Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Overview, July 15, 2024
Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, and George Barros
July 15, 2024, 7pm ET
Click on right here to look ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day along the static maps provide on this file.
Click on right here to look ISW’s three-D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (now not a cell software) is strongly really helpful for the usage of this data-heavy device.
Click on right here to get entry to ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Those maps supplement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day through appearing a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive per 30 days.
Word: The information cut-off for this product was once 12pm ET on July 15. ISW will quilt next studies within the July 16 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Overview.
A contemporary Ukrainian ballot signifies that Ukrainians broadly reject Russia’s calls for for overall Ukrainian capitulation, emphasizing that the Kremlin’s stipulations for the top of the struggle are completely unreasonable and broadly unpopular inside of Ukraine. Ukrainian outlet Dzerkalo Tyzhnya commissioned a ballot through the Ukrainian Razumkov Heart and printed its effects on July 15.[1] The ballot discovered that 83 % of respondents rejected Putin’s observation that Ukraine should withdraw from all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts — together with territory in those oblasts recently underneath Ukrainian management.[2] The ballot additionally reported that 58 % of respondents said that Ukraine must now not comply with enshrine a impartial, non-aligned, and non-nuclear standing in its charter. Putin demanded in June 2024 that Ukraine acknowledge Russia’s territorial claims over jap and southern Ukraine (together with territory that Russia does now not recently occupy), “demilitarize,” and pledge now not to sign up for NATO as preconditions to start out “peace” negotiations.[3] Putin’s excessive phrases are tantamount to Ukraine’s capitulation, indicating that Putin is still bored to death in good-faith negotiations on any phrases rather than Russia’s. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov not too long ago accused NATO on July 14 of now not respecting “Russia’s primary worry” when NATO introduced Ukraine’s possibilities of admission into the alliance, claiming that the alliance’s conduct means that there’s no foundation for negotiations in regards to the struggle in Ukraine.[4] Putin’s framing of Ukraine’s overall capitulation as an affordable precondition for peace negotiations could also be a part of an try to undermine Ukraine’s efforts to garner world beef up for Ukraine’s personal legit negotiating positions, that are in accordance with and sponsored through world legislation, through transferring world perceptions of logical negotiating phrases in Russia’s desire. Persisted Russian efforts to say that Ukraine is refusing “affordable” calls for intend to forged Ukraine because the unreasonable actor, even if Ukraine’s rightful borders were identified through world legislation since 1991.
Ukraine continues to show its willingness to barter with Russia on Ukraine’s personal phrases, and Ukraine’s calls for for a peace agreement are according to world legislation — in direct distinction to Russia’s unwillingness to have interaction in negotiations that lead to the rest wanting complete Ukrainian give up. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on July 15 that Ukrainian plans for a 2nd peace summit must be able through November 2024 and reiterated {that a} Russian consultant must attend.[5] Zelensky said that during preparation, Ukraine will cling a gathering in Qatar on power safety in overdue July or early August 2024, a gathering on freedom of navigation in Turkey in August 2024, and a gathering on prisoner of struggle (POW) exchanges and the repatriation of deported Ukrainian kids in Canada in September 2024 — 3 problems on which the communication of the primary Ukraine-initiated International Peace Summit in Switzerland in June 2024 targeted.[6] Fresh Kremlin statements proceed to show that Russia is rigid on negotiations with Ukraine, on the other hand, and Kremlin officers have without delay said that Russia would now not take part in a 2nd peace summit as a result of its phrases are a non-starter given Russian calls for.[7] Ukrainian officers emphasised that the aim of the primary peace summit was once to facilitate a peace in accordance with world legislation, together with regulations to which the Russian Federation is celebration.[8] Ukraine’s calls for that Russia utterly withdraw from Ukrainian territory are supplied for less than world legislation and are subsequently affordable. Russia’s calls for for Ukraine’s whole capitulation and persisted Russian profession of Ukrainian land are and could be violations of world legislation, on the other hand. ISW additionally continues to evaluate that Putin’s calls for for Ukrainian capitulation would permit Russian forces and profession administrations to proceed their large-scale and planned ethnic cleaning campaigns in occupied Ukraine, and the entire reinstatement of Ukraine’s territory integrity is essential to free up the Ukrainian other folks from Russian profession.[9] An acceptance of the rest however Ukraine’s liberation of its other folks is an implicit endorsement of Russia’s unlawful profession of over 5 million Ukrainians.
