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Institute for the Learn about of Conflict

Institute for the Learn about of Conflict
February 26, 2025


Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Overview, February 25, 2025
Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter
February 25, 2025, 10:00pm ET
Click on right here to look ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day-to-day along the static maps provide on this file.
Click on right here to look ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on right here to look ISW’s three-D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (no longer a cell tool) is strongly advisable for the usage of this data-heavy instrument.
Click on right here to get entry to ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Those maps supplement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day-to-day via appearing a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive per thirty days.
Observe: The knowledge cut-off for this product used to be 12:15 pm ET on February 25. ISW will quilt next studies within the February 26 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Overview.
Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly said Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky because the authentic president of Ukraine and Russia’s long run negotiating spouse whilst selling a brand new data operation that goals to destabilize Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian army from inside. Putin gave an interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on February 24 by which Putin mentioned that “elections in Ukraine aren’t held beneath the pretext of martial regulation” — Putin’s first acknowledgment that Ukrainian regulation prohibits elections all over martial regulation.[1] Putin claimed that Zelensky is “poisonous” for Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian army and that Zelensky would lose any long run presidential election to different Ukrainian political and armed forces leaders. Putin’s statements are probably aimed toward Ukrainian and Russian audiences. Putin’s claims that Zelensky is unpopular and damaging to Ukraine are makes an attempt to force a wedge between the authentic govt of Ukraine and the Ukrainian army and inhabitants. Putin has time and again claimed that Zelensky isn’t the authentic chief of Ukraine after Ukraine didn’t cling elections in 2024 — in response to Ukrainian regulation — as a part of Russian efforts to say that Russia can not negotiate with Zelensky.[2] US President Donald Trump has mentioned that Putin and Zelensky should have interaction in negotiations, and Putin is probably transferring his rhetoric so as to provide an explanation for to Russian home audiences his choice to have interaction in any long run negotiations with Zelensky.[3] Putin and different Kremlin officers will probably try to exploit any Ukrainian army setbacks or differing critiques amongst Ukrainian officers to accentuate this knowledge operation and sow discord in Ukraine.
Putin tried to make use of new language to repackage the requires regime trade in Ukraine that he has demanded since 2021. Putin mentioned all over the interview with Zarubin that Russia “has not anything towards” the preservation of Ukrainian statehood however needs Ukraine to “grow to be a pleasant neighboring state” and for Ukrainian territory to “no longer be used as a springboard for an assault towards Russia” someday.[4] Putin’s requires Ukraine to “flip” right into a “pleasant” state exhibit that Putin remains to be calling for the removing of the democratically elected govt in Ukraine and the set up of a pro-Kremlin govt. The Kremlin has up to now used thinly veiled requires “denazification” to call for regime trade in Ukraine, and Putin seems to be the usage of new language to make those similar calls for.[5] Putin has demanded Ukrainian regime trade since Summer season 2021.[6]
Putin provided to make a handle the USA on Russian uncommon earth minerals as a part of efforts to outbid Ukraine in this topic and to push the USA to simply accept Russian gives of financial measures in lieu of any exact Russian concessions on Ukraine. Putin claimed to Zarubin on February 24 that Russia has an “order of magnitude” extra uncommon earth fabrics than Ukraine and mentioned that Russia can cooperate with each the USA govt and US corporations in capital funding initiatives for uncommon earth fabrics.[7] Putin integrated mineral reserves each inside Russia and inside occupied Ukraine in his makes an attempt to enchantment to the USA to put money into Russian uncommon earth minerals. Putin additionally provided to conclude offers with the USA at the provide of Russian aluminum. Putin held a gathering with senior Kremlin officers on February 24 particularly concerning the significance of additional growing Russia’s home uncommon earth minerals business and recognized this as a concern effort.[8]
The Kremlin is framing any long run US-Russian cooperation on uncommon earth minerals as conditional at the conclusion of a Russian-friendly peace deal at the warfare in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov mentioned on February 25 that any US-Russia cooperation on uncommon earth minerals can handiest start after normalizing bilateral family members and attaining a peace agreement in Ukraine.[9] ISW assessed that Russian officers used the new US-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia to begin an effort to push the USA to simply accept financial advantages which are unrelated to the warfare in Ukraine in go back for Ukrainian and Western concessions which are associated with the warfare.[10] ISW continues to evaluate that American acceptance of those Russian-offered financial measures — with out hard any Russian concessions on Ukraine in go back — would give away leverage that the USA will wish to succeed in Trump’s mentioned goal of attaining an enduring and enduring peace that advantages the USA and Ukraine.
