Institute for the Learn about of Conflict

Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, November 9, 2024
Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Christopher Paludi, and Frederick W. Kagan
November 9, 2024, 6:30pm ET
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day along the static maps provide on this file.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s three-D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (no longer a cell software) is strongly really useful for the usage of this data-heavy device.
Click on right here to get entry to ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Those maps supplement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day via appearing a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive per 30 days.
Word: The knowledge cut-off for this product was once 12:30pm ET on November 9. ISW will duvet next studies within the November 10 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.
Russian forces reportedly misplaced virtually 200 tanks, over 650 armored cars, and suffered an estimated 80,000 casualties in taking kind of 1,500 sq. kilometers right through a length of intensified Russian offensive operations in September and October 2024. United Kingdom (UK) Protection Secretary John Healey advised UK outlet The Telegraph on November 9 that UK protection intelligence estimates that Russian casualties “reached a brand new prime” in October 2024 and that Russian forces suffered a median day by day casualty charge of one,345 troops in keeping with day or about 41,980 casualties in October 2024.[1] The United Kingdom Ministry of Protection (MoD), bringing up information from the Ukrainian Common Team of workers, up to now reported that Russian forces suffered a file prime reasonable day by day casualty charge of one,271 troops in keeping with day or about 38,130 casualties in September 2024.[2] Russian forces have thus suffered an estimated 80,110 casualties during the last two months – kind of 20,000 extra casualties than US forces suffered right through virtually two decades of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[3] Information compiled via Oryx founder Jakub Janovsky signifies that Russian forces additionally misplaced 197 tanks, 661 armored workforce carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery methods greater than 100mm right through the frontline in September and October 2024.[4] Russian forces seized and recaptured a complete of one,517 sq. kilometers–an space not up to a 3rd the dimensions of Delaware–throughout Ukraine and Kursk Oblast during the last two months in change for those losses. Russian forces have intensified offensive operations close to Kupyansk in Kharkiv Oblast and Selydove, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast during the last two months and feature controlled to advance at a touch sooner charge than Russian forces have complicated during the last two years.[5] Russian forces just lately seized Vuhledar and Selydove however have not begun to make operationally important advances, and Russian forces have made maximum in their advances right through this time via open fields and small settlements.
Russian forces will in the end make operationally important beneficial properties if Ukrainian forces don’t prevent ongoing Russian offensive operations, however the Russian army can not maintain such loss charges indefinitely, particularly no longer for such restricted beneficial properties. ISW up to now noticed information indicating that Russian forces have misplaced a minimum of 5 divisions’ value of armored cars and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion on my own since October 2023.[6] Russian forces have most likely accrued a considerable amount of apparatus in precedence frontline spaces, however dwindling Soviet-era tank and armored car stockpiles and present armored car manufacturing charges will most likely make such losses prohibitive over the long term.[7] US Protection Secretary Lloyd Austin said on October 31 that Russian forces are struggling kind of 1,200 casualties in keeping with day, or about 36,000 casualties monthly, and ISW has just lately noticed indications that the Russian army has been suffering to recruit sufficient squaddies to switch its frontline losses.[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin significantly stated Russia’s ongoing hard work shortages and dependence on migrants to fulfill those hard work shortages right through his November 7 Valdai Membership cope with, and ISW famous that Russia additionally will depend on coercing migrants to sign up for the Russian army to fulfill its manpower necessities.[9] The Russian army virtually undoubtedly can not indefinitely maintain a day by day casualty charge of over 1,200 folks as long as Putin stays dedicated to averting every other involuntary call-up of reservists.[10] Even an involuntary reserve mobilization is not going to get to the bottom of the bigger drawback Putin it sounds as if faces find sufficient folks to paintings in Russia’s industries whilst additionally feeding the entrance.
Make a selection Russian milbloggers proceed to whinge about disproportionately prime workforce losses, and wider discontent about losses inside the Russian ultranationalist milblogger neighborhood might also affect Putin’s calculus someday. A former Russian Hurricane-Z trainer and milblogger complained on November 8 that it takes a minimum of six months to coach attack workforce however that the Russian army command is treating attack workforce as “meat” who don’t require a prime stage of coaching and whose number one job is to “catch drones [and] shrapnel.”[11] The milblogger claimed that Russian infantry losses are prime because of the continued Russian tactic of sending small attack teams in more than one, successive waves in an try to crush Ukrainian forces, which the milblogger categorised as “silly” and “improperly arranged.” The milblogger concluded that Russian advances “don’t appear proportionate to the irretrievably spent sources – human and materials.” The Russian milblogger neighborhood just lately criticized the deaths of specialised drone operators whom their commanders despatched on attacks as punishment, and the ongoing use of Russian servicemembers, specifically specialised troops, in unorganized, extremely attritional, infantry-led “meat” attacks that lead to disproportionately small beneficial properties might proceed to anger the milblogger neighborhood – a gaggle in opposition to which the Kremlin has proven itself to be particularly delicate.[12]
