Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation, November 14, 2024
Kateryna Stepanenko, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
November 14, 2024, 8:15pm ET
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day-to-day along the static maps provide on this document.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s three-D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (now not a cellular tool) is strongly beneficial for the use of this data-heavy instrument.
Click on right here to get entry to ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Those maps supplement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day-to-day by means of appearing a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive per 30 days.
Word: The information cut-off for this product was once 12:30pm ET on November 14. ISW will duvet next studies within the November 15 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.
The Kremlin’s contemporary financial insurance policies point out that the Russian economic system will most likely face vital demanding situations in 2025 and that Russian President Vladimir Putin is anxious about Russia’s financial steadiness in the longer term. The Kremlin lately followed a number of insurance policies that purpose to chop Russian govt spending on wounded Russian servicemen, fight inflation, and deal with long-term demographic issues corresponding to low beginning charges and hard work shortages. Those insurance policies show that the Russian economic system isn’t as resilient to Western sanctions, financial constraints, and the price of the warfare effort because the Russian govt postures. Those insurance policies additionally show that the Kremlin will be unable to maintain the protracted warfare effort for years and a long time to come back whilst shielding Russian society from financial demanding situations. Constant Western and global fortify for Ukraine’s resistance at the battlefield will additional exacerbate Russia’s financial issues.
Putin changed reimbursement promised for Russian servicemen wounded whilst preventing in Ukraine — a transparent indicator that the Kremlin is attempting to chop the mounting short- and long-term prices of the warfare and repair stability to the Russian economic system. Putin controversially modified Russian coverage making certain a one-time fee of 3 million rubles ($30,124) to all Russian servicemen who’ve been wounded in fight in Ukraine since March 2022.[1] Putin signed a decree on November 13 that limited the one-time bills of 3 million rubles best to servicemen who sustained severe accidents in fight, best providing a million rubles ($10,152) to flippantly wounded servicemen, and 100,000 rubles ($1,015) to servicemen who sustained minor accidents at the battlefield.[2] Putin’s decree generated vital backlash from the Russian ultranationalist milblogger neighborhood, and Putin tried to placate this neighborhood on November 14 by means of expanding the one-time bills to 4 million rubles ($40,136), however nonetheless just for Russian servicemen who maintain critical battlefield accidents that lead to a incapacity.[3] A Russian milblogger famous that Putin’s authorization to extend reimbursement for disabled servicemen does now not adjust the truth that the Kremlin is reneging on guarantees to 1000’s of Russian servicemen who joined the Russian army only because of massive monetary incentives.[4] The milblogger added that Russian army clinical commissions also are turning into an increasing number of — and steadily intentionally unfairly — selective in diagnosing Russian servicemen with critical accidents.
Putin firstly presented the coverage providing all wounded Russian servicemen 3 million rubles to incentivize army recruitment after he had determined in opposition to pointing out basic mobilization in Spring 2022.[5] Monetary incentives was the important thing pillar of the Russian army’s recruitment marketing campaign and group of workers retention efforts over the last just about 3 years, and the reversal of such incentives signifies that the gadget is turning into economically unsustainable for the Kremlin. ISW particularly assessed in Summer time 2022 that the Kremlin’s reliance on prime monetary incentives for pressure technology was once committing Russia to short- and long-term monetary duties to 1000’s of Russians, corresponding to paying veterans pensions, compensations to households of deceased servicemen, and different state advantages.[6]
The Kremlin’s efforts to fight inflation and prime rates of interest also are reportedly impacting the growth of the Russian protection business base (DIB) and potentialities for mobilizing the economic system. The Russian Central Financial institution lately raised the important thing rate of interest to 21 % on October 25, which reportedly brought on discontent amongst Russian politicians, DIB CEOs, and elites. Kremlin-affiliated Heart for Macroeconomic Research and Quick-Time period Forecasting (TsMAKP) reported that the Russian economic system is “successfully dealing with the specter of stagflation – simultaneous stagnation and even recession and prime inflation” as a result of the Central Financial institution’s tight financial coverage.[7] TsMAKP assessed that if the Russian Central Financial institution maintains the important thing rate of interest at round 20 % till mid-2025 then the composite main indicator (CLI) for recession will exceed its important threshold. The Ukrainian Overseas Intelligence Carrier in a similar way reported that the choice of loans with a dynamic charge — which is dependent upon a bargain from the Central Financial institution — greater from 44 % in past due 2023 to 53 % in past due 2024.[8] The Ukrainian Overseas Intelligence Carrier added that prime rates of interest might create a surprise and a decline in manufacturing, which may end up in bankruptcies and company defaults. A Kremlin insider supply claimed that the Central Financial institution’s tight financial coverage is restraining the Russian DIB’s tempo of construction in the longer term and has already difficult a number of Russian export tasks, even though it had now not but without delay impacted Russian military-technological fortify for the Russian warfare effort.[9]
