Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluate, April 7, 2025
Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Christina Harward, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter
April 7, 2025, 6:45pm ET
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day along the static maps provide on this file.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on right here to peer ISW’s 3-D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (now not a cellular tool) is strongly beneficial for the usage of this data-heavy software.
Click on right here to get right of entry to ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Those maps supplement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by way of appearing a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive per month.
Word: The knowledge cut-off for this product was once 12:15pm ET on April 7. ISW will quilt next studies within the April 8 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluate.
The Kremlin continues to disclaim the legitimacy of the Ukrainian govt as a part of efforts to assert that Ukraine isn’t a sound negotiating spouse and to call for Ukrainian regime trade and demilitarization. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 7 that Russian President Vladimir Putin helps the speculation of a ceasefire in Ukraine however claimed that a number of problems “are placing within the air.”[1] Peskov claimed that those problems come with the “loss of management” over the Ukrainian govt and the Ukrainian govt’s alleged lack of ability to management the movements of unspecified extremist and nationalist devices that “merely don’t obey” the Ukrainian govt’s orders. Peskov claimed that those devices are hooked up to “plans for the additional militarization” of Ukraine. Peskov is selling Putin’s March 28 narrative falsely claiming that the present Ukrainian govt is illegal and incapable of combatting neo-Nazi teams, which Putin claimed have the “exact energy of their arms.”[2] Those Kremlin statements are a part of a broader effort to undermine the Ukrainian govt’s legitimacy and repackage Russia’s long-standing calls for for regime trade and demilitarization in Ukraine. Putin and different Russian officers in the past quickly paused selling claims about Ukraine’s alleged illegitimacy following Putin’s telephone name with US President Donald Trump on February 12, however later resumed those claims on March 28.[3] Trump not too long ago expressed dissatisfaction with Putin’s disparaging remarks attacking Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s legitimacy and expressed a willingness to impose further sanctions on Russia if the US and Russia are not able to “make a deal.”[4]
Ukrainian officers didn’t file any Russian long-range missile or drone moves at the evening of April 6 to 7 or all through the day on April 7 following Russia’s greatest strike bundle in over a month at the evening of April 5 to six. It stays unclear why the Russian forces didn’t behavior any long-range moves, after having finished so day by day since December 12, 2024.[5] Russia used the large-scale missile and drone strike sequence at the evening of April 5 to six to experiment with its strike applications to extend their effectiveness, and Russia could also be making ready to behavior every other large-scale strike bundle within the close to long run.[6]
Ukraine’s Eu allies proceed to ramp up home materiel manufacturing and deal with shortages inhibiting artillery ammunition manufacturing. German palms producer Rheinmetall introduced on April 7 that the corporate will gain and repurpose German nitrocellulose manufacturer “Hagerdorn-NC” for guns manufacturing as a part of ongoing efforts to extend Rheinmetall’s capability for production ammunition propellants, in particular for 155mm artillery shells.[7] Nitrocellulose, sometimes called guncotton, is a a very powerful element of propellants for contemporary artillery ammunition and different munitions that use gunpowder.[8] Rheinmetall lately produces nitrocellulose at amenities in Switzerland, Spain, and South Africa and plans to extend its manufacturing of gunpowder by way of over 50 p.c by way of 2028.[9] Rheinmetall subsidiary Nitrochemie Aschau — which produces nitrocellulose, different gunpowder parts, and dynamite — has greater its manufacturing capability by way of 60 p.c for the reason that get started of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and plans for every other 40 p.c building up by way of mid-2025.[10] Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger and Saab CEO Micael Johansson warned in April 2024 that the Folks’s Republic of China (PRC) equipped an vast majority of Eu ammunition parts, together with the ones vital for nitrocellulose, leading to bottlenecks inhibiting Eu artillery ammunition manufacturing.[11] Bloomberg reported in March 2025 that Rheinmetall expanded its sourcing of cotton linters — a key element for nitrocellulose manufacturing that confronted a essential scarcity in Spring 2024 — from Europe and international locations pleasant to the Eu Union (EU) and constructed up a stockpile of a number of years’ value of linters.[12] NATO Basic Secretary Mark Rutte instructed CBS Information on April 7 that he has steered US and Eu leaders to ramp up protection spending and protection commercial manufacturing amid considerations of long run Russian aggression towards Europe.[13] Rutte famous that NATO states blended manufacture 4 instances fewer ammunition rounds than Russia manufactures by itself, although NATO’s blended economic system is 20 instances higher than Russia’s.
