detailing Russia’s preliminary 2022 calls for for Ukraine’s general capitulation, additional supporting ISW’s long-standing evaluate that Russia hasn’t ever been keen to have interaction in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine on any phrases however its personal.
Russian drone and missile moves opposed to Ukrainian power infrastructure in Summer time 2024 reportedly considerably impacted Ukrainian electric era capability in comparison to March 2024, although it’s unclear whether or not Russia have been in a position to inflict important additional injury at the Ukrainian power grid since.
The Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the distinguished Rybar Telegram channel and social media venture tried to falsely painting himself as a non-Kremlin actor within the Western media and showed the Kremlin’s efforts to ascertain “media colleges” in a foreign country.
Russian government arrested Rosgvardia’s Deputy Head of Logistics Main Common Mirza Mirzaev for bribery on November 3.
Russian forces complex close to Novy Put, Kursk Oblast.
Ukrainian forces complex in Kharkiv Oblast and Russian forces complex within the Kupyansk, Kreminna, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar instructions.
The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) continues makes an attempt to shape a cadre of unswerving navy reporters so that you could management the pro-war Russian knowledge house and centralize management over Russia’s conflict protection.
We don’t record intimately on Russian conflict crimes as a result of those actions are well-covered in Western media and do indirectly impact the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We will be able to proceed to judge and record at the results of those felony actions at the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on battle in Ukrainian city spaces. We completely condemn Russian violations of the regulations of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes opposed to humanity even if we don’t describe them in those studies.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian Major Effort — Jap Ukraine (created from 3 subordinate primary efforts)
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and way to inside of tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 — Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 — Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
Russian Mobilization and Pressure Technology Efforts
Russian Technological Diversifications
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces
Important Task in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Ukrainian and Russian forces persevered preventing in the principle Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on November 3 and four, however there have been no fresh adjustments to the frontline. Geolocated photos printed on November 3 reportedly presentations Russian forces putting a Ukrainian place in jap Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha), indicating that Ukrainian forces proceed to perform within the house.[21] Russian assets, together with the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD), claimed that Russian forces attacked southeast of Korenevo close to Darino, Leonidovo, Nikolayevo-Darino, and Novoivanovka; and southeast of Sudzha close to Plekhovo.[22] Russian assets claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked close to Novoivanovka, Leonidovo, and Plekhovo, and northwest of Sudzha close to Pogrebki.[23] A Russian milblogger attributed the loss of adjustments at the frontline to deteriorating climate prerequisites, most probably with the onset of the Fall dust season.[24] Ukrainian Middle for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on November 4 that North Korean servicemen “got here underneath hearth” in Kursk Oblast however didn’t be offering additional specifics.[25]
Russian forces lately marginally complex west of the principle Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, even though Ukrainian and Russian assets didn’t record preventing within the Glushkovsky Raion on November 3 and four. Geolocated photos printed on November 4 presentations Ukrainian forces putting Russian forces west of Novyi Put (southwest of Glushkovo), indicating that Russian forces complex within the house.[26]
Russian Major Effort — Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and way to inside of tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town)
Ukrainian forces lately complex in northern Kharkiv Oblast amid persevered Russian offensive operations within the house on November 4. Geolocated photos printed on November 4 signifies that Ukrainian forces lately complex west of Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv Town) at the jap financial institution of the Travyanske Reservoir.[27] Russian forces persevered attacking north of Kharkiv Town close to Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv Town close to Vovchansk on November 3 and four.[28] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Kharkiv route said that Russian forces didn’t behavior attacks the usage of armored cars in fresh weeks (most probably implying all the way through October 2024) and feature as an alternative depended on engaging in attacks in small infantry teams.