Putin tried to say that he helps Europe’s participation in negotiations on Ukraine whilst proceeding to turn his unwillingness to make concessions and apparently proposing Russian allies as imaginable long run negotiating events. Putin spoke back to Zarubin’s query about Putin’s evaluation of Europeans’ “calls for” for the “proper to vote in negotiations” about Ukraine, declaring that he “does no longer see the rest unhealthy right here.”[11] Putin then claimed that “most certainly nobody can call for the rest right here, particularly from Russia” however they may be able to attempt to make calls for of any person else — signaling Russia’s unwillingness to make compromises in long run negotiations. Putin claimed that Moscow respects the positions of Russia’s “pals” from BRICS and that “different international locations have the best and will take part” in discussions about problems concerning the warfare and efforts to reach peace. Putin particularly highlighted his contemporary name with Other folks’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping and applauded PRC efforts to speak about peace in Ukraine. The PRC and Brazil — two contributors of BRICS — have put forth peace proposals for the warfare in Ukraine that closely liked Russia, and Putin seems to be posturing those states as imaginable individuals in long run negotiations.[12]
Kremlin officers proceed to take advantage of diplomatic engagements with Russia’s allies to support Moscow’s narrative that Russia invaded Ukraine to give protection to Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine. Russian Overseas Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Iranian Overseas Minister Abbas Araghchi in Tehran.[13] The Russian Ministry of Overseas Affairs (MFA) mentioned that the delegations “touched upon” the placement in Ukraine and that Lavrov expressed gratitude to Iranian government for his or her “balanced place” and their working out of the “root reasons” of the warfare, together with Russia’s want to give protection to Russian-speaking minorities from alleged discrimination from the Ukrainian govt.[14] Islamic Modern Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim Information Company readout of the assembly famous that the delegations mentioned Ukraine and Lavrov’s observation about Iran’s “balanced place” however significantly didn’t point out discussions of the “root reasons” of the warfare in Ukraine.[15] Kremlin officers have not too long ago increasingly more referred to Russia’s alleged want for long run peace negotiations to deal with the “root reasons” of the warfare in Ukraine, which Lavrov outlined in December 2024 as NATO’s alleged violation of commitments to not advance eastward and the Ukrainian govt’s alleged discrimination towards Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.[16] Lavrov met with PRC Overseas Minister Wang Yi on February 20, and the Russian MFA claimed that Wang emphasised that the PRC’s option to resolving the warfare in Ukraine makes a speciality of addressing the warfare’s “root reasons,” whilst the PRC’s MFA legit readout of the Wang-Lavrov assembly attributed all communicate of the “root reasons” of the warfare to Lavrov and no longer Wang.[17] Russia is making an attempt to make use of conferences with its allies to publicly reiterate its requires regime trade in Ukraine and posture Russia’s allies as supportive of those efforts.
A delegation from North Korea’s Employees’ Birthday celebration of Korea (WPK) arrived in Moscow on February 25 on the invitation of Russia’s ruling celebration, United Russia, amid studies that North Korea is also delivery extra subject material to Russia.[18] Russian and North Korean state media reported that Russian Ministry of Overseas Affairs (MFA) Consular Division Head Andrei Klimov and North Korean Ambassador to Russia Sin Hong Chol met with a high-ranking North Korean delegation, together with North Korean Politburo member Ri Hello Yong, in Moscow.[19] The Russian Embassy in Pyongyang reported on February 24 that the delegations will talk about higher cooperation between United Russia and the WPK in response to the Russia-North Korea complete strategic partnership settlement that entered into pressure in December 2024.[20] South Korean media outlet Korea JoongAng Day by day reported on February 24 that industrial satellite tv for pc imagery gathered via Planet Labs PBC displays a 110-meter-long vessel getting into and leaving North Korea’s Rason Port close to the border with the Other folks’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia.[21] The satellite tv for pc imagery additionally displays a line of packing containers kind of 100 meters lengthy at the pier at Rason Port subsequent to the docked vessel. The vessel reportedly arrived on the interior facet of Rason Port’s pier on February 20 and moved to the outer facet on February 21, indicating that the vessel unloaded packing containers at the pier’s interior facet and loaded new packing containers at the outer facet prior to departing. ISW reported that North Korea probably used Rason Port to switch munitions to Vladivostok, Russia in November 2023.[22]
Western officers proceed to spotlight the size of Ecu army help to Ukraine. The Wall Side road Magazine (WSJ), mentioning Ecu officers, reported on February 25 that Ecu Union (EU) international locations, the UK (UK), and Norway equipped Ukraine with army help value roughly $25 billion in 2024 and that that is greater than the USA despatched to Ukraine in 2024.[23] An unspecified Western legit additionally instructed the WSJ that Europe provides about 25 % of Ukraine’s army {hardware} and that the USA provides about 20 %.