Russian government most likely facilitated the elimination of a outstanding Russian insider supply from Telegram as a part of persevered efforts to crack down at the Russian data house. Russian insider channel VChK-OGPU-Reserve claimed on April 7 that Telegram directors deleted the unique VChK-OGPU channel and a number of other different channels on the behest of Russian government.[14] The opposite affected channels reportedly come with pro-Ukrainian channels and channels publishing details about Kursk Oblast and migrants in Russia — two subjects the Kremlin has in the past sought to censor.[15] Telegram denied taking down the VChK-OGPU channel and said that the channel’s directors deleted their very own channel.[16] Different Russian resources claimed that simplest Telegram has the facility to take down the channel, and one milblogger claimed that the VChK-OGPU directors could have fallen sufferer to a phishing rip-off — a declare which the VChK-OGPU-Reserve channel denied.[17] VChK-OGPU is reportedly affiliated with Russian legislation enforcement and has presented purported insights into Kremlin factional dynamics, interior checks of Russian govt insurance policies, important adjustments within the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD), and leaks of data in regards to the MoD and Russian army.[18] Russian government arrested an alleged administrator of VChK-OGPU in February 2023 and designated the VChK-OGPU channel a “overseas agent” in July 2024 at a time when the Kremlin was once intensifying its effort to deanonymize Russian Telegram channels and take extra direct management over the Russian data house.[19] The Kremlin, if liable for the channel’s elimination, is most likely aiming to exert management over the remainder sides of the Russian data house that put up criticisms of the Kremlin or data deemed delicate. Many Russian ultranationalist milbloggers spoke back definitely on April 7 to the elimination of the VChK-OGPU channel, demonstrating the level to which the Kremlin has already coopted a lot of the ultranationalist data house and conditioned many milbloggers to simply accept and advertise the Kremlin’s censorship.[20]
Key Takeaways:
The Kremlin continues to disclaim the legitimacy of the Ukrainian govt as a part of efforts to assert that Ukraine isn’t a sound negotiating spouse and to call for Ukrainian regime trade and demilitarization.
Ukrainian officers didn’t file any Russian long-range missile or drone moves at the evening of April 6 to 7 or all through the day on April 7 following Russia’s greatest strike bundle in over a month at the evening of April 5 to six.
Ukraine’s Eu allies proceed to ramp up home materiel manufacturing and deal with shortages inhibiting artillery ammunition manufacturing.
Russian government most likely facilitated the elimination of a outstanding Russian insider supply from Telegram as a part of persevered efforts to crack down at the Russian data house.
Russian forces not too long ago complicated in Belogorod Oblast and close to Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Kremlin continues to make use of its “Time of Heroes” program to militarize regional governments and society in occupied Ukraine.
We don’t file intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of those actions are well-covered in Western media and do indirectly impact the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We can proceed to guage and file at the results of those legal actions at the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and in particular on battle in Ukrainian city spaces. We completely condemn Russian violations of the regulations of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity even supposing we don’t describe them in those studies.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian Major Effort – Japanese Ukraine (made out of 3 subordinate primary efforts)
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside of tube artillery differ of Kharkiv Town
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
Russian Mobilization and Power Era Efforts
Russian Technological Diversifications
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces
Vital Process in Belarus
Alleged Ceasefire Violations
Ukraine and Russia have now not but concluded a maritime ceasefire settlement because of ongoing Russian calls for for Western sanctions aid. Negotiations in regards to the prerequisites of the ceasefire on moves towards power infrastructure are ongoing, and the solution of those negotiations stays unclear.