Ukrainian forces carried out drone moves at the Aleksin Chemical Plant in Tula Oblast at the evening of November 8 to 9. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on November 9 that its assets in Ukraine’s Safety Provider (SBU) said that the SBU and Ukraine’s Particular Operations Forces (SSO) released a minimum of 13 drones on the Aleksin Chemical Plant and {that a} a hit strike brought about a hearth, halting the plant’s operations and in the end inflicting a chemical explosion at the afternoon of November 9.[13] The SBU assets said that the Aleksin Chemical Plant is a subsidiary of the Russian state protection conglomerate Rostec and that the plant produces ammunition, gunpowder, and different merchandise for the Russian protection commercial base.[14] Photos printed on November 9 purportedly presentations a strike at the Aleksin Chemical Plant and the next fireplace.[15] Suspilne’s assets said that Ukrainian drone moves additionally broken an influence transmission line on the close by Aleksinskaya Thermal Energy Plant.[16] Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike close to Aleksin however that falling drone particles broken a number of homes.[17]
Russian government are reportedly taking into account merging Russia’s 3 biggest oil corporations — Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, and Lukoil, more likely to lend a hand Russia achieve extra tremendous power offers with non-Western states. The Wall Side road Magazine (WSJ) reported on November 9, bringing up assets acquainted with the subject, that Russian officers and managers are negotiating a imaginable merger between state-affiliated Rosneft, state-owned Gazprom Neft, and independently-owned Lukoil that may create the second-largest crude oil manufacturing corporate on this planet.[18] The WSJ reported that Rosneft Head and shut affiliate of Russian President Vladimir Putin Igor Sechin is a “primary participant” within the ongoing talks and that the merger is also aimed toward extracting upper costs for Russian oil from India or the Other folks’s Republic of China (PRC). The WSJ’s assets said that the deal continues to be topic to modify and that it’s unclear whether or not Sechin would head the merged corporate, and representatives of the Kremlin, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, and Rosneft all denied the talks. Gazprom Neft’s dad or mum corporate, Gazprom, has misplaced important revenues from a drop in power gross sales because the get started of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.[19] Longtime Gazprom Head Alexey Miller reportedly failed to succeed in a maintain the PRC in early 2024 because of disagreements over the proposed Energy of Siberia-2 (PS-2) gasoline pipeline, and Putin emphasised in his November 7 Valdai Membership cope with that Russia is keen to promote oil, gasoline, and nuclear power to the PRC to make amends for the PRC’s power provides misplaced because of Western sanctions.[20] The Kremlin is also looking to consolidate its affect within the world power marketplace to succeed in extra tremendous power offers, specifically with the PRC, amid falling revenues from world power exports and greater federal spending on nationwide safety and protection.
Russian government arrested a former Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) building authentic for fraud on November 9. Russian government arrested former Russian MoD Particular Building Directorate Head Alexander Molodchenko and two different unspecified defendants on suspicion of fraud after reportedly “deceptive” Russian MoD officers in regards to the success of state building contracts.[21] Molodchenko was once reportedly pushed aside from his submit as MoD Particular Building Directorate head in September 2024.
The USA Division of Protection (DOD) reportedly said on November 8 that it’s going to ship a “small quantity” of US protection contractors to rear spaces of Ukraine to fix US-provided guns and gear. The Washington Submit reported that the United States protection contractors will restore F-16 fighter jets, Bradley infantry preventing cars, and unspecified air protection methods.[22] An unspecified US protection authentic advised The Gentleman Report that the contractors can be situated “a ways from” the frontline and famous that F-16s and Patriot air protection methods “require particular technical experience to handle.”[23] The DoD advised the Wall Side road Magazine (WSJ) in a November 9 article that protecting those guns methods mission-capable is “essential” for Ukraine’s protection.[24] A senior Biden management authentic advised the WSJ that the United States could also be offering over 500 interceptors for Patriot missile methods and NASAMS to Ukraine, which is able to most likely arrive within the coming weeks.[25]
Key Takeaways:
Russian forces reportedly misplaced virtually 200 tanks, over 650 armored cars, and suffered an estimated 80,000 casualties in taking kind of 1,500 sq. kilometers right through a length of intensified Russian offensive operations in September and October 2024.
Russian forces will in the end make operationally important beneficial properties if Ukrainian forces don’t prevent ongoing Russian offensive operations, however the Russian army can not maintain such loss charges indefinitely, particularly no longer for such restricted beneficial properties.
Ukrainian forces carried out drone moves at the Aleksin Chemical Plant in Tula Oblast at the evening of November 8 to 9.
Russian government are reportedly taking into account merging Russia’s 3 biggest oil corporations — Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, and Lukoil, more likely to lend a hand Russia achieve extra tremendous power offers with non-Western states.
Russian government arrested a former Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) building authentic for fraud on November 9.
The USA Division of Protection (DOD) reportedly said on November 8 that it’s going to ship a “small quantity” of US protection contractors to rear spaces of Ukraine to fix US-provided guns and gear.
Ukrainian forces just lately regained positions close to Siversk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces just lately complicated close to Kreminna, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
Ukraine’s Overseas Minister Andrii Sybiha said on November 9 that Ukrainian intelligence assesses that Russia will be capable to produce 30 p.c extra artillery shells than all Ecu Union (EU) international locations mixed in 2025 must the EU fail to enforce further measures, corresponding to sanctions, towards Russia’s protection commercial base (DIB).