Key Takeaways:
Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly said Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky because the authentic president of Ukraine and Russia’s long run negotiating spouse whilst selling a brand new data operation that goals to destabilize Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian army from inside.
Putin tried to make use of new language to repackage the requires regime trade in Ukraine that he has demanded since 2021.
Putin provided to make a handle the USA on Russian uncommon earth minerals as a part of efforts to outbid Ukraine in this topic and to push the USA to simply accept Russian gives of financial measures in lieu of any exact Russian concessions on Ukraine.
Putin tried to say that he helps Europe’s participation in negotiations on Ukraine whilst proceeding to turn his unwillingness to make concessions and apparently proposing Russian allies as imaginable long run negotiating events.
Kremlin officers proceed to take advantage of diplomatic engagements with Russia’s allies to support Moscow’s narrative that Russia invaded Ukraine to give protection to Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.
A delegation from North Korea’s Employees’ Birthday celebration of Korea (WPK) arrived in Moscow on February 25 on the invitation of Russia’s ruling celebration, United Russia, amid studies that North Korea is also delivery extra subject material to Russia.
Western officers proceed to spotlight the size of Ecu army help to Ukraine.
Russian forces not too long ago complex in Kursk Oblast and close to Kupyansk, Lyman, and Velyka Novosilka, and Ukrainian forces not too long ago complex close to Kupyansk.
Samara Oblast government decreased one-time bills to infantrymen who signal army carrier contracts with the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) after quickly expanding those bills in January 2025.
The BBC Russian Provider reported on February 25 that over 100 Russian govt, army, and safety officers accused and convicted of more than a few corruption fees are preventing in Ukraine.
The Kremlin continues efforts to make use of its “Time of Heroes” program, which puts veterans of the warfare in Ukraine in govt positions, to shape a brand new Russian elite composed of dependable and ultranationalist veterans that can proceed to militarize Russian society over the long run.
Russia is also reopening a Soviet-era submarine base in occupied Crimea.
Institute for the Learn about of Conflict
We don’t file intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of those actions are well-covered in Western media and do indirectly have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We will be able to proceed to guage and file at the results of those legal actions at the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city spaces. We completely condemn Russian violations of the rules of armed war and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity although we don’t describe them in those studies.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian Major Effort — Jap Ukraine (constituted of 3 subordinate primary efforts)
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and option to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 — Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 — Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
Russian Mobilization and Pressure Technology Efforts
Russian Technological Variations
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces
Important Task in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian forces not too long ago complex in Kursk Oblast. Preventing persisted northwest of Sudzha close to Pogrebki, Orlovka, Novaya Sorochina, Staraya Sorochina, and Lebedevka.[24]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated pictures printed on February 25 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago complex in central Pogrebki.[25]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pogrebki, Orlovka, and Novaya Sorochina and complex close to Maryevka (simply east of Pogrebki) and Kurilovka (south of Sudzha).[26]
Order of Fight: Components of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly running in Kursk Oblast; parts of the thirty fourth Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty ninth Mixed Fingers Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) and ninth Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Department, eleventh Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are reportedly running close to Pogrebki; parts of the twenty second Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Basic Team of workers Major Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly running in Novaya Sorochina; and parts of the 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Department) are reportedly running close to Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha).[27]

Russian forces persisted offensive operations close to the world border in Sumy Oblast on February 25 however didn’t make any showed advances. Preventing persisted close to Novenke and Basivka.[28]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian supply claimed that Russian forces seized Novenke and complex in northern Zhuravka.[29]
Russian Major Effort — Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and option to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town)
Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Kharkiv course on February 25 however didn’t advance. Russian forces performed offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv Town close to Vovchansk on February 24 and 25.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked close to Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv Town).[31]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally complex at the japanese outskirts of Vovchansk.[32]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade running close to Vovchansk mentioned that snowy climate is complicating Russian attacks.[33]
