Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, January 4, 2025
Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 4, 2025, 4:00 pm ET
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day along the static maps provide on this file.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s 3-d management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (now not a cellular software) is strongly really useful for the usage of this data-heavy instrument.
Click on right here to get admission to ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Those maps supplement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by means of appearing a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive per month.
Be aware: The knowledge cut-off for this product was once 11 am ET on January 4. ISW will quilt next stories within the January 5 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.
Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or broken over 3,000 Russian tanks and virtually 9,000 armored cars in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue automobile losses which are most likely unsustainable within the medium-term. Knowledge from the Ukrainian Normal Personnel signifies that Ukrainian forces destroyed or broken 3,689 tanks, 8,956 infantry combating cars (IFVs), 13,050 artillery programs, and 407 air protection programs between January 1, 2024 and January 1, 2025.[1] Russian forces reportedly misplaced a minimum of 197 tanks, 661 armored workforce carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery programs better than 100mm all the way through the frontline all through a duration of intensified offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast in September and October 2024 and most likely sustained a better charge of tank and armored automobile losses in June and July 2024 when Russian forces have been undertaking mechanized attacks in western Donetsk Oblast a number of instances every week that regularly led to armored automobile losses.[2]
Russia’s present armored automobile and tank manufacturing charges point out that such losses will be prohibitive over the long term, specifically as Russia continues to dip into its Soviet-era shares.[3] Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets mentioned in February 2024 that the Russian protection commercial base (DIB) can produce 250-300 “new and carefully modernized” tanks consistent with 12 months and will restore more or less 250-300 further broken tanks consistent with 12 months, a ways underneath Ukraine’s estimate of three,600 Russian tanks misplaced in 2024.[4] The British World Institute for Strategic Research (IISS) suppose tank additionally reported in February 2024 that Russia is most likely ready to maintain its charge of car losses at the moment (over 3,000 armored combating cars together with tanks, armored workforce carriers, and infantry combating cars once a year as of 2023 and just about 8,800 between February 2022 and February 2024) for a minimum of two to 3 years (till about February 2026 or 2027) by means of principally refurbishing cars from Soviet-era garage amenities.[5] A social media supply monitoring Russian army depots by means of satellite tv for pc imagery shared an up to date overview of Russian tank and armored automobile garage amenities on December 22 and assessed that Russian forces have 47 % in their pre-war tank reserves, 52 % of pre-war infantry combating automobile reserves, and 45 % of pre-war armored workforce provider reserves final in garage as of a contemporary unspecified date.[6] The social media supply famous that Russian forces have used maximum in their more recent T-90 and T-80 tanks however nonetheless have a majority in their older tanks in garage, despite the fact that a few of these tanks have most likely been closely degraded by means of climate and time. It sounds as if an increasing number of not likely that the Russian army can maintain its present annual charge of virtually 9,000 armored automobile losses thru 2025. This loss charge is just about thrice the once a year loss charge of the primary two years of the battle in keeping with IISS, suggesting that the February 2024 IISS estimate that Russia can maintain its automobile losses thru 2025 and most likely 2026 is not legitimate.