Ecu Union (EU) officers proceed to take steps to show the EU’s non-alignment with Hungarian Top Minister Viktor Orban’s political stances in regards to the struggle in Ukraine. Balazs Orban, Viktor Orban’s Political Director, said on July 15 that Viktor Orban has further “journeys and negotiations” deliberate and wrote to the Ecu Council about his earlier visits to and discussions about negotiations with Ukraine, Russia, the Folks’s Republic of China (PRC), and the United States.[10] EU Fee Spokesperson Eric Mamer said on July 15 that because of Orban’s contemporary movements, EU leaders, together with Ecu Fee President Ursula von der Leyen, would now not attend casual conferences led through Hungary.[11] Politico reported on July 15 that 3 unspecified EU diplomats said that EU Top Commissioner Josep Borrel will cling a “formal” international affairs council assembly concurrently Hungary’s international affairs summit in Budapest in overdue August 2024.[12] A supply reportedly said that different EU international ministers need to “ship a transparent sign that Hungary does now not talk for the EU.” Swedish Minister for EU Affairs Jessika Roswall informed Reuters on July 11 that Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland would handiest ship civil servants to executive conferences hooked up with Hungary’s EU Council presidency in July 2024 and that different EU states are making an allowance for an identical measures.[13]
The Russian executive proposed to seriously building up the selection of stipulations on which the Russian executive can designate an individual as a terrorist or extremist, most probably as a part of efforts to censor criticisms about Russia’s struggle in Ukraine. The Russian executive submitted a invoice to the State Duma on July 15 that will increase the selection of articles of the Russian Felony Code underneath which the Russian Federal Provider for Monetary Tracking (Rosfinmonitoring) may just upload other folks to Russia’s record of terrorists and extremists.[14] The proposal significantly would permit Rosfinmonitoring so as to add other folks whom Russian government have convicted of spreading “fakes” in regards to the Russian army out of political, ideological, racial, nationwide, or spiritual hatred to the record. The proposal would additionally permit Rosfinmonitoring so as to add other folks accused of committing unspecified “different crimes” motivated through political, ideological, racial, nationwide, or spiritual hatred to the record — granting the Russian executive vital leeway to designate individuals who have allegedly dedicated a big selection of crimes as terrorists and extremists. The Kremlin has many times tried to painting Russia as a harmonious multinational and multireligious society regardless of contemporary will increase in xenophobic rhetoric from Russia’s ultranationalist neighborhood.[15] The Russian executive is most probably taking a look to modify the mechanisms for including other folks to the terrorist and extremist record so as to incentivize Russians to have interaction in self-censorship through tightening the Kremlin’s management over complaint in Russian society, particularly about Russia’s struggle in Ukraine, whilst posturing those adjustments as a part of efforts to make sure political and spiritual freedom and societal solidarity in Russia.
Ukrainian forces performed drone moves in opposition to Russian power infrastructure in a single day on July 14 to fifteen and reportedly additionally hit Russian army belongings in occupied Crimea. Lipetsk Oblast Head Igor Artamonov claimed on July 15 {that a} Ukrainian drone struck the grounds of {an electrical} substation in Stanovlyansky Raion, Lipetsk Oblast, and the Oryol Oblast management claimed {that a} Ukrainian drone broken an oil garage container after Russian digital conflict (EW) suppressed the drone over a gas and effort advanced within the Oryolsky Raion.[16] An area Crimean channel claimed that Ukrainian drones struck both a Russian S-300/S-400 air protection device or a Black Sea Fleet (BSF) digital intelligence unit close to occupied Cape Fiolent, however ISW is not able to substantiate this strike.[17] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed six Ukrainian drones over occupied Crimea and one Ukrainian drone over Lipetsk Oblast in a single day on July 14 to fifteen and some other Ukrainian drone close to western Crimea at the afternoon of July 15.[18]
A brand new Russian migrant assimilation program highlights the plain battle the Russian executive is dealing with with reconciling facets of its coverage against Central Asian migrants because the Russian state wants to give itself as welcoming and multicultural whilst additionally emphasizing the primacy of Russian language and historic legacy. Kremlin-affiliated business-focused outlet Kommersant reported on July 15 that the Russian Federal Company for Ethnic Affairs (FADN) has advanced a 70-minute lecture for Central Asian migrants on find out how to adapt to existence in Russia.[19] Kommersant reportedly reviewed the direction, which has 4 sections: “basics of migration and exertions law,” “basics of casual conduct in Russia,” “accountability for non-compliance with Russian law,” and “the historical past of family members between Russian and the international locations of Central Asia.” The direction reportedly emphasizes that migrants might go through a simplified procedure for obtaining citizenship in the event that they make a choice to serve with the Russian army, suggesting that the Russian executive continues to make use of the promise of citizenship as a technique of luring Central Asian migrants into the military. The direction additionally stresses that “you will need to remember the fact that Russia is an earthly state” so migrants should now not carry out spiritual rituals, together with day by day prayers, in public areas and that “Russians are a multinational other folks, however everybody speaks Russian.” Kommersant discovered that the direction gives a paternalistic and Russia-centric model of Central Asian historical past, claiming that “large cash from the Soviet funds allowed the Central Asian republics to broaden effectively.”