The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed with out proof on April 7 that Ukrainian forces performed six moves towards Russian power infrastructure amenities in Rostov, Voronezh, and Bryansk oblasts and in occupied Crimea and Donetsk and Kherson oblasts.[21]
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian forces not too long ago complicated in Kursk Oblast amid persevered preventing within the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border house.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated pictures revealed on April 7 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago complicated to western and southern Guyevo, Kursk Oblast (south of Sudzha).[22] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized and cleared Guyevo, whilst others claimed that Ukrainian forces nonetheless care for positions inside of and at the outskirts of the agreement.[23]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers persevered to assert that Russian forces seized Basivka, Sumy Oblast (northeast of Sumy Town).[24] Ukrainian Middle for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko said on April 6 that Russian forces don’t occupy Basivka, alternatively.[25] Russian resources claimed that Russian forces complicated southeast of Basivka and to the northern outskirts of Loknya, Sumy Oblast (simply south of Basivka).[26]
Preventing persevered in Kursk Oblast close to Guyevo, Oleshnya (northwest of Guyevo alongside the world border), and Gornal (southwest of Guyevo close to the world border) and in Sumy Oblast close to Basivka and Loknya.[27] A Russian supply claimed that Ukrainian forces care for positions close to Oleshnya and Gornal.[28]
The co-founder of a Ukrainian supply reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian army intelligence said that Russian forces are attacking Basivka in small attack teams and on buggies with a purpose to take safe haven within the agreement.[29] Ukraine’s Siversk Workforce of Forces Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk reported on April 7 that Russian shelling of the border spaces of Chernihiv, Sumy, and a part of Kharkiv oblasts have sharply lowered prior to now day and that Russian assaults within the house have lowered by way of about two instances, most likely because of converting climate prerequisites and Ukrainian moves towards Russian flooring strains of conversation (GLOCs).[30] Mysnyk said that there aren’t any indications that Russian forces are forming large-scale pressure groupings within the house.
Ukraine’s Unmanned Programs Forces (USF) reported on April 7 that parts of the USF struck 3 Russian Buk air protection techniques within the Kursk path inside of 12 hours.[31] The USF reported that Ukrainian forces performed drone moves towards two Buk-M3 air protection machine launchers, destructive the radars, and towards one Buk-M2 launcher, detonating its missiles and destroying the launcher.
Order of Combat: Components of the Russian BARS-Sarmat (Russian Military Struggle Reserve) and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly working in Kursk Oblast.[32] Drone operators of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly working close to Gornal.[33]
Russian forces not too long ago complicated in Belgorod Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated pictures revealed on April 7 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago complicated in central Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod Town).[34]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces driven Ukrainian forces out of Demidovka and Popovka (northwest of Demidovka).[35] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces care for positions in Demidovka, and every other claimed that Demidovka is a contested “grey zone.”[36]
Preventing persevered close to Popovka and Demidovka.[37]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are the usage of first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables to counter Ukrainian digital war (EW) techniques within the Belgorod path.[38]
Order of Combat: Components of the Russian thirty fourth Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty ninth Blended Palms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) and one hundred and fifty fifth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly working close to Popovka.[39]
Russian Major Effort – Japanese Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian purpose: Push Ukrainian forces again from the world border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside of tube artillery differ of Kharkiv Town)
Russian forces persevered flooring assaults in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 7 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces persevered flooring assaults north of Kharkiv Town close to Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv Town close to Vovchansk and Tykhe on April 6 and seven.[40]
The commander of a Ukrainian attack corporate working within the Kharkiv path said that Russian forces are making an attempt to acquire infantry for additional attack operations as Russian forces don’t lately have sufficient infantry within the house.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that almost all of central Vovchansk is a contested “grey zone.”[42]
Order of Combat: Components of the Chechen Akhmat “Kanada” detachment are reportedly placing Ukrainian forces close to Strilecha (north of Kharkiv Town).[43]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian purpose: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northerly Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces persevered offensive operations within the Kupyansk path on April 7 however didn’t make showed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complicated west of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) and towards Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) and Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[44] Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said on April 7 that Russian forces have complicated a number of hundred meters east of Zapadne past the P-79 Kupyansk-Dvorchina street.[45]
Russian forces performed offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk close to the world border close to Kamyanka and Fyholivka, north of Kupyansk close to Mala Shapivka and Kindrashivka, east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk close to Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on April 6 and seven.[46] Mashovets said on April 7 that Russian forces are attacking Ukrainian positions close to Zapadne.[47] A Ukrainian drone regiment working in Kupyansk path reported that Russian forces attacked two times within the Kupyansk path with tanks and infantry preventing automobiles (IFVs) between April 6 and seven.[48] The drone regiment said that Ukrainian forces destroyed two tanks and broken two IFVs.
The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment working within the Kupyansk path reported on April 7 that Russian forces are looking to extend their bridgehead at the proper (west) financial institution of the Oskil River close to Dvorchina (north of Kupyansk).[49] The commander said that Ukrainian forces have avoided Russian forces from setting up pontoon crossings at the Oskil River and that Ukrainian forces are placing Russian engineering apparatus.