Order of Fight: Components of the Russian forty first Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Department, forty fourth Military Corps [AC], Leningrad Army District {LMD]) and the “Sheikh Mansur” volunteer battalion are reportedly running within the Kharkiv course.[34]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northerly Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian and Russian forces not too long ago complex within the Kupyansk course. Russian forces performed offensive operations north of Kupyansk close to Dvorichna, east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk close to Stepova Novoselivka on February 24 and 25.[35]
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated pictures printed on February 25 signifies that Ukrainian forces not too long ago complex west of the P-79 Dvorichna-Kupyansk freeway northeast of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[36]
Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian Basic Team of workers printed a map on February 25 indicating that Russian forces complex northwest of Tabaivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[37]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complex north and west of Topoli (alongside the world border northeast of Kupyansk), north of Kucherivka (simply east of Kupyansk), northwest of Ivanivka (southeast of Kupyansk), and extra northwest of Tabaivka.[38]
Order of Fight: Components of the Russian 153rd Tank Regiment (forty seventh Tank Department, 1st Guards Tank Military, Moscow Army District [MMD]) are reportedly running close to Stepova Novoselivka.[39]

Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Borova course on February 25 however didn’t make any showed advances. Russian forces performed offensive operations northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka and towards Borivska Andriivka and east of Borova close to Nadiya on February 24 and 25.[40] A Ukrainian regiment running within the Kupyansk course reported on February 24 that Russian forces performed an a minimum of strengthened platoon-sized mechanized attack at the outskirts of Lovoza (northeast of Borova) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed a tank and an armored team of workers service and struck 3 extra armored team of workers carriers.[41]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces complex west of Makiivka (southeast of Borova), and Russian resources claimed that Russian forces complex close to Makiivka and Novovodyane (north of Makiivka).[42]
Russian forces not too long ago complex within the Lyman course. Russian forces performed offensive operations northeast of Lyman close to Novolyubivka and Yampolivka and towards Zelena Dolyna, Nove, and Katerynivka and east of Lyman close to Dibrova and within the Serebryanske wooded area house on February 24 and 25.[43]
Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian Basic Team of workers printed a map on February 25 indicating that Russian pressure complex southwest of Terny (northeast of Lyman).[44]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complex towards Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman) and Torske (east of Lyman).[45]
Order of Fight: Ukrainian army observer Yuriy Butusov mentioned that parts of the Russian twenty fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (sixth Mixed Fingers Military [CAA], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are running within the Lyman course.[46]

Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Siversk course on February 25 however didn’t make any showed advances. Russian forces performed offensive operations northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka, east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk close to Ivano-Darivka on February 24 and 25.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Bilohorivka.[48]
Russian resources claimed that Russian forces seized Bilohorivka.[49] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized maximum of Bilohorivka however no longer all of the agreement.[50] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces handle positions at the outskirts of the agreement, that preventing continues in western Bilohorivka, and that northern Bilohorivka is a contested “grey zone.”
Order of Fight: Components of the Russian seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (third Mixed Fingers Military [CAA], previously second Luhansk Other folks’s Republic Military Corps [LNR AC], Southern Army District [SMD]) reportedly proceed to function in Bilohorivka.[51]
Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar course on February 25 however didn’t make any showed advances. Russian forces performed offensive operations in and close to Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar close to Stupochky on February 24 and 25.[52]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complex in northern and southern Chasiv Yar and alongside the T-0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka freeway northeast of Stupochky.[53]
Servicemembers of a Ukrainian brigade running within the Chasiv Yar course reported on February 25 that Russian forces, together with Typhoon-Z penal gadgets, are attacking on bikes, buggies, and automobiles and once in a while assault with armored preventing automobiles and tanks.[54] The spokesperson of every other Ukrainian brigade running within the Chasiv Yar course mentioned that Russian forces are making the most of their manpower benefit and carrying out frontal attacks with small infantry teams.[55] The spokesperson famous that Russian forces once in a while use mechanized apparatus.