The purposed assimilation lecture distills a number of of the tensions that recently exist in Russia’s courting with its migrant minority communities, in particular the ones from quite a lot of Central Asian states. As ISW has written at duration, Russia’s reliance on Central Asian migrants to beef up Russia’s exertions drive and maintain army mobilization efforts, has brought about really extensive frictions inside of such communities, in particular as many pro-war ultranationalist voices have espoused an increasing number of xenophobic rhetoric over the backdrop of the struggle in Ukraine.[20] Head of the Russian Federal Provider for the Supervision of Schooling and Science (Rosnobrnadzor) Anzor Muzaev, as an example, advocated that migrants’ kids should know Russian to check in Russian colleges.[21] A number of ultranationalist commentators answered and advised that the Russian executive should undertake a harsher reaction that prohibits migrants from bringing their households to Russia or prohibits migrant kids from finding out in public colleges in any respect.[22] The FADN’s assimilation program is ostensibly intended to assuage those tensions, however emphasizes that Russian language, historical past, and tradition are supposed to revel in particular primacy in migrant communities—without delay undermining the Kremlin narrative that Russia is an open and accepting multicultural and multireligious society. This program may additionally building up tensions and emotions of disenfranchisement inside of Central Asian migrant communities through imposing their isolation from their languages, customs, and spiritual practices.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov is posturing himself and the North Caucasus as key to Russia’s outreach to the Arab international. Kadyrov met on July 15 with United Arab Emirates (UAE) Ambassador to Russia Mohammed Akhmed Sultan Essa Al Jaber and Qatari Ambassador to Russia Sheikh Ahmed bin Nasser Al Thani in Grozny, Chechnya on the ongoing Caucasus Funding Discussion board.[23] Kadyrov emphasised Qatar’s and the UAE’s “heat family members” with Russia and Qatar, whilst additionally highlighting their person relationships with Chechnya and the broader Caucasus area. The Kremlin most probably seeks to make use of the Caucasus’ distinctive geopolitical, spiritual, and socio-cultural positioning vis-a-vis the Arab international so as to draw funding to the area and building up political and diplomatic ties with primary political gamers comparable to Qatar and the UAE. Qatar and the UAE, as an example, proceed to mediate prisoner of struggle (POW) exchanges and the repatriation of deported Ukrainian kids, so it stays in Russia’s hobby to handle company ties with Gulf states.[24]
Key Takeaways:
A contemporary Ukrainian ballot signifies that Ukrainians broadly reject Russia’s calls for for overall Ukrainian capitulation, emphasizing that the Kremlin’s stipulations for the top of the struggle are completely unreasonable and broadly unpopular inside of Ukraine.
Ukraine continues to show its willingness to barter with Russia on Ukraine’s personal phrases, and Ukraine’s calls for for a peace agreement are according to world legislation — in direct distinction to Russia’s unwillingness to have interaction in negotiations that lead to the rest wanting complete Ukrainian give up.
Ecu Union (EU) officers proceed to take steps to show the EU’s non-alignment with Hungarian Top Minister Viktor Orban’s political stances in regards to the struggle in Ukraine.