Order of Combat: Mashovets said that parts of the Russian twenty fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (sixth Blended Palms Military [CAA], Leningrad Army District [LMD]) are working north of Kupyansk and that the brigade is working with out one among its common battalions however with two connected separate rifle battalions.[50] Mashovets said that parts of the 1007th and 1486th motorized rifle regiments (each made out of mobilized group of workers) and a battalion of the 1431st Motorized Rifle Regiment (eleventh Military Corps, LMD) also are working north of Kupyansk. Mashovets said that a minimum of two battalions of the twenty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Military [GTA], Moscow Army District [MMD]) are working close to Lyman Pershyi (northeast of Kupyansk).
Russian forces persevered offensive operations within the Borova path on April 7 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces persevered flooring attacks north of Borova close to Bohuslavka and towards Novoplatonivka, northeast of Borova close to Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka, east of Borova close to Nadiya, and southeast of Borova close to Hrekivka, Novoserhiivka, and Novoyehorivka on April 6 and seven.[51] The Ukrainian Khortytsia Workforce of Forces reported that Russian forces performed a mechanized attack of an unspecified echelon with armored automobiles and all-terrain automobiles (ATVs) close to Bohuslavka.[52]
A Ukrainian drone regiment revealed pictures on April 7 of a Ukrainian drone strike towards a Russian Buk-M3 air protection machine reportedly value $100 million in an unspecified house of Luhansk Oblast.[53]
Order of Combat: Components of the Russian sixteenth Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Basic Personnel’s Major Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly working within the Borova path.[54]
Russian forces persevered offensive operations within the Lyman path on April 7 however didn’t make showed complicated.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Katerynivka (northeast of Lyman).[55] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complicated west of Balka Zhuravka (northeast of Lyman, south of Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman), close to Nove (simply southwest of Katerynivka), and in northern Torske (south of Yampolivka).[56]
Russian forces persevered flooring assaults northeast of Lyman close to Balka Zhuravka, Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, Nove, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka, and east of Lyman close to Torske on April 6 and seven.[57]
The commander of a Ukrainian drone corporate working within the Lyman path said that Russian forces have intensified offensive operations and reasonably shifted their primary effort additional north in opposition to Hrekivka, Novomykhailivka, and Novolyubivka (all northeast of Lyman).[58] The commander said that Russian forces nonetheless assault in small teams and not too long ago started working armored automobiles and making an attempt to determine pontoon bridges around the Zherebets River however are unsuccessful. Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces carrying out offensive operations within the twenty fifth CAA’s (Central Army District [CMD]) house of duty (AOR) at the east financial institution of the Zherebets River close to Torske are suffering greater than the Russian bridgehead at the west (proper) financial institution of the Zherebets within the twentieth CAA’s (MMD) AOR additional north within the Novolyubivka house regardless of having a equivalent quantity of forces.[59]
Order of Combat: Mashovets reported that parts of the 144th Motorized Rifle Department (twentieth CAA) are preventing west of Novolyubivka and towards Nove and Zelena Dolyna (northeast of Lyman).[60] Mashovets reported that parts of the 67th Motorized Rifle Department (twenty fifth CAA), together with of its 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade, are preventing close to Torske.[61]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian purpose: Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces not too long ago complicated within the Siversk path.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated pictures revealed on April 7 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago complicated north of Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk).[62]
Russian forces attacked north of Siversk close to Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka, and east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske on April 6 and seven.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Bilohorivka.[64]
Russian forces persevered offensive operations within the Chasiv Yar path on April 7 however didn’t advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces complicated in southwestern Chasiv Yar.[65]
Russian forces attacked close to Chasiv Yar itself and southeast of Chasiv Yar close to Kurdyumkivka on April 7.[66]
Order of Combat: Components of the Russian 88th “Hispaniola” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) and the 98th Airborne (VDV) Department, together with parts of its 217th and 331st VDV regiments and 215th Reconnaissance Battalion, are reportedly working close to Chasiv Yar.[67]
Russian forces not too long ago complicated within the Toretsk path.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated pictures revealed on April 7 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago complicated to the southwestern waste heap of the Tsentralna Mine in southwestern Toretsk.[68]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complicated northeast of Toretsk close to Krymske; east of Toretsk close to Pivnichne; and southeast of Toretsk close to Valentynivka, Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil.[69]
Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka and Dachne, west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka, southwest of Toretsk close to Leonidivka and Romanivka, and southeast of Toretsk close to Sukha Balka, Oleksandropil, and Valentynivka on April 6 and seven.[70]
The commander of a Ukrainian drone corporate working within the Toretsk path reported on April 7 that Russian forces are intensively the usage of first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables whilst increasingly more carrying out guided float bomb moves.[71] The commander famous that Russian forces aren’t carrying out guided float bomb moves towards structures during which each Russian and Ukrainian forces care for positions however are the usage of the moves to spot different Ukrainian positions. The commander famous that Russian forces are making an attempt to make use of motorized apparatus and that Russian forces have doubled their collection of attacks as in comparison to closing week (more or less March 30 to April 5).