The Russian DIB is not likely to compare the manufacturing charge essential to exchange Russian guns losses underneath those financial insurance policies. Overseas Coverage (FP), mentioning OSINT analysts, reported that Russia has been shedding round 320 tank and artillery cannon barrels per thirty days however can best produce 20 per thirty days.[10] FP reported that Russia will most likely run out of cannon barrels in 2025 because of battlefield losses, dwindling Soviet shares, and sanctions affects. FP additionally cited OSINT estimates that Russian forces have misplaced a minimum of 4,955 infantry preventing automobiles (IFVs) since February 2022 — about 155 IFVs per thirty days. FP reported that Russia can best produce about 17 IFVs per 30 days or 200 every year. FP assessed that the Central Financial institution’s coverage of elevating rates of interest has made it tricky for nondefense firms to boost capital via loans, which is shrinking the civilian economic system and might result in vital post-war recession as returning Russian veterans can have a more difficult time discovering employment.
The Kremlin could also be adopting insurance policies geared toward bolstering the home inhabitants in the longer term, signaling mounting considerations over declining demographics and hard work shortages that might threaten the sustainable operations of the Russian DIB. Russian state outlet RBK claimed on November 14 that the Russian govt has advanced a draft Means of Motion via 2036 to handle Russia’s an increasing number of dire demographic problems.[11] The Means of Motion objectives to extend birthrates and advertise the relations way of life by means of making improvements to fortify gadget for households with youngsters and offering beginning incentives; fixing housing issues to extend the provision of condo, social, and new housing; developing stipulations for a extra a hit work-family stability; making improvements to reproductive well being of the inhabitants, specifically girls’s prenatal and infertility care; and embellishing family-positive propaganda in media and the Russian data house. The Means of Motion is part of broader efforts by means of Russian government to advance insurance policies geared toward expanding the Russian inhabitants each via concrete regulation but in addition via rhetoric targeted on “familial and standard” values.[12]
ISW prior to now assessed that Russia’s demographic demanding situations had been worsened by means of the warfare with an estimated 800,000 to 900,000 Russians — together with many extremely certified workers- fleeing the rustic since February 2022 most likely inflicting Russian government to depend extra on migrant populations.[13] Russian Federal State Statistics Carrier (Rosstat) records displays that Russia’s hard work scarcity amounted to 4.8 million other folks in 2023, an issue that has decreased Russia’s financial output.[14] Rosstat additionally estimated in 2023 that Russia’s inhabitants will decline naturally at a charge of greater than 600,000 other folks in line with 12 months till 2032. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated Russia’s ongoing hard work scarcity on November 7 and admitted to Russia’s heavy reliance on migrants with a view to mitigate the affects of its waning inhabitants at the broader Russian body of workers.[15] Putin warned, then again, that reliance on migrant populations calls for systematic assimilation efforts, most likely in keeping with persisted tensions between Russian ultranationalist rhetoric and the want to stay the Russian hard work pressure capability afloat via migration. Migrant populations also are not really to yield the required end result in Russia given persisted racist rhetoric and regulation and loss of skillsets amongst financial migrants had to include a qualified running magnificence. FP reported that the Russian “civilian economic system” has skilled group of workers shortages and loss of certified employees because of concerted Russian govt efforts to draw Russian laborers to its DIB resulting in imaginable long term financial turmoil on account of hard work shortages and declining inhabitants. ISW has lately noticed Russian government revoking migrants’ Russian citizenship for refusing to sign in for army provider, an build up in migrant deportations in 2024, protests, and violence in opposition to minority communities, amongst different rhetorical and prison realities that experience created stumbling blocks for migrants each to go into and to advance within the Russian body of workers.[16] A mixture of naturally declining inhabitants and aversion to making stipulations conducive to migration and enhancement of the professional hard work body of workers will perhaps impair the Russian economic system and as a result Russian DIB within the mid- to long-term.