The Russian executive proposed to seriously building up the selection of stipulations on which the Russian executive can designate an individual as a terrorist or extremist, most probably as a part of efforts to censor criticisms about Russia’s struggle in Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces performed drone moves in opposition to Russian power infrastructure in a single day on July 14 to fifteen and reportedly additionally hit Russian army belongings in occupied Crimea.
A brand new Russian migrant assimilation program highlights the plain battle the Russian executive is dealing with with reconciling facets of its coverage against Central Asian migrants because the Russian state wants to give itself as welcoming and multicultural whilst additionally emphasizing the primacy of Russian language and historic legacy.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov is posturing himself and the North Caucasus as key to Russia’s outreach to the Arab international.
Ukrainian forces not too long ago regained misplaced positions close to Toretsk, and Russian forces not too long ago complicated close to Toretsk and Avdiivka.
Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasised ongoing Russian efforts to combine the metallurgy trade in occupied Ukraine into Russia’s protection business base (DIB).
We don’t file intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of those actions are well-covered in Western media and do indirectly impact the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We will be able to proceed to guage and file at the results of those prison actions at the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and in particular on struggle in Ukrainian city spaces. We totally condemn Russian violations of the regulations of armed war and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity even if we don’t describe them in those studies.
Russian Major Effort — Japanese Ukraine (made out of 3 subordinate primary efforts)
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside of tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 — Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 — Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
Russian Mobilization and Pressure Era Efforts
Russian Technological Diversifications
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces
Ukrainian Protection Commercial Base Efforts
Russian Data Operations and Narratives
Important Task in Belarus
Russian Major Effort — Japanese Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside of tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town)
Russian forces persisted offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 15 however didn’t make showed advances. Ukrainian Kharkiv Team of Forces Colonel Yuriy Povkh said that Russian forces are making ready new attack teams from parts of the “153rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the forty seventh Motorized Rifle Department” and 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade (sixth Blended Hands Military [CAA], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) for renewed assaults within the Kharkiv route.[25] Povkh will have misspoken and was once in all probability regarding the 153rd Tank Regiment of the forty seventh Tank Department (1st Guards Tank Military, Moscow Army District [MMD]), for the reason that forty seventh Motorized Rifle Department isn’t showed to have a 153rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (not like the forty seventh Tank Department, which reportedly has a 153rd Tank Regiment), is a part of the fortieth Military Corps (18th CAA, Southern Army District [SMD]) and has been combating in southern Ukraine since September 2022.[26] ISW has noticed common mentions of the forty seventh Tank Department running in Kharkiv Oblast in contemporary months, while the deployment of the forty seventh Motorized Rifle Department from southern Ukraine would constitute a significant inflection.[27] Social media photos circulated on July 14 and 15 presentations a Russian soldier of the “Typhoon” detachment of the 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade complaining about prime losses all over attacks in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv Town) and claiming that his unit misplaced 16 of 46 squaddies all over one assault.[28] Russian and Ukrainian assets reported that combating persisted inside of Vovchansk and close to Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv Town).[29] Components of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade reportedly proceed running close to Vovchansk.[30]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northerly Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces persisted offensive operations alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 15 however didn’t make showed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complicated as much as 300 meters east of Makiivka (northwest of Kreminna), despite the fact that ISW has now not noticed visible proof of this declare.[31] Russian forces persisted attacking northwest of Svatove close to Pishchane and Stelmakhivka; northwest of Kreminna close to Makiivka and Hrekivka; and west of Kreminna close to Terny on July 14 and 15.[32] Components of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (third Motorized Rifle Department, twentieth Blended Hands Military [CAA], Moscow Army District [MMD]) are reportedly running close to Makiivka.[33]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces persisted assaults within the Siversk space on July 15 however didn’t make any showed advances. Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka, east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk close to Spirne and Vyimka on July 14 and 15.[34] Components of the Russian second Artillery Brigade (second Luhansk Folks’s Republic Military Corps [LNR AC]) reportedly proceed to function within the Siversk route.[35]
Russian forces didn’t make any showed positive aspects amid persisted combating close to Chasiv Yar on July 15. Russian forces attacked inside of easternmost Chasiv Yar; north of Chasiv Yar close to Hryhorivka and Kalynivka; east of Chasiv Yar close to Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar close to Andriivka on July 14 and 15.[36] Components of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Department reportedly proceed to function close to Chasiv Yar.[37]
Each Russian and Ukrainian forces not too long ago complicated within the Toretsk route as combating persisted on July 15. Geolocated photos printed on July 14 presentations that Ukrainian forces not too long ago recaptured some positions inside of southern Niu York (south of Toretsk) and confirms some claims of Russian advance throughout the town.[38] Further geolocated photos printed on July 15 presentations that Russian forces not too long ago marginally complicated inside of jap Pivnichne (east of Toretsk).[39] Russian forces additionally persisted to assault inside of Zalizne (straight away southeast of Toretsk) on July 14 and 15, the place Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complicated.[40] ISW has now not noticed affirmation of those claimed Russian advances in Zalizne, on the other hand.