Russian forces have reportedly been the usage of fewer armored cars in attacks in essentially the most energetic spaces of the frontline in fresh weeks, most likely so as to preserve those cars as Soviet shares dwindle. Ukrainian army resources have lately famous that Russian forces had been the usage of fewer armored cars and undertaking fewer mechanized attacks within the Kurakhove path after struggling vital automobile losses in October and November 2024.[7] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade running within the Kurakhove path mentioned on January 3 that Russian forces have switched to principally the usage of infantry to behavior attacks within the space over the last few weeks and are simplest the usage of armored cars as hearth give a boost to for infantry attacks.[8] The New York Instances reported on December 31 {that a} Ukrainian lieutenant colonel mentioned that Russian forces are an increasing number of the usage of electrical scooters, bikes, and all-terrain cars (ATVs) all through attacks in japanese Ukraine, most likely as a part of ongoing Russian efforts to offset armored automobile losses.[9] Russian assaults close to extra mid-sized, city settlements corresponding to Kurakhove and Pokrovsk can also be much less conducive to mechanized attacks than the small settlements and open fields the place Russian forces complex in maximum of 2024. Russian forces could also be the usage of fewer armored cars within the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk instructions if the Russian army is suffering to reequip frontline Russian gadgets and formations and if Russian army command does now not need to withdraw Russian gadgets for relaxation and reconstitution and chance additional slowing Russian advances in high-priority frontline sectors.[10]
Ukrainian forces struck a gasoline terminal on the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast at the evening of January 3 to 4. Geolocated pictures revealed on January 4 displays harm to the Novatek gasoline terminal in Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast following a Ukrainian drone strike.[11] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that its resources mentioned that Russian forces shot down many of the drones over the port terminal of Novatek subsidiary Novatrans LLC, inflicting minor harm to a development on the port.[12] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed that Russian forces downed 3 drones close to Luga Bay however that there was once no harm.[13] Drozdenko claimed that Russian forces destroyed a complete of 4 drones over Leningrad Oblast.[14] The Ust-Luga sea business port is the second one greatest in Russia after Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, and Ukrainian forces performed a a success drone strike in opposition to the Novatek gasoline terminal on the port in January 2024.[15]
Astra reported that its resources within the Russian emergency services and products mentioned that Ukrainian forces centered the Baltimore Air Base in Voronezh Town with a minimum of 5 drones at the evening of January 3 to 4 and that Russian forces shot down the entire drones.[16] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that Russian forces destroyed a minimum of 5 drones over Voronezh Town in a single day and that a number of drones fell on residential constructions.[17] Astra additionally reported on January 4 that its resources within the Kursk Oblast emergency services and products mentioned {that a} Ukrainian HIMARS strike in opposition to Ivanovskoye, Kursk Oblast on January 2 killed seven Russian servicemembers.[18] Ukrainian and Russian resources prior to now mentioned that the strike centered a command publish of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Army District [SMD]).[19]
Key Takeaways:
Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or broken over 3,000 Russian tanks and virtually 9,000 armored cars in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue automobile losses which are most likely unsustainable within the medium-term.
Russian forces have reportedly been the usage of fewer armored cars in attacks in essentially the most energetic spaces of the frontline in fresh weeks, most likely so as to preserve those cars as Soviet shares dwindle.
Ukrainian forces struck a gasoline terminal on the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast at the evening of January 3 to 4.
Ukrainian forces lately regained misplaced positions close to Kreminna and most likely care for positions close to Kurakhove.
Russian forces lately complex close to Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
The Russian govt continues to extend monetary incentives so as to spice up the recruitment of army workforce.
We don’t file intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of those actions are well-covered in Western media and do indirectly have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We will be able to proceed to judge and file at the results of those legal actions at the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on battle in Ukrainian city spaces. We totally condemn Russian violations of the rules of armed warfare and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity although we don’t describe them in those stories.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian Primary Effort – Japanese Ukraine (made from 3 subordinate major efforts)
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the global border with Belgorod Oblast and option to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #3 – Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
Russian Mobilization and Power Era Efforts
Russian Technological Variations
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces
Vital Task in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian forces persevered offensive operations alongside Ukraine’s salient in Kursk Oblast on January 4, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that combating is ongoing southeast of Korenevo close to Leonidovo, Aleksandriya, Viktorovka, and Kruglenkoye, and some other milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces performed a number of counterattacks in unspecified spaces of Kursk Oblast.[20] A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade running in Kursk Oblast reported that Russian forces are sending maximum newly skilled Russian workforce to battle in both Kursk Oblast or western Donetsk Oblast.[21] The servicemember reported that Russian forces are undertaking attacks in small teams the usage of mild cars, bikes, buggies, and scooters in Kursk Oblast. Parts of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Department are reportedly running close to Sverdlikovo and Lebedevka (each southeast of Korenevo).[22] Parts of the Russian 83rd and eleventh VDV brigades reportedly proceed running in Kursk Oblast, and artillery parts of the Russian 1434th “Akhmat-Chechnya” Regiment are reportedly running close to Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha).[23]
Russian Primary Effort – Japanese Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian purpose: Push Ukrainian forces again from the global border with Belgorod Oblast and option to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town)
Russian forces persevered restricted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv Town close to Starytsya and Vovchansk on January 3 and four.[24]
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian purpose: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northerly Donetsk Oblast)
Be aware: ISW is now orienting Russian process alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line within the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman instructions to mirror Russian forces’ precedence operational objectives in those spaces.