Russian forces lately complex into Kupyansk throughout a most likely kind of company-sized mechanized attack, even if ISW does now not assess that Russian forces management the realm. Geolocated photos printed on November 13 displays a minimum of 4 Russian automobiles undertaking an attack, indicating that Russian forces lately complex southward alongside a railway line.[17] Russian and Ukrainian assets mentioned that Russian forces attacked in two armored car columns and that one column consisted of 1 tank and 3 armored automobiles and the opposite column consisted of an unspecified composition and choice of automobiles.[18] Ukrainian Heart for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on November 14 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults in Kupyansk and averted Russian forces from setting up positions in Kupyansk.[19] The Ukrainian Armed Forces Heart for Strategic Communications (StratCom) reported that Kupyansk is totally underneath Ukrainian management and reiterated a Ukrainian Common Body of workers document from November 13 mentioning that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack at the agreement.[20] ISW assessed that Russian forces most likely complex in northeastern Kupyansk however very most likely don’t management the realm, and ISW maps lately display spaces in northeastern Kupyansk the place ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or introduced assaults in opposition to however don’t management. Russian forces have intensified offensive operations close to Kupyansk throughout the remaining two months and ISW continues to evaluate that the Russian seizure of Kupyansk would generate operationally vital results.[21] ISW isn’t ready to evaluate whether or not Russian forces will be capable of leverage contemporary tactical advances to make operationally vital features, then again. Russian forces additionally persisted offensive operations north of Kupyansk close to Holubivka; east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk close to Kolisnykivka, Hlushkivka, Kruhlyakivka, Lozova, Zahryzove, Kucherivka on November 13 and 14.[22]
A up to date Russian state-affiliated ballot suggests that almost all Russian citizens really feel in large part unaffected by means of the warfare in Ukraine, supporting studies of rising considerations amongst Russian officers and elites that many voters stay detached in opposition to the warfare. Kremlin newswire TASS amplified a ballot carried out by means of the Russian state-affiliated Institute of Sociology of the Federal Analysis Heart of the Russian Academy of Sciences on November 14 revealing that 83 % of respondents claimed that the “Particular Army Operation” didn’t impact their day-to-day lifestyles or affected it best to a slight extent.[23] Patriarch Kirill, head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), claimed on October 31 that some segments of Russian society make a selection to “flip a blind eye” to the realities of the frontline and the hardships confronted by means of the ones dwelling in border spaces close to the warfare, even if the warfare in Ukraine represents the “maximum pressing danger” to Russia.[24] Kirill condemned Russians who’re unwilling to sacrifice their non-public comforts, as a substitute depending on “superficial distractions” to steer clear of confronting the arduous realities of the warfare. ISW assessed that Kirill’s remarks most likely mirror underlying considerations amongst Russian government, as they recommend imaginable waning public fortify for the warfare effort, doable difficulties in long term recruitment efforts, and a rising societal divide between parts of the Russian inhabitants maximum without delay suffering from the warfare and the ones in large part insulated from its affects.[25]
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 14 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is in my opinion coping with problems relating to Ukraine and that he calls for no particular envoys, most likely in keeping with studies that US President-elect Donald Trump will “quickly” appoint a “Ukrainian peace envoy to steer negotiations on finishing the warfare.”[26]
Key Takeaways:
The Kremlin’s contemporary financial insurance policies point out that the Russian economic system will most likely face vital demanding situations in 2025 and that Russian President Vladimir Putin is anxious about Russia’s financial steadiness in the longer term.