[29]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northerly Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces complex southeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Kreminna amid persevered Russian offensive operations alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 4. Geolocated photos printed on November 4 signifies that Russian forces complex west of Novoselivske (southeast of Kupyansk) and southeast of Yampolivka (northwest of Kreminna).[30] Pictures printed through Ukrainian forces on November 4 presentations Ukrainian forces lately repelling a platoon-sized Russian mechanized attack within the Lyman route (west of Kreminna).[31] The Ukrainian Common Workforce reported that Russian forces persevered offensive operations north of Kupyansk close to Kindrashivka and Holubivka; east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk close to Kolisnykivka, Kruhlyakivka, Lozova, Cherneshchyna, Stepova Novoselivka, Zahryzove, Kucherivka, and Berestove; west of Svatove close to Vyshneve and Pershotravneve; southwest of Svatove close to Druzhelyubivka, Makiivka, and Hrekivka; west of Kremmina close to Torske, Zarichne, and Terny; and southwest of Kremmina close to Dibrova on November 3 and four.[32]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
The Ukrainian Common Workforce reported that Russian forces performed unsuccessful floor assaults northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka on November 4.[33]
Russian forces persevered restricted offensive operations close to Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar close to Stupochky on November 4 however didn’t make any showed advances.[34] Components of the Russian sixth Motorized Rifle Department and 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (either one of the third Military Corps [AC]); 58th Spetsnaz Brigade (51st Blended Fingers Military [CAA], previously 1st Donetsk Other folks’s Republic [DNR] AC); and 98th VDV (Airborne) Department reportedly proceed working close to Chasiv Yar.[35]
Russian and Ukrainian forces lately complex close to Toretsk. Geolocated photos printed on November 3 signifies that Russian forces have complex alongside Molodizhna Side road in northwestern Pivnichne (east of Toretsk).[36] Further geolocated photos printed on November 4 signifies that Ukrainian forces have regained misplaced positions in central Nelipivka (southwest of Toretsk).[37] The Ukrainian Common Workforce reported that Russian forces performed unsuccessful floor assaults close to Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk close to Dachne; and west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka on November 3 and four.[38]
Russian forces lately complex south and southeast of Pokrovsk amid proceed offensive operations within the house on November 4. Geolocated photos printed on November 3 signifies that Russian forces complex in fields northwest of Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk).[39] Geolocated photos printed on November 4 presentations Russian forces engaging in a kind of platoon-sized mechanized attack and advancing to the jap outskirts of Novooleksiivka (southwest of Selydove and south of Pokrovsk).[40] Russian assets claimed that parts of the eightieth Tank Regiment (ninetieth Guards Tank Department, forty first CAA, Central Army District [CMD]) performed the attack on Novooleksiivka.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complex in fields southwest of Vyshneve (at once west of Selydove), even though ISW has no longer seen visible affirmation of this declare.[42] Russian and Ukrainian assets reported persevered preventing east of Pokrovsk close to Myrolyubivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Sukhyi Yar, Lysivka, Novohrodivka, Hryhorivka, and Vyshneve; and south of Pokrovsk within the route of Novooleksiivka and Yurivka on November 3 and four.[43]
Russian forces lately complex northwest of Kurakhove amid persevered offensive operations within the Kurakhove route on November 4. Geolocated photos printed on November 4 signifies that Russian forces complex to western Novodmytrivka (northwest of Kurakhove).[44] DNR Head Denis Pushilin posted photos on November 4 purportedly from inside of Hirnyk (northeast of Kurakhove), suggesting that Russian forces have most probably lately seized the agreement.[45] Russian assets claimed that Russian forces additionally complex in fields south of Kreminna Balka (southeast of Novodmytrivka and north of Kurakhove), close to Illinka (northeast of Kurakhove), and close to Novoselydivka and Voznesenka (each north of Kurakhove), even though ISW has no longer but seen affirmation of those claims.[46] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade working within the Kurakhove route reported that Russian forces are seeking to evacuate and service mechanized apparatus so as to get ready for additional mechanized attacks within the Kurakhove route however famous that Ukrainian forces destroyed just about 100 items of armored apparatus together with tanks and different cars on this house in October 2024 on my own.[47] The Ukrainian Common Workforce reported that Russian forces persevered floor assaults northwest of Kurakhove close to Novodmytrivka; north of Kurakhove close to Kreminna Balka and Novoselydivka; and northeast of Kurakhove close to Illinka, Vovchenka, and Ostrivske on November 3 and four.[48]