Order of Fight: Components of the Russian fifth Anti-Plane Missile Regiment and 299th and 331st airborne (VDV) regiments (all a part of the 98th VDV Department) are reportedly running in and close to Chasiv Yar.[56] Components of the second Artillery Brigade (third Mixed Fingers Military [CAA], previously second Luhansk Other folks’s Republic Military Corps [LNR AC], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly running close to Hryhorivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[57]

Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Toretsk course on February 25 however didn’t advance. Russian forces performed offensive operations close to Toretsk itself and east of Toretsk close to Krymske on February 24 and 25.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked close to the Toretska mine in northern Toretsk.[59]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complex in northern Toretsk.[60] A Russian supply claimed that Ukrainian forces complex in northern Toretsk.[61]
Order of Fight: Components of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Department, eighth CAA, Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly running in Toretsk.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian army command redeployed 3 unspecified regiments to Toretsk.[63] ISW not too long ago noticed studies that the Russian army command redeployed parts of the a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Department (eighth CAA, SMD), together with its 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, from the Kurakhove course to the Toretsk course.[64]
Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Pokrovsk course on February 25 however didn’t advance. Russian forces performed offensive operations close to Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk close to Tarasivka and Vodyane Druhe; east of Pokrovsk close to Promin; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Nadiivka, Preobrazhenka, Zaporizhzhia, Leontovychi (previously Pershe Travyna), Kotlyne, and Udachne and towards Molodetske and Troitske on February 24 and 25.[65]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complex close to Uspenivka and Nadiivka.[66] A Russian supply claimed that Ukrainian forces driven Russian forces out of Uspenivka, whilst every other Russian supply claimed that Ukrainian forces handiest driven Russian forces out of central Uspenivka.[67]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade running within the Pokrovsk course mentioned that Russian forces are the usage of donkeys to move infantry to close the frontline and that Russian forces are handiest the usage of infantry in attacks after having suffered heavy apparatus losses within the first part of February 2025.[68] The spokesperson mentioned that Russian forces are the usage of first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables to smash Ukrainian heavy bomber drones.[69]
Order of Fight: Drone operators of the Russian “Rubikon” Heart for Complicated Unmanned Applied sciences and ” Vizantiya” detachment are reportedly running within the Pokrovsk course.[70]
Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Kurakhove course on February 25 however didn’t make any showed advances. Russian forces persisted attacks west of Kurakhove close to Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, Ulakly, and Oleksiivka on February 24 and 25.[71] Russian resources claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack close to Kostyantynopil.[72]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complex west of Andriivka and Rozdolne (southeast of Kurakhove) and driven Ukrainian forces to the western outskirts of Kostyantynopil.[73]
Order of Fight: Components of the Russian thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Jap Army District [EMD]) are reportedly running close to Kostyantynopil; parts of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk Other folks’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly running close to Oleksiivka; and parts of the “Somalia” Battalion (132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA) are reportedly running close to Kostyantynopil and Bohdanivka.[74] Drone operators of the Russian “Rubikon” Heart for Complicated Unmanned Applied sciences are reportedly running within the Vuhledar (southwest of Donetsk Town) course.[75]
Russian forces not too long ago complex within the Velyka Novosilka course. Russian forces persisted flooring assaults north of Velyka Novosilka close to Skudne and Dniproenerhiya; northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Burlatske and Pryvilne; and west of Velyka Novosilka close to Novopil on February 24 and 25.[76]
Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian Basic Team of workers printed a map on February 25 indicating that Russian forces complex in fields north and west of Velyka Novosilka.[77]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complex additional north of Velyka Novosilka and seized Skudne.[78] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces additionally complex east and southwest of Burlatske, southwest of Pryvilne, and southwest of Novosilka.[79] A Russian supply claimed that Russian forces have “almost” surrounded Burlatske from two facets.[80]
Order of Fight: Components of the Russian sixtieth Motorized Rifle Brigade (fifth CAA, EMD) are reportedly running between Novoocheretuvate (north of Velyka Novosilka) and Pryvilne.[81]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian goal: Handle frontline positions and safe rear spaces towards Ukrainian moves)