Putin changed reimbursement promised for Russian servicemen wounded whilst preventing in Ukraine — a transparent indicator that the Kremlin is attempting to chop the mounting short- and long-term prices of the warfare and repair stability to the Russian economic system.
The Kremlin’s efforts to fight inflation and prime rates of interest also are reportedly impacting the growth of the Russian protection business base (DIB) and potentialities for mobilizing the economic system.
The Russian DIB is not likely to compare the manufacturing charge essential to exchange Russian guns losses underneath those financial insurance policies.
The Kremlin could also be adopting insurance policies geared toward bolstering the home inhabitants in the longer term, signaling mounting considerations over declining demographics and hard work shortages that might threaten the sustainable operations of the Russian DIB.
Russian forces lately complex into Kupyansk throughout a most likely kind of company-sized mechanized attack, even if ISW does now not assess that Russian forces management the realm.
A up to date Russian state-affiliated ballot suggests that almost all Russian citizens really feel in large part unaffected by means of the warfare in Ukraine, supporting studies of rising considerations amongst Russian officers and elites that many voters stay detached in opposition to the warfare.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 14 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is in my opinion coping with problems relating to Ukraine and that he calls for no particular envoys, most likely in keeping with studies that US President-elect Donald Trump will “quickly” appoint a “Ukrainian peace envoy to steer negotiations on finishing the warfare.”
Russian forces complex within the Ukrainian primary salient in Kursk Oblast, west of Ukraine’s primary salient in Kursk Oblast in Glushkovsky Raion, within the Chasiv Yar path, and within the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border house.
Russian assets are speculating that North Korea could have supplied North Korean-produced 170mm M1989 “Koksan” self-propelled artillery programs to Russia. Russian milbloggers printed photographs appearing a teach transporting alleged North Korean 170mm M1989 “Koksan” self-propelled artillery programs in Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai.
We don’t document intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of those actions are well-covered in Western media and do indirectly impact the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We will be able to proceed to guage and document at the results of those felony actions at the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and in particular on fight in Ukrainian city spaces. We totally condemn Russian violations of the rules of armed warfare and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity even supposing we don’t describe them in those studies.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian Primary Effort — Jap Ukraine (produced from 3 subordinate primary efforts)
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces again from the global border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #2 — Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #3 — Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
Russian Mobilization and Power Era Efforts
Russian Technological Diversifications
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces
Important Job in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian forces lately complex throughout the Ukrainian primary salient in Kursk Oblast. Geolocated photos printed on November 13 displays Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian platoon-sized mechanized attack south of Zelenyi Shlyakh (southeast of Korenevo) and signifies that Russian forces complex within the house.[27] Geolocated photos printed on November 14 displays that parts of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Army District [SMD]) introduced mechanized assaults close to Maryevka, Pogrebki, Orlovka, and Novaya Sorochina (all northwest of Sudzha), and complex to the southern a part of Novaya Sorochina.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian charge of advance had bogged down; that Russian forces seized some positions between Pogrebki and Kremyanoye (east of Korenevo); and there aren’t any confirmations that Russian forces entered Kurilovka (south of Sudzha).[29] Russian assets, together with the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD), claimed that preventing persisted east of Korenevo close to Kremyanoye; south of Korenevo close to Nikolayevo-Darino; southeast of Korenevo close to Novoivanovka, Leonidovo, and Darino; northwest of Sudzha close to Novaya Sorochina and Malaya Loknya; and south of Sudzha close to Plekhovo.[30] Parts of the Russian one hundred and fifty fifth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Jap Army District [EMD]), 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (seventh VDV Department), and 106th VDV Department reportedly persisted to perform within the Kursk path.[31] Attack parts of the Russian “Arbat” Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly running close to Plekhovo.[32]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian box commanders are intentionally generating false studies, which exaggerate Russian advances throughout the Ukrainian primary salient in Kursk Oblast and give a contribution to Russian losses at the battlefield.[33] The milblogger mentioned that Russian army command is committing parts of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade to day-to-day unprepared attacks and that Ukrainian defenses are additional destroying the brigade. The milblogger added that parts of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade are nonetheless preventing for Orlovka, Pogrebki, Novaya Sorochina, and Staraya Sorochina (right away southwest of Novaya Sorochina), and that Ukrainian forces encircled and eradicated one of the crucial brigade’s two teams. The Kremlin is starting to face some restricted protests from Russians citizens in Kursk Oblast’s border house, and the issue of Russian box commanders misreporting the level of the Russian advances in Kursk Oblast is most likely a symptom of the Kremlin’s calls for to decisively repel the Ukrainian incursion.[34]
Russian forces lately marginally complex west of Ukraine’s primary salient in Kursk Oblast in Glushkovsky Raion. Geolocated photos printed on November 14 signifies that Russian forces lately complex east of Novy Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[35]
Belgorod Oblast-based outlet Pepel reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian army apparatus garage house in Belgorod Town on November 14.[36] Pepel reported that an unspecified Ukrainian missile struck the roof of a construction the place Russian forces retailer a number of “Ural” vehicles and different army apparatus, and that the strike injured a number of conscripts.