Russian forces persevered offensive operations within the Kupyansk path on January 4 however didn’t make showed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complex north of Kupyansk to the west and southwest of Zapadne, to northeastern Kalynove and to the west (proper) financial institution of the Oskil River east of Holubivka; east of Kupyansk to the north and northeast of Petropavlivka and south and southwest of Stepova Novoselivka; and southeast of Kupyansk in fields east of Kivsharivka.[25] ISW has now not seen affirmation of this declare, alternatively. Russian forces additionally persevered offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk close to Synkivka and east of Kupyansk close to Kucherivka on January 3 and four.[26]
Russian forces persevered offensive operations within the Borova path on January 4 however didn’t make showed advances. The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed on January 4 that Russian forces seized Nadiya (east of Borova), which ISW assessed Russian forces had seized as of November 6.[27] Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove; east of Borova close to Nadiya, Pershotravneve, Novoserhiivka, Novoyehorivka, and Tverdokhlibove; and southeast of Borova close to Makiivka and Cherneshchyna on January 3 and four.[28]
Russian and Ukrainian forces lately complex northwest of Kreminna within the Lyman path. Geolocated pictures revealed on January 2 displays that Ukrainian forces recaptured positions in central Terny (northwest of Kreminna).[29] Further geolocated pictures revealed on January 4 displays that Russian forces complex around the Zherebets River and into central Ivanivka (northwest of Kreminna).[30] Russian forces additionally persevered floor assaults northwest of Kreminna close to Yampolivka and Terny and southwest of Kreminna within the Serebryanske woodland space on January 3 and four.[31]
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian purpose: Seize the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces persevered offensive operations close to Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka (each northeast of Siversk) on January 3 and four however didn’t make any showed advances.[32]
Russian forces persevered offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar path on January 4 however didn’t make any showed advances. Russian forces performed offensive operations inside and close to Chasiv Yar itself, southeast of Chasiv Yar close to Klishchiivka, and south of Chasiv Yar close to Bila Hora and in opposition to Predtechyne and Stupochky on January 3 and four.[33] The commander of a Ukrainian brigade running within the Chasiv Yar path mentioned that the Russian army command has lately dedicated over 10,000 workforce to offensive operations close to Chasiv Yar.[34] Parts of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Department and seventh Army Base (forty ninth Mixed Hands Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly running close to Chasiv Yar.[35]
Russian forces lately marginally complex in Toretsk amid persevered offensive operations within the space on January 4. Geolocated pictures revealed on January 4 signifies that Russian forces lately marginally complex alongside 1-Hirskyi Boulevard in northwestern Toretsk.[36] Russian forces performed offensive operations close to Toretsk itself, northeast of Toretsk close to Dyliivka, and west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka on January 3 and four.[37]