Russian forces lately complex within the Vuhledar route amid persevered offensive operations within the house on November 4. Geolocated photos printed on November 3 presentations Russian forces elevating a Russian flag in western Shakhtarske (northwest of Vuhledar), indicating that Russian forces have seized the agreement.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complex northeast of Vuhledar close to Katerynivka and northwest of Vuhledar close to Yasna Polyana, even though ISW has no longer seen affirmation of those claims.[50] Russian forces persevered attacking northeast of Vuhledar close to Katerynivka and Antonivka and northwest of Vuhledar close to Trudove, Maksymivka, and Yasna Polyana on November 3 and four.[51] Components of the Russian “Bashkir Volki” detachment of the “Dostavalov” Volunteer Battalion (a volunteer battalion shaped in Republic of Bashkortostan in 2022) are reportedly working close to Antonivka; parts of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Common Workforce’s Major Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are working within the normal Vuhledar house; parts of the eleventh Air Pressure and Air Protection Military (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Jap Army District [EMD]) are reportedly engaging in airstrikes opposed to Rozdolne (northwest of Vuhledar); and parts of the 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth CAA, Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to Dalne (north of Vuhledar).[52]
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian goal: Care for frontline positions and safe rear spaces opposed to Ukrainian moves)
Russian forces persevered offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 4 however didn’t advance. The Ukrainian Common Workforce reported that Russian forces persevered attacking north of Robotyne close to Novodanylivka and Orikhiv; and northwest of Robotyne close to Novoandriivka and Stepove.[53]
Russian forces persevered localized floor attacks in east (left) financial institution Kherson Oblast on November 3 and four however didn’t advance.[54]
Ukrainian Military Spokesperson Captain 3rd Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk said on November 4 that Ukrainian naval drones proceed to stop Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels from freely working within the Black Sea.[55] Pletenchuk additionally famous that worsening climate prerequisites are combating Russian aviation — Russian forces’ number one type of aerial reconnaissance — from working over the Black Sea. Pletenchuk prior to now famous that the Russian navy is excited by Ukrainian moves on Russian BSF vessels within the port of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, and that Russian forces are sortieing BSF vessels to restrict the chance of imaginable Ukrainian drone moves and additional destruction to BSF vessels.[56]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Function: Goal Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and at the frontline)
Russian forces performed a chain of drone and missile moves opposed to Ukraine at the evening of November 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported on November 4 that Russian forces released one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Rostov Oblast opposed to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and 80 strike drones of Shahed and unidentified varieties from Bryansk Oblast, Kursk Oblast, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai Oblast.[57] The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Ukrainian forces downed 50 drones over Kyiv, Sumy, Odesa, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Zhytomyr, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Kirovohrad oblasts and that 27 drones had been “in the community misplaced,” most probably because of Ukrainian digital war (EW) interference. Ukrainian officers said on November 4 that falling drone particles led to fires in Desnyanskyi and Obolonskyi raions, Kyiv Town and that Shahed drone moves broken residential structures within the Bolhradska Hromada and a game camp in Vasylivska Hromada, Odesa Oblast.[58] Ukrainian officers reported that Russian FAB-250 drift bomb with unified making plans and correction module (UMPC) moves on civilian infrastructure and a grocery store injured 11 civilians and 4 policemen in Shevchenkivskyi Raion, Kharkiv Town at the evening of November 3 to 4.[59]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on November 4 that Russian forces higher Shahed drone moves on Ukrainian goals tenfold since Fall 2023.[60] Ukrainian Floor Forces Commander Lieutenant Common Oleksandr Pavlyuk said on November 4 that Ukrainian forces downed 464 Shahed-131/136 drones in all of October and downed 139 Shahed-131/136 drones within the week of October 28 to November 3 on my own.[61]
Russian Mobilization and Pressure Technology Efforts (Russian goal: Increase battle energy with out engaging in normal mobilization)
The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) continues makes an attempt to shape a cadre of unswerving navy reporters so that you could management the pro-war Russian knowledge house and centralize management over Russia’s conflict protection. The Russian MoD introduced on November 4 that its Prince Alexander Nevsky Army College is providing a five-year navy journalist forte program that prepares members to turn out to be both Russian navy reporters or contributors of the Russian navy press provider, and gives lessons on journalism, tactical navy coaching, and data war.[62] The members may also reportedly achieve sensible enjoy through running at Russian state-run media shops and media companies for Russian navy districts and Russian naval fleets. The Russian MoD famous that graduates of this system obtain the army rank of lieutenant.