Russian forces not too long ago complicated northwest of Avdiivka amid persisted combating on July 15. Geolocated photos printed on July 15 presentations that Russian forces complicated inside of central Yevhenivka (northwest of Avdiivka).[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces additionally complicated 1.12 kilometers deep alongside a railway line east of Prohres (northwest of Avdiivka), as much as 1.2 kilometers deep in fields southeast of Novoselivka Persha (northwest of Avdiivka), and marginally at the outskirts of Karlivka (southwest of Avdiivka), however ISW has now not noticed affirmation of those claims.[42] Russian forces additionally attacked northwest of Avdiivka close to Novooleksandrivka, Vozdvyzhenka, and Lozuvatske; and west of Avdiivka close to Yasnobrodivka on July 14 and 15.[43] Components of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk Folks’s Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly running within the Avdiivka route.[44]
Russian forces not too long ago marginally complicated west of Donetsk Town amid persisted combating within the space on July 15. Geolocated photos printed on July 14 presentations that Russian forces marginally complicated inside of western Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk Town), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complicated even additional west inside of and in fields south of Krasnohorivka.[45] Russian forces additionally persisted attacking southwest of Donetsk Town close to Paraskoviivka, Kostyantynivka, and Vodyane on July 14 and 15.[46] Components of the Russian thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Japanese Army District [EMD]) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Normal Workforce’s Major Directorate [GRU]) reportedly proceed running within the space west and southwest of Donetsk Town.[47]
Russian forces didn’t make any showed advances amid persisted combating within the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border space on July 15. Russian forces persisted attacking south of Velyka Novosilka close to Makarivka on July 14 and 15.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are making an attempt to advance north of Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka) following claims that Russian forces seized the agreement on July 14, however one milblogger claimed on July 15 that Ukrainian forces retain some positions inside of northern Urozhaine.[49] Russian milbloggers credited the Russian thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade, thirtieth Artillery Brigade, and fifth Tank Brigade (the entire thirty sixth Blended Hands Military, EMD) and fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) with seizing Urozhaine.[50]
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian goal: Deal with frontline positions and protected rear spaces in opposition to Ukrainian moves)
Positional engagements persisted in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 15, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complicated as much as 500 meters in two unspecified spaces within the Orikhiv route (western Zaporizhia Oblast).[51] The Ukrainian Normal Workforce reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults northwest of Robotyne close to Novoandriivka and northwest of Robotyne close to Mala Tokmachka on July 15.[52] Components of the Russian nineteenth Motorized Rifle Department (58th Blended Hands Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly running within the Orikhiv route; and parts of the “Valkyrie” Particular Detachment (4th Army Base, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly running close to Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[53]
Positional engagements persisted in east (left) financial institution Kherson Oblast, together with close to Krynky, on July 15.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that combating is ongoing at the Dnipro River Delta islands.[55] Components of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (seventh VDV Department) and seventieth Motorized Rifle Department and 126th Coastal Protection Brigade (either one of the 18th CAA, SMD) are running within the Kherson route.[56]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Purpose: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and at the frontline)
Russian forces introduced two D-30SN flow bombs with common joint flow munitions (UMPBs) at Myrhorod, Donetsk Oblast on July 14 and struck a residential construction and academic establishment.[57]
Russian Mobilization and Pressure Era Efforts (Russian goal: Increase struggle energy with out accomplishing normal mobilization)
Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasised ongoing Russian efforts to combine the metallurgy trade in occupied Ukraine into Russia’s protection business base (DIB).[58] Putin claimed in a July 15 speech for Russia’s Metallurgist Day that the Russian metallurgy trade is strategically necessary to Russia’s protection and safety and continues to develop regardless of Western sanctions. Putin claimed that the manufacturing of steel merchandise in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts has higher through 30 % in 2023 from 2022.