Russian forces lately complex southeast and southwest of Pokrovsk amid ongoing offensive operations within the Pokrovsk path on January 4. Geolocated pictures revealed on January 4 signifies that Russian forces lately complex in central Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and northwest of Vovkove (southwest of Pokrovsk), indicating that Russian forces have most likely seized Vovkove.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complex northeast of Pokrovsk from Vozdvyzhenka to the western outskirts of Vodyane Druhe (northwest of Vodvyzhenka) and 1.5 kilometers north of Tymofiivka (southwest of Vozdvyzhenka) and that Russian forces are lately one kilometer from the T-05-04 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka freeway.[39] ISW has now not seen affirmation of those claims, alternatively. Ukraine’s Khortytsia Workforce of Forces Spokesperson Primary Viktor Trehubov mentioned that Russian forces are making an attempt to envelop Pokrovsk as a result of they need to steer clear of city battle and famous that Russian forces are lately undertaking fewer drift bomb moves alongside the frontline in japanese Ukraine than in early 2024.[40] Preventing continues close to Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk close to Baranivka, Myrne, Vodyane Druhe, and Tymofiivka; east of Pokrovsk close to Promin and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Dachenske, Zelene, Novyi Trud, Shevchenko, and Pishchane and within the path of Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Solone, Novoolenivka, Kotlyne, Novovasylivka, Novoyelyzavetivka, Nadezhdynka, and Ukrainka and in opposition to Sribne on January 3 and four.[41] Russian resources credited parts of the thirtieth Motorized Rifle Brigade (2d CAA, Central Army District [CMD]) and eightieth Tank Regiment (ninetieth Tank Department, forty first CAA, CMD) with the hot seizure of Novoolenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[42]
Ukrainian forces most likely care for restricted positions close to the Kurakhivske Reservoir amid ongoing Russian advances southwest of Kurakhove on January 4. Geolocated pictures revealed on January 3 signifies that Ukrainian forces care for restricted positions south of Stari Terny (northwest of Kurakhove) at the western fringe of the Kurakhivske Reservoir.[43] Further geolocated pictures revealed on January 3 signifies that Russian forces lately marginally complex northeast of Kostyantynopolske (southwest of Kurakhove).[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are clearing restricted Ukrainian positions in western Kurakhove, are seeking to bypass Petropavlivka (northwest of Kurakhove) from the north, and complex alongside the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia Town freeway towards Dachne (west of Kurakhove).[45] A Russian supply additionally claimed that Russian forces entered Petropavlivka.[46] ISW has now not seen affirmation of those claims. Pictures revealed on January 4 signifies that Ukrainian forces lately repelled a platoon-sized mechanized attack within the Kurakhove path on an unspecified day.[47] Russian forces persevered attack close to Kurakhove itself, northwest of Kurakhove close to Petropavlivka, west of Kurakhove close to Dachne and within the path of Kostyantynopil, south of Kurakhove in opposition to Yantarne, and southwest of Kurakhove close to Zelenivka and Rozlyv on January 3 and four.[48] Drone operators of the Russian a hundred and tenth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously the first Donetsk Other folks’s Republic [DNR] Military Corps [AC]) and artillery gadgets of the 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth CAA, SMD) are reportedly running close to the reservoir; parts of the Russian a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Department (eighth CAA) are reportedly running close to Dachne; parts of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Normal Personnel’s Primary Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly running close to Zelenivka; and parts of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (fifth CAA, Japanese Army District [EMD]) are reportedly running within the basic Kurakhove path.[49]
Be aware: ISW will likely be incorporating information prior to now reported because the Vuhledar path as a part of the Kurakhove path shifting ahead to mirror the moving operational scenario on this space.