Russian Primary Effort — Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian function: Push Ukrainian forces again from the global border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Town)
Russian forces persisted offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 13 and 14 however didn’t make any showed advances. Reliable Ukrainian assets reported that preventing persisted north of Kharkiv Town close to Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv Town close to Vovchansk.[37] Ukrainian assets additionally reported that Russian forces carried out most likely cross-border raids close to Vysoka Yaruha (without delay south of the global border and about 20km north of Kharkiv Town).[38] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade running in northern Kharkiv Oblast mentioned on November 14 that the worsening climate stipulations are complicating Russian forces’ motion and each Russian and Ukrainian troops’ talent to make use of drones.[39] The Ukrainian reliable additional reported that Russian forces are benefiting from the loss of Ukrainian drones within the house to fill up their reserves within the house.
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian function: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northerly Donetsk Oblast)
See topline textual content for updates at the Kupyansk path.
Russian forces persisted offensive operations alongside the Svatove-Kreminna line on November 14, however didn’t make showed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 14 that Russian forces complex west, south, and east of Pershotravneve (west of Svatove), however ISW has now not noticed affirmation of this declare.[40] Russian forces carried out offensive operations west of Svatove close to Zelenyi Hai and Pershotravneve; and northwest of Svatove close to Pishchane; southwest of Svatove close to Cherneshchyna, Novoyehorivka and Druzhelyubivka; northwest of Kremmina close to Novomykhailivka, Makiivka, and Katerynivka; and west of Kremmina close to Zarichne, Nevske, Torske, and Terny on November 13 and 14.[41]
Russian Subordinate Primary Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian function: Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces persisted attacks east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske on November 14, however didn’t advance.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 14 that Russian forces complex south of Siversk close to Rozdolivka, however ISW has now not showed affirmation of this declare.[43] A Ukrainian brigade reported on November 13 that Russian forces lately carried out an unsuccessful platoon-sized mechanized attack close to Spirne (southeast of Siversk).[44] Parts of the Russian 2d Artillery Brigade (third Mixed Palms Military [CAA], previously the 2d Luhansk Other people’s Republic (LNR] Military Corps [AC]) are reportedly running close to Zvanivka (south of Siversk).[45] Parts of the Russian thirty ninth Radiation, Chemical, and Organic Coverage Regiment (third CAA) are reportedly running within the Siversk path.[46]
Russian forces lately complex south of Chasiv Yar amid persisted offensive operations on this path on November 14. Geolocated photos posted on November 14 signifies that Russian forces lately complex east of Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar).[47] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 14 that Russian forces complex southeast of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar), however ISW has now not noticed visible affirmation of this declare.[48] Russian forces carried out offensive operations close to Stupochky on November 13.[49] Parts of the Russian Ivanovo Airborne (VDV) Formation (98th VDV Department) and the Russian sixth Motorized Rifle Department (third AC) are reportedly running within the Chasiv Yar path.[50]
Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Toretsk path on November 14, however didn’t make showed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 13 that Russian forces complex in southern Krymske (northeast of Toretsk), however ISW has now not noticed visible affirmation of this declare.[51] Russian forces persisted offensive operations close to Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka; right away west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk close to Nelipivka on November 13 and 14.[52]
Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Pokrovsk path on November 14 however didn’t make any showed advances. Russian forces persisted attacking east of Pokrovsk close to Promin and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka, Krutyi Yar, Sukhyi Yar; and south of Pokrovsk close to Hyrhorivka, Pustynka, Petrivka, Novooleksiivka, Yurivka, Dachenske, Pushkine, and Zhovte on November 13 and 14.[53]
Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Kurakhove path on November 14 however didn’t make any showed advances. The Ukrainian Heart for Strategic Communications (Stratcom) mentioned on November 14 that Ukrainian forces management Illinka and that preventing is ongoing at the outskirts of the agreement.[54] ISW assessed that Russian forces most likely seized Illinka as of November 13 because of geolocated photos printed on November 13 appearing parts of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk Other people’s Republic [DNR] AC) elevating a flag over central Illinka (northeast of Kurakhove).[55] ISW does now not assess that Russian forces management the agreement, even if Russian forces most likely occupy it. The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Voznesenka (north of Kurakhove).[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complex inside jap Kurakhove and north of Illinka (north of Kurakhove).[57] ISW has now not noticed visible proof of those claims. A Ukrainian brigade running within the Kurakhove path printed photos on November 13 appearing Russian forces undertaking a kind of decreased company-sized mechanized attack in an unspecified house within the Kurakhove path.[58] Russian forces persisted attacking inside Kurakhove; northeast of Kurakhove close to Zorya and Sontsivka; north of Kurakhove close to Novoselydivka, Berestky, Illinka, and Kreminna Balka, Voznesenka; and west of Kurakhove close to Maksymilyanivka on November 13 and 14.[59] The spokesperson of Ukrainian brigade running within the Kurakhove path mentioned that Russian forces are undertaking attacks the use of tanks, armored group of workers carriers, infantry preventing automobiles, bikes, and buggies and are making an attempt to achieve Uspenivka (southwest of Kurakhove and northeast of Vuhledar).[60] Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets mentioned on November 14 that the Russian army has concentrated kind of 70,000 group of workers from its Central, Southern and Jap groupings of forces within the Kurakhove path.[61] Mashovets mentioned that parts of the Russian ninetieth Tank Department (forty first CAA, Central Army District [CMD]) and 1st, fifth, one hundred and tenth, 114th motorized rifle brigades (51st CAA) are running north and northeast of the Kurakhove close to Novooleksiivka, Ukrainka, Novodmytrivka, and Solntsivka.[62]
Russian forces persisted offensive operations within the Vuhledar path on November 14 however didn’t make any showed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Dalne (north of Vuhledar) and complex northeast of Vuhledar close to Antonivka and Maksymivka.[63] Russian forces persisted attacking north of Vuhledar close to Dalne; northeast of Vuhledar close to Katerynivka and Antonivka; northwest of Vuhledar close to Yantarne, Kosyantynopolske, and Trudove on November 13 and 14.[64] Parts of the Russian “Astra” artillery unit of the thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, EMD) are reportedly running close to Maksymivka.[65] Mashovets mentioned that parts of the Russian twentieth and one hundred and fiftieth motorized rifle divisions (eighth CAA, Southern Army District [SMD]) are running close to Dalne; parts of the thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Jap Army District [EMD]) are running close to Antonivka, Katerynivka, and Yelyzavetivka (all northeast of Vuhledar); parts of the thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, EMD) and thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, EMD) are running west of Trudove; parts of the fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) and thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade are running within the path of Rozlyv (northwest of Vuhledar).[66]
Russian forces lately complex within the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border house amid persisted offensive operations within the house on November 14. Geolocated photos printed on November 11 and 12 signifies that Russian forces lately complex south of Rivnopil and north of Levadne (each southwest of Velyka Novosilka). [67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Novodarivka, even if ISW has now not noticed visible proof of this declare.[68] Russian forces persisted attacking south of Velyka Novosilka close to Makarivka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Novodarivka, Rivnopil, and Novopil on November 13 and 14.[69]
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian function: Handle frontline positions and protected rear spaces in opposition to Ukrainian moves)
Russian forces reportedly lately complex within the Hulyaipole (some distance jap Zaporizhia Oblast) path. Russian assets claimed on November 14 that Russian forces complex southeast of Hulyaipole close to Marfopil and south of Hulyaipole close to Dorozhnyanka, even if ISW has now not noticed visible affirmation of those claims.[70] The Ukrainian Common Body of workers reported that Russian forces didn’t behavior any offensive operations within the Hulyaipole path on November 14.[71] Sniper parts of the Russian thirty eighth Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty fifth Mixed Palms Military [CAA], Jap Army District [EMD]) are reportedly running within the Polohy path.[72]