We don’t file intimately on Russian conflict crimes as a result of those actions are well-covered in Western media and do indirectly have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We can proceed to guage and file at the results of those felony actions at the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on struggle in Ukrainian city spaces. We completely condemn Russian violations of the rules of armed warfare and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity even if we don’t describe them in those studies.   
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian Major Effort – Jap Ukraine (constituted of 3 subordinate primary efforts)
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and way to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
Russian Mobilization and Power Technology Efforts
Russian Technological Diversifications
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces
Important Job in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Preventing persisted in the primary Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on November 9, however neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made showed advances within the space. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces running east of Korenevo alongside the northern fringe of the salient complicated close to Staraya Sorochina and recaptured Pogrebki and Orlovka right through a strengthened platoon-sized mechanized attack, however ISW has no longer noticed visible affirmation of those claims.[26] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are the usage of unspecified tanks right through attacks on Russian positions in Kursk Oblast.[27] Preventing persisted southeast of Korenevo close to Darino, Nikolayevo-Darino, Leonidovo, Novoivanovka, and Zeleny Shlyakh; east of Korenevo close to Novaya Sorochina and Staraya Sorochina; northeast of Sudzha close to Martynovka; and southeast of Sudzha close to Plekhovo.[28] Components of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Department, together with its 51st VDV Regiment, and the 83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly running in Korenevsky and Sudzhansky raions.[29] Components of the Russian “Arbat” Spetsnaz Battalion (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly proceed to perform in Kursk Oblast.[30]
Russian assets claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian cross-border assault close to Novy Put (south of Glushkovo) in Glushkovsky Raion (west of the primary Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast) on November 9.[31]

See topline textual content for reporting on Ukrainian drone moves into Russia.
Russian Major Effort – Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and way to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town)
Russian forces persisted offensive operations north of Kharkiv Town close to Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv Town close to Vovchansk on November 8 and 9, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline.[32] Ukraine’s Kharkiv Team of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Yevhenii Romanov said that small Russian infantry teams with air and artillery reinforce are attacking in Vovchansk, and each Romanov and the spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade running within the Kharkiv path famous that Russian forces don’t seem to be the usage of armored cars right through attacks on this path.[33] Romanov famous that the new onset of deficient climate stipulations on this path has considerably impacted Russian and Ukrainian drone and artillery operations.[34]

Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northerly Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces just lately marginally complicated northwest of Kreminna amid persisted offensive operations alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 9. Geolocated photos printed on November 9 presentations that Russian forces just lately marginally complicated inside northeastern Terny (northwest of Kreminna).[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces additionally complicated southwest of Stelmakhivka (northwest of Svatove) and additional inside northern Terny, however ISW has no longer noticed visible affirmation of those claims.[36] A Kremlin-awarded milblogger rejected claims, together with from the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD), that Russian forces have seized Terny, and famous that photos appearing a Russian flag inside Terny was once planted via a drone and that there’s no proof to verify that Russian forces have seized all of the agreement.[37] The milblogger additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces grasp positions additional east within the Serebryanske wooded area space (southwest of Kreminna) than Russian assets had up to now assessed.[38] Russian forces persisted floor assaults east of Kupyansk close to Kucherivka; southeast of Kupyansk close to Kruhlyakivka, Kindrashivka, Kolisnykivka, Zahryzove, Lozove, and Berestove; northwest of Kreminna close to Hrekivka, Nevske, and Terny; west of Kreminna close to Torske; and south of Kreminna close to Hryhorivka on November 8 and 9.[39] The commander of a Ukrainian brigade running within the Kupyansk path said that Russian forces are engaging in offensive operations with “disproportionate forces and method” and taking prime workforce and gear losses as a part of efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the east (Ieft) financial institution of the Oskil River.[40] Components of the Russian 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (67th Motorized Rifle Department, twenty fifth Blended Fingers Military [CAA], Central Army District [CMD]) reportedly proceed to perform within the Lyman path.[41]

Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Ukrainian forces just lately regained misplaced positions within the Siversk path amid persisted Russian offensive operations within the space on November 9. Geolocated photos printed on November 8 signifies that Ukrainian forces just lately regained misplaced positions in northern Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complicated 1.5 kilometers from Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk), however ISW has no longer noticed visible affirmation of this declare.[43] Russian forces carried out offensive operations close to Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) and Bilohorivka on November 8 and 9.[44] Components of the Russian thirty ninth Radiation, Chemical, and Organic Protection Regiment (third Blended Fingers Military [CAA], previously second Luhansk Other folks’s Republic Military Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly running within the Siversk path.[45]

Russian forces persisted offensive operations close to Chasiv Yar on November 9, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline. Russian forces carried out offensive operations northeast of Chasiv Yar close to Bondarne and south of Chasiv Yar close to Bila Hora on November 8 and 9.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally complicated close to Hryhorivka (north of Chasiv Yar), however ISW has no longer noticed visible affirmation of this declare.[47] Components of the Russian sixth Motorized Rifle Department (third AC) are reportedly running southeast of Chasiv Yar, and parts of the “Okhotnik” (“Hunter”) Spetsnaz Detachment (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk Other folks’s Republic [DNR] AC) and the 98th Airborne (VDV) Department are reportedly running close to Chasiv Yar.[48]

Russian forces persisted offensive operations close to Toretsk on November 9, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline. Russian forces carried out offensive operations close to Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka, northeast of Toretsk close to Druzhba, west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka and Petrivka, and southwest of Toretsk close to Nelipivka on November 8 and 9.[49] Components of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly running within the Toretsk path.[50]

Ukrainian and Russian forces just lately complicated within the Pokrovsk path amid persisted preventing within the space on November 9. Geolocated photos printed on October 31 and November 9 signifies that Ukrainian forces regained misplaced positions north of Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[51] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 8 that Ukrainian forces are steadily counterattacking close to Novohrodivka and just lately recaptured a stronghold north of the agreement.[52] Further geolocated photos printed on November 9 signifies that Russian forces just lately complicated alongside the E-50 (Donetsk Town-Pokrovsk) freeway north of Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk).[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces additionally complicated as much as 1.28 kilometers intensive alongside the railway south of Hyrhorivka (southeast of Pokrovsk and west of Selydove) and as much as jap Petrivka (northwest of Hryhorivka), however ISW has no longer noticed affirmation of those claims.[54] Russian forces carried out offensive operations east of Pokrovsk close to Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Novotoretske and southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka, Krutyi Yar, Selydove, Vyshneve, Petrivka, and Chumatske on November 8 and 9.[55] Components of the Russian eightieth Tank Regiment (ninetieth Tank Department, forty first CAA, Central Army District [CMD]) are reportedly running close to Novooleksiivka (south of Pokrovsk and west of Selydove).[56]