The Kremlin is leveraging the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) to advertise the “Time of Heroes” program, which prepares Russian veterans of the conflict in Ukraine for positions in Russian native and regional governments. ROC Head Patriarch Kirill met with Russian veterans at a “Time of Heroes” match on November 3 to talk about the significance of Russian veterans contributing to the Russian govt and emphasised the significance of “religious team spirit” and “conventional values.”[63] ISW continues to evaluate that the “Time of Heroes” program is a part of Kremlin efforts to militarize Russian society and govt and to fill govt positions with pro-Kremlin and pro-war veterans.[64]
The Russian command continues to misuse specialised Russian devices to improve depleted attack devices. A soldier within the Russian 174th Reconnaissance Battalion (one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Department, eighth Blended Fingers Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) claimed on November 3 that one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Department Commander Main Common Vitaly Terekhin disbanded the soldier’s reconnaissance unit and transferred the warriors into significantly depleted infantry attack devices.[65] The soldier famous that the higher casualty charges of infantrymen from specialised devices may jeopardize the advent of Russian military-technical enhance devices. A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian one hundred and tenth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) disbanded its “Hurricane” drone unit and moved drone operators from the “Hurricane” unit into attack devices.[66] ISW continues to evaluate that Russian MoD efforts to centralize management over Russian specialist devices are prone to degrade the total high quality of the Russian pressure through pulling down distinctions between other battle specialties and rendering everybody an infantry soldier.[67]
The Russian command continues to depend on attritional infantry-led “meat attacks” to degrade Ukrainian defenses and advance alongside the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 2 {that a} Russian commander referred to as newly recruited contract infantrymen “second-rate infantry” and threatened to make use of them in “meat attacks” to degrade Ukrainian forces at the frontline.[68] The milblogger claimed that the usage of new recruits in those attack devices is an unstated Russian navy tactic. ISW prior to now seen Russian milblogger court cases about how infantry-led attacks worsen Russian forces’ group of workers issues.[69]
Russian Technological Diversifications (Russian goal: Introduce technological inventions to optimize programs to be used in Ukraine)
A distinguished, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on November 4 that Russian corporate Nova Labs advanced a hand-launched drone interceptor gun that fires a drone supplied with an optical honing instrument able to autonomously locking on to focus on drones.[70] The milblogger famous that civilians may use the launcher to offer protection to Russian essential infrastructure, together with oil depots.
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed spaces; forcibly combine Ukrainian electorate into Russian sociocultural, financial, navy, and governance programs)
ISW isn’t publishing reporting on actions in Russian-occupied spaces lately.
Important task in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Workforce task in Belarus)
Not anything important to record.
Be aware: ISW does no longer obtain any categorized subject material from any supply, makes use of handiest publicly to be had knowledge, and attracts broadly on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially to be had satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the foundation for those studies. References to all assets used are equipped within the endnotes of each and every replace.
[1] dot md/cec-presidential-results-tour2.html; dot media/872499-cvk-moldovi-zaversila-pidrahunok-golosiv-sandu-nabrala-5533/; dot md/cec-presidential-results-tour2.html
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