Russian forces reportedly lately complex in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid persisted preventing on November 14, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complex additional north of Robotyne, even if ISW has now not noticed visible affirmation of this declare.[73] Russian forces carried out flooring assaults north of Robotyne close to Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne close to Novoandriivka on November 13 and 14.[74] A Russian milblogger downplayed contemporary speculations that Russian forces might accentuate attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast within the close to long term.[75] ISW has nonetheless now not noticed any studies confirming that Russian forces have redeployed forces to the Zaporizhia path from different spaces of the frontline. Artillery parts of the Russian ”Viking” Detachment (twenty second Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian Common Body of workers Primary Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly running in Zaporizhia Oblast.[76]
Positional preventing persisted within the Dnipro path in east (left) financial institution Kherson Oblast on November 13 and 14, however there have been no showed adjustments to the frontline.[77] Parts of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Military Battle Reserves) reportedly proceed running within the Kherson path.[78]
A highway bridge at the Dzhankoy-Maslove (each northeast of Simferopol) freeway in occupied Crimea collapsed in a single day on November 13 to fourteen, prompting some Russian data house considerations about Russian army logistics from occupied Crimea to in different places in occupied southern Ukraine. Russian profession officers reported that the bridge collapsed because of an outsized truck riding around the bridge and that the bridge collapsed onto railway tracks, briefly preventing civilian and freight railway site visitors between occupied Crimea and Zaporizhia Oblast.[79] Russian profession officers claimed that the railway tracks stay operational and resumed railway site visitors throughout the day on November 14.[80] Russian profession government reported that restoring the roadway bridge will take 3 to 4 months. Russian milbloggers expressed worry about Russian railway logistics, claiming that the affected railway is the one railway connecting occupied Crimea to occupied Kherson Oblast and that the cave in briefly bring to an end Russian logistics to Russian forces in occupied Kherson Oblast.[81]
Ukrainian Military Spokesperson Captain 3rd Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on November 14 that Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels are now not running within the Black Sea because of deficient climate stipulations and are as a substitute expanding aviation operations over the Black Sea.[82]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Purpose: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and at the frontline)
Russian forces carried out a chain of drone moves in opposition to Ukraine at the evening of November 13 to fourteen. The Ukrainian Air Power reported on November 14 that Russian forces introduced 59 Shahed drones and unspecified strike drones from Kursk Oblast.[83] The Ukrainian Air Power reported that Ukrainian forces downed 21 drones over Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Kyiv oblasts and that 38 drones have been ”in the community misplaced,” most likely because of Ukrainian digital war (EW) interference. The Sumy Oblast Army Management reported on November 14 that Ukrainian forces downed 11 Shahed drones over Sumy Oblast.[84]
Russian Mobilization and Power Era Efforts (Russian function: Increase fight energy with out undertaking basic mobilization)
Russian assets are speculating that North Korea could have supplied North Korean-produced 170mm M1989 “Koksan” self-propelled artillery programs to Russia. Russian milbloggers printed photographs appearing a teach transporting alleged North Korean 170mm M1989 “Koksan” self-propelled artillery programs in Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai.[85] Russian milbloggers claimed that the North Korean “Koksan” self-propelled artillery programs are fixed on Russian T-54 or T-62 tank chassis, have a hearth charge of 1 to 2 pictures in line with 5 mins, and feature a variety of 40 to 60 kilometers.[86] A distinguished, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger celebrated the alleged guns switch and speculated that North Korea may provide Russian forces with higher-caliber guns and make allowance Russia to seriously amplify its army functions.[87] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) reported that Russian forces might use the “Koksan” self-propelled artillery gadget to exchange contemporary losses of Russian 2S7 Pion 203mm self-propelled artillery programs in difficult operational spaces.[88] ISW is not able to independently ascertain studies of North Korea offering Russian forces with artillery programs.