Russian forces just lately complicated within the Kurakhove path amid persisted offensive operations on November 9. Geolocated photos printed on November 9 signifies that Russian forces just lately complicated to central Sontsivka (northeast of Kurakhove).[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces additionally complicated as much as 1.3 kilometers south of Novodmytrivka (northwest of Kurakhove and northeast of Sontsivka), in northwestern Sontsivka, as much as the jap outskirts of Zorya (northeast of Kurakhove and north of Sontsivka), close to Voznesenka (north of Kurakhove), southwest of Maksymilyanivka (east of Kurakhove), and northwest of Kostyantynivka (southeast of Kurakhove).[58] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Voznesenka.[59] ISW has no longer noticed affirmation of those claims, then again. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 9 that Russian forces first of all complicated to the Solona River in Sontsivka on November 7 however that Ukrainian forces later driven Russian forces again to the agreement’s outskirts and feature since been the usage of a tank to stop additional Russian advances into the agreement.[60] Russian forces carried out offensive operations north of Kurakhove close to Illinka, Novoselydivka, Novodmytrivka, Berestky, and Voznesenka; east of Kurakhove close to Maksymilyanivka; and south of Kurakhove close to Dalne on November 8 and 9.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian charge of advance in opposition to Kurakhove is sluggish as a result of Russian forces can most effective safely assault Ukrainian fortifications within the space following Russian go with the flow bomb or artillery moves.[62]
Russian forces reportedly complicated within the Vuhledar path on November 9, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complicated in a local as much as 4.3 kilometers huge and 1.8 kilometers intensive east of Maksymivka (northwest of Vuhledar) and as much as 3.6 kilometers huge and 1.6 kilometers deep east of Bohoyavlenka (northwest of Vuhledar).[63] ISW has no longer noticed affirmation of those claims, then again. Russian forces carried out offensive operations northeast of Vuhledar close to Yelizavetivka, Katerynivka, and Antonivka and northwest of Vuhledar close to Maksymivka, Bohoyavlenka, Shakhtarske, Yasna Polyana, and Trudove and in opposition to Kostyantynopilske and Sukhy Yaly on November 8 and 9.[64] Components of the Russian “Dostavalov” Volunteer Battalion (a volunteer battalion shaped in Republic of Bashkortostan in 2022) are reportedly running close to Katerynivka; parts of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (fifth CAA, Jap Army District [EMD]) are reportedly running close to Trudove; parts of the eleventh Air Power and Air Protection Military (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly running close to Uspenivka (northwest of Vuhledar); parts of the fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) are reportedly running close to Shakhtarske; and parts of the thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) are reportedly running close to Yelizavetivka.[65]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian assets reported offensive operations within the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border space on November 9. Components of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Common Team of workers’s Major Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly running within the Vremivka path.[66]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Care for frontline positions and safe rear spaces towards Ukrainian moves)
Positional preventing persisted in western Zaporizhia Oblast close to Novoandriivka (northwest of Robotyne) on November 8 and 9, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline.[67] Russian milbloggers persisted to assert on November 9 that Russian forces complicated northwest of Robotyne, together with close to Nesteryanka.[68] Ukrainian Southern Team of Forces Spokesperson Vladyslav Volodin said that Russian forces greater the selection of go with the flow bomb and unguided rocket moves within the Orikhiv (western Zaporizhia Oblast) path and feature struck Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) with over 100 munitions since about November 1.[69] Reconnaissance and drone parts of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (forty second Motorized Rifle Department, 58th Blended Fingers Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) reportedly proceed running within the Zaporizhia path.[70]

Positional preventing persisted in east (left) financial institution Kherson Oblast on November 8 and 9, however there have been no adjustments to the frontline.[71] Kherson Oblast profession head Vladimir Saldo claimed that Ukrainian forces fired 20 rockets at occupied Radensk on November 8.[72]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Purpose: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and at the frontline)
Russian forces carried out a chain of drone moves towards Ukraine at the evening of November 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Russian forces released 51 Shaheds and different unspecified strike drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and Oryol Oblast.[73] The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Ukrainian forces downed 32 drones over Odesa, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, Vinnytsia, Cherkasy, and Ternopil oblasts and that 18 drones had been “misplaced,” most likely because of Ukrainian digital battle (EW) interference. Ukrainian officers reported that Shahed drone moves on Odesa Town brought about a hearth at a warehouse and broken civilian infrastructure and the Odesa Town Council development.[74]
Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces released a most likely Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea at Mykolaiv Oblast at the night of November 8, however that the strike didn’t reason harm or casualties.[75]
Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces struck Kharkiv Town with a Grom-E1 hybrid air-launched guided missile at the evening of November 8 to 9, harmful civilian infrastructure.[76]
Russian Mobilization and Power Technology Efforts (Russian goal: Extend struggle energy with out engaging in common mobilization)
Ukraine’s Overseas Minister Andrii Sybiha said on November 9 that Ukrainian intelligence assesses that Russia will be capable to produce 30 p.c extra artillery shells than all Ecu Union (EU) international locations mixed in 2025 must the EU fail to enforce further measures, corresponding to sanctions, towards Russia’s protection commercial base (DIB).[77] Sybiha said that Russia intends to make use of revenues from its “shadow fleet,” which sells Russian petroleum in violation of worth caps and world sanctions, to fund shell manufacturing.[78] Sybiha known as at the EU to make stronger sanctions with a view to struggle this earnings drift to Russia.
Russian Technological Diversifications (Russian goal: Introduce technological inventions to optimize methods to be used in Ukraine)  
UK Protection Secretary John Healey said on November 8 that Russian forces evolved unspecified learn how to counter new Ukrainian drone era inside kind of two months of Ukrainian forces introducing such era to the battlefield.[79] Healey famous that the pace of innovation and manufacturing is “very important” to Ukrainian forces countering Russian battlefield adaptions.
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed spaces; forcibly combine Ukrainian electorate into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance methods)
ISW isn’t publishing protection of actions in Russian-occupied spaces as of late.
Important job in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Team job in Belarus)
Not anything important to file.
Word: ISW does no longer obtain any categorised materials from any supply, makes use of most effective publicly to be had data, and attracts widely on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially to be had satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the root for those studies. References to all assets used are offered within the endnotes of each and every replace.