Russian forces persevered offensive operations close to Velyka Novosilka on January 4 however didn’t make any showed advances. Russian forces performed offensive operations west of Velyka Novosilka close to Novosilka on January 3 and four.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complex northwest of Neskuchne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and in opposition to Novosilka south of the O0510 Velyka Novosilka-Hulyaipole freeway, however ISW has now not seen affirmation of those claims.[51]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian purpose: Handle frontline positions and protected rear spaces in opposition to Ukrainian moves)
Russian forces persevered offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast however didn’t make any showed advances on January 4. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 4 that Russian forces complex northwest of Robotyne close to Mala Tokmachka and Bilohirya.[52] ISW has now not seen affirmation of those claims, alternatively. Russian forces additionally performed offensive operations north of Robotyne close to Novodanylivka on January 4.[53] A Russian milbogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in unspecified spaces in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[54] Drone operators of the Russian BARS-1 Detachment (Russian Struggle Military Reserve) and drone operators of the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (seventh VDV Department) reportedly proceed running within the Orikhiv path.[55]
Russian forces persevered attacks within the Dnipro path and at the islands within the Dnipro River Delta on January 3 and four however didn’t make any showed advances.[56]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Function: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and at the frontline)
Russian forces performed a chain of drone and missile moves in opposition to Ukraine all through the day on January 3 and in a single day on January 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Russian forces introduced 5 S-300 air protection missiles at Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast; 3 Iskander-M ballistic missiles at Chernihiv Oblast; 3 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles at Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; and 32 Shahed and decoy drones from the northeastern path all through the day on January 3.[57] The Ukrainian Air Power mentioned that Ukrainian forces downed 3 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 13 drones, and that 19 drones have been ”misplaced,” most likely because of Ukrainian digital conflict (EW) interference, as of 2000 native time. Ukrainian officers reported that Russian forces performed 3 missile moves on a unmarried residential development at the outskirts of Chernihiv Town inside only some hours at the afternoon of January 3, destructive the encompassing homes and killing one civilian.[58] The Ukrainian Air Power reported on January 4 that Russian forces introduced 81 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai in a single day on January 3 to 4.[59] The Ukrainian Air Power mentioned that Ukrainian forces downed 34 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts and that 47 drones have been ”misplaced,” most likely because of Ukrainian digital conflict (EW) interference, as of 0900 native time. The Ukrainian Air Power reported that particles from downed drones broken residential properties in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts. The Ukrainian Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command reported on January 4 that possibly a Russian Shahed drone broken two commercial places in Stari Borovychi, Chernihiv Oblast.[60]
Russian Mobilization and Power Era Efforts (Russian purpose: Make bigger battle energy with out undertaking basic mobilization)
The Russian govt continues to extend monetary incentives so as to spice up the recruitment of army workforce. Russian opposition shops Astra and Mobilization Information reported on January 4 that Russian officers in Samara Oblast greater one-time lump bills for signing a freelance with the Russian army to 4 million rubles (about $36,222), which Samara Oblast officers characterised because the easiest one-time fee lately presented in Russia.[61] A Ukrainian supply reported on January 4 that recruitment posters display that Voronezh Oblast greater one-time bills to people who refer somebody else to signal an army contract with the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) by means of 50 % to 75 thousand rubles (about $679) – simply two weeks after Voronezh Oblast officers ultimate greater the one-time fee (since about December 21).[62]
Russian Technological Variations (Russian purpose: Introduce technological inventions to optimize programs to be used in Ukraine)
A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian army has to this point did not modernize its naval drones as Ukrainian forces proceed to effectively innovate their naval drone fleet.[63] The milblogger claimed on January 2 that the Russian army has lengthy been creating and checking out more than a few naval drone prototypes and puzzled why the Russian army has now not broadly deployed those drones. The milblogger insinuated that Russia lags in the back of Ukraine in relation to drone innovation and famous that Russia plans to expand a producing hub for Russian naval drones on the Kingisepp Gadget-Construction Plant in St. Petersburg in 2025.
A Russian milblogger reported that Russian forces are adapting older tank fashions, such because the T-62 tank, to function changed armored workforce carriers (APCs).[64] The milblogger posted a picture of a changed Russian T-62 tank with a flat platform and claimed that Russian forces tailored the tank in an try to clear up a prolonged scarcity of Russian APCs.
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces (Russian purpose: Consolidate administrative management of annexed spaces; forcibly combine Ukrainian electorate into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance programs)
ISW isn’t reporting on actions in Russian-occupied spaces lately.
Vital process in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and extra combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Not anything vital to file.
Be aware: ISW does now not obtain any labeled subject material from any supply, makes use of simplest publicly to be had data, and attracts broadly on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially to be had satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the foundation for those stories. References to all resources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
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