Russian milbloggers expressed persisted worry over deficient Russian hospital therapy to Russian infantrymen who fought in Ukraine amid contemporary Ministry of Protection (MoD) efforts to posture as offering efficient care.[89] Russian milbloggers complained on November 14 that the Russian MoD failed to correctly increase distribution and logistics networks to offer the Russian army with clinical provides on the military, divisional, and regimental ranges after just about 3 years of warfare in spite of having enough provides in garage.[90] The Russian milbloggers claimed that the shortfalls within the MoD’s clinical provides have pressured volunteer organizations and different clinical devices now not tasked with acquiring provides to fill the gaps in clinical shops however that those efforts are inadequate for Russian wishes. Russian opposition outlet Astra printed photos on November 14 appearing Russian infantrymen of the thirty fifth Control Brigade (forty first Mixed Palms Military [CAA], Central Army District [CMD] rioting following a war of words with Russian army cops over being denied hospital therapy and being misled by means of commanding officials in Novosibirsk Town.[91]
Russian Technological Diversifications (Russian function: Introduce technological inventions to optimize programs to be used in Ukraine)
Not anything vital to document.
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces (Russian function: Consolidate administrative management of annexed spaces; forcibly combine Ukrainian voters into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance programs)
Russia could also be suffering to create a coherent and unified federal-level profession technique for Ukraine and is as a substitute depending on unswerving Kremlin insiders to adjudicate management over occupied spaces. A Russian insider supply claimed on November 14 that the Kremlin has reportedly deserted its earlier plan to create the “Novorossiya” Federal Okrug (federal district) in occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts till a minimum of the tip of the energetic section of army operations in Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin’s administrative management of occupied Ukraine stays slightly advert hoc and de-centralized.[92] Zaporizhia Oblast profession governor Yevgeny Balitsky first publicly introduced the plan to create the Novorossiya Federal Okrug in June 2024.[93] A Russian insider supply prior to now claimed that the okrug venture, if Russian government had proceeded with it, would have showcased the Kremlin’s pivot towards creating the commercial potentialities of occupied Ukraine and streamlining its integration with Russia.[94] The Kremlin’s obvious abandonment of the venture might then be a trademark of accelerating constraints on Russia’s talent to manage the profession of Ukraine because of ongoing home financial struggles. The Russian insider supply additional claimed that Presidential Management First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko’s contemporary discuss with to Ukraine is a sturdy indicator that the Kremlin will most likely proceed to depend on Kiriyenko to steer federal-level tasks in occupied Ukraine following the de-prioritization of the Novorossiya Federal Okrug venture.[95] ISW has prior to now assessed that Kiriyenko is likely one of the primary Kremlin officers without delay enthusiastic about administering the profession of Ukraine.[96] Kiriyenko will most likely proceed to in my opinion oversee profession efforts within the absence of a bigger okrug-level administrative frame to supervise the profession. Kiriyenko’s non-public bandwidth to take action is most likely restricted, then again, as he additionally oversees lots of the Kremlin’s interior machinations, together with the veteran-focused “Time of Heroes” program.[97]
Important job in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and extra combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Crew job in Belarus)
Russian and Belarusian government proceed to extend prison cooperation via unified border management requirements. The Belarusian Ministry of Business mentioned on November 14 that Russian and Belarusian government signed a brief settlement to streamline border controls and the alternate of digital passports for exports between Russia and Belarus, in addition to identify a groundwork for an enduring digital passport gadget by means of the tip of 2024.[98]
Word: ISW does now not obtain any categorised subject matter from any supply, makes use of best publicly to be had data, and attracts widely on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially to be had satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial records as the foundation for those studies. References to all assets used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
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