Russian forces persisted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Obast on February 25 however didn’t make any showed advances. Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne close to Kamyanske, Mali Shcherbaky, and Pyatykhatky on February 24 and 25.[82] A Russian supply claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to Lobkove and Stepove (each northwest of Robotyne).[83]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complex in japanese Pyatykhatky, to Lobkove and Stepove, and against Shcherbaky (northwest of Robotyne) and Mali Shcherbaky.[84] A Russian supply claimed that Russian forces cleared Pyatykhatky, whilst every other Russian supply claimed that Russian forces have no longer seized all of the agreement.[85]
Order of Fight: Components of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (seventh VDV Department) are reportedly running close to Pyatykhatky, Lobkove, and Stepove.[86] Drone operators of the Russian “BARS-Sarmat” volunteer detachment (Russian Fight Military Reserve) reportedly proceed running within the Orikhiv course.[87]
A Ukrainian supply posted pictures on February 24 appearing a Ukrainian drone placing a Russian 9A82 transporter erector launcher and radar (TELAR) of an S-300V air protection machine in an unspecified house in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[88]

Russian forces persisted restricted flooring assaults within the Kherson course on February 25 however didn’t advance. Russian forces attacked within the course of Sadove (east of Kherson Town on west [right] financial institution Kherson Oblast) on February 24 and 25.[89]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and at the frontline)
Russian forces performed a sequence of drone and missile moves towards Ukraine at the night time of February 24 to twenty-five. The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Russian forces introduced 213 Shahed and decoy drones from the instructions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk towns and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[90] The Ukrainian Air Forces reported that Russian forces additionally introduced seven Kh-101 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers.[91] The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 133 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and that 79 decoy drones have been “misplaced,” probably because of Ukrainian digital war (EW) interference. Ukrainian officers reported that Russian forces struck Zhytomyr, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts.[92]
Russian Mobilization and Pressure Technology Efforts (Russian goal: Increase fight energy with out carrying out common mobilization)
Samara Oblast government decreased one-time bills to infantrymen who signal army carrier contracts with the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) after quickly expanding those bills in January 2025. Samara Oblast Head Vyacheslav Fedorishchev mentioned on February 21 that Samara Oblast is decreasing the regional one-time bills from 3.6 million rubles (about $41,571) to two.1 million rubles (about $24,249) beginning on February 24.[93] Samara Oblast quickly higher one-time bills from January 1 to February 23.[94] Government in Kosinsky Municipal Okrug, Perm Krai introduced on February 25 a 100,000-ruble (about $1,154) one-time fee to Russian voters and foreigners who signal contracts with the Russian MoD between March 1, 2025, and December 31, 2025.[95]
The BBC Russian Provider reported on February 25 that over 100 Russian govt, army, and safety officers accused and convicted of more than a few corruption fees are preventing in Ukraine.[96] The BBC Russian Provider famous that the Russian Federal Safety Provider (FSB) comes to a decision which of those officers can struggle in Ukraine in lieu of serving their sentences and applies the foundations arbitrarily. The BBC Russian Provider reported that one situation of this deal is that the officers admit guilt in their crimes and that the FSB is not going to settle for people dealing with or convicted of fees associated with terrorism, extremism, treason, or positive sexual crimes. The BBC Russian Provider reported that many officers accredited this be offering believing that they’re going to no longer see fight however are struggling excessive casualties at the entrance. The BBC Russian Provider famous that Russian government aren’t granting many of those officers fight veterans standing however that one of the officers go back to Russia and take in new posts, together with via the government’s “Time of Heroes” veteran program.
The Kremlin continues efforts to make use of its “Time of Heroes” program, which puts veterans of the warfare in Ukraine in govt positions, to shape a brand new Russian elite composed of dependable and ultranationalist veterans that can proceed to militarize Russian society over the long run.[97] The Time of Heroes program introduced on February 25 that its player, Denis Didenko, changed into the Russian Presidential Management’s Head Marketing consultant for Tracking Research of Social Processes.[98]
Russia is also reopening a Soviet-era submarine base in occupied Crimea. Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan workforce “Atesh” reported on January 19 that Russian government started the usage of the “825 GTS” submarine base in occupied Balaklava Bay, Crimea for army functions and famous on February 13 that Russian government put in anti-naval drone limitations in Balaklava Bay.[99] Jamestown Basis analyst John C. Okay. Daly instructed Radio Loose Europe/Radio Liberty for an editorial printed on February 25 that Russia would probably use the bottom for floor vessels since the submarine base is simply too small for Russia’s Kilo-class submarines.[100]
Russian Technological Variations (Russian goal: Introduce technological inventions to optimize techniques to be used in Ukraine)
Not anything important to file.