The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) introduced on July 15 the of completion of Russia’s Spring 2024 conscription cycle.[59] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian army conscripted 150,000 body of workers and reiterated reassurances that Russian conscripts don’t serve in occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and did take part in struggle operations in Ukraine.[60] ISW continues to evaluate that Russia coerced conscripts into signing Russian army contracts to beef up ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.[61]
Russian opposition shops reported that pro-war Russian Telegram channels are making an attempt to threaten mobilized body of workers and their kin in opposition to voicing court cases in opposition to the Russian army and advocating for demobilization. Russian opposition shops Astra and Mobilization Information reported that pro-war Russian Telegram channels printed a video of Russian squaddies purportedly claiming that “provocateurs” are organizing rallies in beef up demobilization after kin of Russian mobilized body of workers advocated for his or her family members’ demobilization.[62] The Russian opposition shops reported that pro-war Russian Telegram channels had in fact re-dubbed an present video of Russian squaddies discussing a special matter so as to threaten mobilized body of workers and their kin from talking out in opposition to the Russian army.
Russian Technological Diversifications (Russian goal: Introduce technological inventions to optimize methods to be used in Ukraine)
Russian state-owned protection conglomerate Rostec reported on July 15 that it’s recently creating an progressed model of unified making plans and correction modules (UMPCs) so as to building up the variability of unguided flow bombs.[63] Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov said that it’s a lot less expensive and nonetheless efficient for Rostec to provide unguided flow bombs with UMPCs than guided flow bombs.[64] A Russian protection business base (DIB) supply informed Kremlin newswire TASS that FAB-3000 flow bombs with UMPCs have a spread of up 50 to 60 kilometers and that FAB-250 to FAB-1500 flow bombs, probably with UMPCs, have a spread of as much as 60 to 70 kilometers.[65]
Rostec subsidiary United Airplane Company said on July 15 that it passed over the primary batch of repaired and modernized MiG-31 fighter plane for 2024 to the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD).[66]
Ukrainian Protection Commercial Efforts (Ukrainian goal: Increase its protection business base to develop into extra self-sufficient in cooperation with US, Ecu, and world companions)
Ukraine’s Western companions proceed to supply army and monetary support to Ukraine. The German executive introduced on July 8 that it delivered further army support to Ukraine, together with ammunition for Leopard tanks, a Patriot air protection device and missiles, and 155mm artillery ammunition.[67] The Ukrainian Ministry of Economic system said on July 9 that Ukraine and the Ecu Union (EU) signed an settlement that regulates monetary support value 5.27 billion euros (about $5.7 billion) to beef up Ukraine’s financial system over the following 4 years underneath the EU’s Ukraine Facility mechanism.[68] Portugal introduced on July 10 that Portuguese support to Ukraine will overall greater than 220 million euros (about $239 million) in 2024 and that Portugal will allocate an identical quantity in 2025.[69] New Zealand introduced a bundle on July 10 of six million NZD (about $3.6 million) value of army support to Ukraine, together with two million NZD (about $1.2 million) to beef up Ukraine’s army healthcare device.[70] New Zealand additionally introduced that it will supply a bundle of ten million NZD (about $6 million) value of humanitarian help to Ukraine. Canadian Top Minister Justin Trudeau introduced on July 11 a bundle of army support value 500 million CAD (about $365 million) to Ukraine.[71] Norwegian Top Minister Jonas Gahr Retailer said on July 11 that Norway will allocate a billion kroner (about $92 million) to beef up Ukraine’s air defenses.[72] The Lithuanian MoD said on July 11 that Lithuania provided drone jamming apparatus and 5.56x45mm NATO intermediate ammunition cartridges to Ukraine.[73] Spain said on July 15 that it all started shifting 10 repaired Leopard tanks to Ukraine and that the tanks will first arrive in Poland on July 20 ahead of touring to Ukraine.[74]