[1] 
[2]  united kingdom/war-in-ukraine-update-october-2024/
[3] 
[4] 
[5] 

[6] 
[7]  ; ; ; ; 

[8] 
[9] 
[10] 
[11] 
[12] ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100524
[13]  media/876305-ukrainski-droni-v-rf-atakuvali-aleksinskij-himkombinat-so-viroblae-poroh-ta-boepripasi-dzerela/
[14]  dot media/876127-ssa-dozvolili-robotu-vijskovih-pidradnikiv-v-ukraini-svitovij-bank-nadast-137-mlrd-grantu-990-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1731160455&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=playstation
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[16]  dot media/876127-ssa-dozvolili-robotu-vijskovih-pidradnikiv-v-ukraini-svitovij-bank-nadast-137-mlrd-grantu-990-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1731160455&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=playstation
[17] 
[18] 
[19] 
[20]  dot ru/occasions/president/information/75521
[21]  ; dot ru/proisshestviya/22356159 ;
dot ru/2024/11/08/v-moskve-arestovan-gendirektor-upravleniia-specstroitelstva-minoborony.html ; dot ru/russia/990883
[22] 
[23] 
[24] 
[25] 
[26] 

[27] 
[28] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80332 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/45515 ;  ;  ; https://t.me/sashakots/50055
[29] 
 ; 
[30] 
[31] 
[32] 

[33] 
com.ua/2024/11/09/kaby-solnczepok-fpv-drony-na-harkivshhyni-vorog-shturmuye-za-aktyvnoyi-vognevoyi-pidtrymky/ ; 
ua/2024/11/09/soldaty-zamist-broni-chomu-okupanty-ekonomlyat-tehniku-na-harkivshhyni/; 
ua/2024/11/09/vytratnyj-material-jde-pishky-ta-nese-vse-na-sobi-kym-i-yak-voyuye-rosiya-na-harkivshhyni/
[34]  ua/2024/11/09/imla-doshh-viter-sutinky-bezpilotnykam-na-harkivshhyni-staye-dedali-vazhche/
[35] 
[36] 
[37] 
[38] 
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[40]  com.ua/2024/11/09/nespivmirni-syly-zasoby-ta-riven-vtrat-na-kupyanshhyni-vorog-pre-vsim-chym-mozhe/
[41] 
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[45] 
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[47] 
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;
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[53] 

[54] 
[55] 
 
;  ;
[56] 
[57] 
[58]  https://t.me/z_arhiv/29282; https://t.me/motopatriot/29349;   
[59] 
[60] 
[61] 
 

[62] 
[63] 
[64] 

; 

[65] 
[66] 
[67] 

[68]  ; 
[69]  dot media/zaporizhzhia/875841-na-orihivskomu-napramku-zbilsilas-kilkist-aviaudariv-armii-rf-volosin/
[70] 
[71] 

[72] 
[73] 
[74] 
[75] 
[76] 
[77]  ua/rus/information/2025-rotsi-rf-zmozhe-viroblyati-30-bilshe-1731161036.html ; 
media/876431-sibiga-zasterig-so-rf-u-2025-roci-zmoze-viroblati-na-30-bilse-artsnaradiv-niz-razom-usi-kraini-es/
[78]  ;
; 

[79] 
 
 

Author: OpenAI