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed spaces; forcibly combine Ukrainian voters into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance techniques)
ISW isn’t publishing protection of actions in Russian-occupied spaces nowadays.
Important task in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and extra combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Not anything important to file.
Observe: ISW does no longer obtain any categorized subject material from any supply, makes use of handiest publicly to be had data, and attracts widely on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially to be had satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the foundation for those studies. References to all resources used are equipped within the endnotes of each and every replace.

[1]  dot ru/occasions/president/information/76331
[2] 
[3] 
[4]  dot ru/occasions/president/information/76331
[5] 
[6]  ru/occasions/president/information/66181 ; 
[7]  dot ru/occasions/president/information/76331
[8]  ru/occasions/president/information/76330; 
[9] 
[10] 
[11]  dot ru/occasions/president/information/76331
[12] 
[13]  dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/information/1999840/;
[14]  dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/information/1999840/; ; dot com/fa/information/1403/12/07/3264996
[15]  dot com/fa/information/1403/12/07/3264996
[16]  ;
[17] 
[18]  ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23234891 ;  org/newstream/1740465426-892058820/wpk-delegation-arrives-in-moscow/
[19]  dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23234891 ; dot org/newstream/1740465426-892058820/wpk-delegation-arrives-in-moscow/
[20]  dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23234891
[21]  com/information/2025-02-24/nationwide/northKorea/Send-likely-carrying-arms-to-Russia-spotted-at-North-Korean-port-as-Pyongyang-upgrades-drone-force-Reviews/2248655
[22] 
[23] 
[24] 
[25] 
[26] 
[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/24974; https://t.me/mod_russia/49371; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24420; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86906 ; https://t.me/sashakots/52141 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22597 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24438 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/65372; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22163 ;  https://t.me/motopatriot78/32777; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32790; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32796; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86877;
[28] 
[29] https:// t.me/boris_rozhin/155767
[30] 
[31] 
[32] 
[33]  ua/2025/02/25/shturmovykiv-vydno-na-bilomu-pokryvali-na-vorozhyh-pihotyncziv-polyuyut-yak-na-kuripok/
[34] 
[35] 
[36] 
[37] 
[38] ; https:// t.me/boris_rozhin/155767; 
[39] 
[40] 
[41] 
[42] 
[43] 
[44] 
oto?fbid=985347213778357&set=pcb.985347813778297
[45] 
[46] 
[47] 
[48] 
[49] 
[50] 
[51]  ;
[52]  ; ;
[53]  ;
[54]  dot ua/2025/02/25/vidbyttya-banzaj-atak-shtorm-z-na-motoczyklah-pid-royem-droniv-ta-navaloyu-kabiv-armiyainform-na-gostynah-u-30-yi-ombr/
[55]  dot ua/2025/02/25/lobovi-ataky-bagatopoverhivok-v-chasovomu-yaru-tryvaye-zhorstka-vijna-v-ruyinah/
[56] 
[57] 
[58]  https://t.me/b4_101/105;
[59] ; ;
[60] ; 
[61] 
[62] 
[63] 
[64] 
[65] 
[66] 
[67] 
[68] https://youtu.be/HFgWwiWYcv4;  dot ua/2025/02/25/dovoyuvalysya-do-vislyukiv-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-kynuly-v-bij-nezvychajnu-kavaleriyu/
[69] https://youtu.be/HFgWwiWYcv4;  dot ua/2025/02/25/optovolokno-proty-vampiriv-rosiyany-namagayutsya-zdolaty-nash-bombery/
[70] 
[71]  ; ; ;
[72] 
 
[73] ; ;
[74] 
[75] 
[76] 
[77] 
[78] https:// t.me/boris_rozhin/155767; ;
[79] https:// t.me/boris_rozhin/155767; ; https://t.me/rybar/68321;
[80] 
[81] 
[82]  ;
[83] 
[84] https://t.me/tass_agency/302524; ; ; ;
[85] ;
[86] 
[87] 
[88]  ;
[89] 
[90] 
[91] 
[92]  doy ua/2025/02/24/na-sumshhyni-okupanty-atakuvaly-bezpilotnykom-czyvilne-avto-odna-lyudyna-zagynula-odna-distala-poranennya/ ; 
[93] https://t.me/Fedorischev63/2288;  ru/obschestvo/23206915
[94]  ru/obschestvo/23206915
[95] 
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[97] 
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[100] 

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