The Czech-led artillery shell coalition will reportedly ship shells to Ukraine beginning in July 2024. Czech outlet Ceske Noviny reported on July 13 that Czech President Petr Pavel said that the coalition must ship 50,000 shells to Ukraine in July and August 2024 and 80,000 to 100,000 shells per 30 days from September 2024 to the top of 2024.[75]
Ukraine’s Western companions proceed to beef up the United Kingdom and Latvian-led drone coalition. The Swedish MoD introduced on July 11 that Sweden joined the coalition.[76] Participants of the coalition — the Netherlands, UK, Latvia, New Zealand, and Sweden — signed a memorandum of working out on July 10 that gives a framework for the coalition’s actions and procurement mechanisms to supply Ukraine with a million first-person view (FPV) drones.[77] The Dutch MoD said on July 10 that the Netherlands will supply 20 million euros (about $21.8 million) to the drone coalition.[78] The New Zealand executive introduced on July 10 it will supply 4 million NZD (about $2.4 million) to beef up the drone coalition.[79]
Ukraine’s Western companions proceed to beef up the supply of F-16 plane to Ukraine. Norway said on July 10 that it’ll supply Ukraine with six F-16 plane at an unspecified time in 2024.[80] The Dutch MoD said on July 10 that the Netherlands would offer an extra 300 million euros (about $326 million) to buy ammunition for F-16 plane for Ukraine.[81] Canada introduced on July 11 that it allotted 389 million CAD (about $284 million) to beef up the learning of Ukrainian F-16 pilots during the Ukraine Protection Touch Air Pressure Capacity Coalition.[82]
Ukraine’s Western companions proceed to beef up Ukraine’s protection business base (DIB). The Danish Ministry of Protection (MoD) said on July 10 that Denmark financed the manufacturing of 18 Bohdana self-propelled howitzers in Ukraine, that are anticipated to reach to Ukrainian forces within the coming months.[83] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with representatives of US protection corporations on July 11 and mentioned joint partnerships in Ukraine.[84] Ukraine’s state-owned protection undertaking supervisor Ukroboronprom signed an settlement on July 11 with US protection corporate Northrop Grumman to create a brand new joint manufacturing line for NATO same old medium caliber artillery ammunition.[85]
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed spaces; forcibly combine Ukrainian voters into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance methods)
ISW isn’t publishing protection of actions in Russian-occupied spaces nowadays.
Russian Data Operations and Narratives
Russian milbloggers seized on a file from the Ukrainian Normal Workforce on July 15 saying that Ukrainian Commander-in-Leader Colonel Normal Oleksandr Syrskyi is accomplishing an investigation into the command of a Ukrainian brigade because of contemporary body of workers losses so as to unfold discontent and mistrust of the Ukrainian army command.[86]
Russia continues to rate Ukrainian officers with invented and unsubstantiated crimes in absentia to implement Russian legislation outdoor of Russian prison jurisdiction and insinuate that Ukraine must now not exist as an impartial state. The Moscow Town Basmanny District Court docket issued in absentia struggle crimes sentences in opposition to former head of the Ukrainian State Safety Provider (SBU) Valentyn Nalyvaichenko and Secretary of the Ukrainian Nationwide Safety and Protection Council Oleksandr Lytvynenko.[87]
Disinformation-focused analytical outlet NewsGuard reported on July 11 that it has recognized 41 English- and French-language TikTok accounts that use AI-generated narration to unfold disinformation, together with Kremlin narratives in regards to the struggle in Ukraine.[88] NewsGuard discovered that 17 of those accounts in particular pay attention to pro-Kremlin narratives, 14 of which use AI generated French-language narration.
Important task in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Team task in Belarus)
Not anything vital to file.
Word: ISW does now not obtain any categorized subject material from any supply, makes use of handiest publicly to be had knowledge, and attracts broadly on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially to be had satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the foundation for those studies. References to all assets used are supplied within the endnotes of each and every replace.
[1] ua/ukr/UKRAINE/44-ukrajintsiv-vvazhajut-shcho-nastav-chas-dlja-perehovoriv-z-rf-rezultati-sotsiolohichnoho-opituvannja-znua.html ;
[2] ua/ukr/UKRAINE/vijna-chi-mir-ukrajintsi-khochut-povernuti-kordoni-1991-roku-ale-chijimi-rukami-rezultati-sotsiolohichnoho-doslidzhennja.html
[3]
[4]
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