Order of Combat: Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on April 7 that parts of the Russian one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Department (eighth Blended Palms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) are working in Zabalka Microraion (southernmost Toretsk) and close to Krymske .[72] Mashovets said that parts of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk Folks’s Republic Military Corps [DNR AC], SMD), supported by way of parts of the eighth CAA, are working close to Panteleymonivka and Sukha Balka. Components of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (third Blended Palms Military [CAA], previously 2d Luhansk Folks’s Republic [LNR] AC) are reportedly working close to Druzhba.[73]
Russian forces not too long ago complicated within the Pokrovsk path.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated pictures revealed on April 7 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago marginally complicated in southwestern Uspenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[74] Geolocated pictures revealed on April 5 and seven signifies that Russian forces not too long ago complicated in central and western Lysivka (south of Pokrovsk).[75]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian resources claimed that Russian forces working southwest of Pokrovsk complicated west and north of Uspenivka, to northern Nadiivka, east of Kotlyarivka and Kotlyne, southeast of Bohdanivka, and in western Troitske.[76] Russian resources additionally claimed that Russian forces seized Uspenivka.[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces occupy maximum of Troitske and that Ukrainian forces care for positions in western Troitske.[78] A Russian supply claimed that Russian forces occupy about part of Kotlyne.[79] Some Russian resources claimed that Russian forces working southeast of Pokrovsk seized Lysivka, whilst others claimed that Russian forces occupy about one-third of Lysivka, that Ukrainian forces care for positions within the western a part of the agreement, and that central Lysivka is a contested “grey zone.”[80]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk close to Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk close to Yelyzavetivka, Kalynove, and Vodyane Druhe; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk close to Udachne, Kotlyarivka, Kotlyne, Uspenivka, Bohdanivka, and Kotlyne, and towards Serhiivka, Muravka, and Novooleksandrivka on April 6 and seven.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked with drone improve southwest of Pokrovsk close to Solone.[82]
Ukrainian Khortytsia Workforce of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov said that the depth of preventing within the Pokrovsk path on my own is occasionally similar to that alongside all the frontline in jap Ukraine.[83] Trehubov reiterated that Russian forces performed a brief pause within the Pokrovsk path following heavy losses in early March 2025 however have since restored their battle functions. Trehubov said that Russian forces are making an attempt to avoid Pokrovsk from the west and advance towards Novopalivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka freeway.
Order of Combat: Components of the Russian fifteenth Motorized Rifle Brigade (2d CAA, Central Army District [CMD]) are reportedly working close to Solone; parts of the Vanya Ivanov Workforce are reportedly working close to Kotlyne; and parts of the ninetieth Tank Department (forty first CAA, CMD) are reportedly working close to Troitske.[84]
Russian forces persevered offensive operations within the Kurakhove path on April 7 however didn’t make showed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complicated close to Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove) and from Rozlyv (southwest of Kurkahove) towards Bahatyr (northwest of Rozlyv).[85]
Russian forces performed offensive operations west of Kurakhove close to Andriivka and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove close to Rozlyv on April 6 and seven.[86]
Order of Combat: Components of the Russian thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, Japanese Army District [EMD]) and fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly working within the Kurakhove path.[87] Components of the thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, EMD) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions in Bahatyr.[88]
Russian forces not too long ago complicated within the Velyka Novosilka path.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated pictures revealed on April 6 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago complicated northeast of Pryvilne (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[89]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian resources claimed that Russian forces seized Prvyilne and complicated north of Vesele, close to Burlatske (each northwest of Velyka Novosilka), and to the northeastern outskirts of Shevchenko (northwest of Burlatske).[90]
Russian forces performed offensive operations north of Velyka Novosilka close to Skudne and northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Vilne Pole, Pryvilne, Vesele, Fedorivka, and Burlatske on April 6 and seven.[91]
Order of Combat: Components of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (fifth CAA, EMD) are reportedly working close to Shevchenko; parts of the fifth Tank Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, EMD) are reportedly working within the path of Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka); and parts of the thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, EMD) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions in Komar.[92] Components of the thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, EMD), 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Basic Personnel’s Major Directorate [GRU]), and one hundred and fortieth Anti-Airplane Missile Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, EMD) are reportedly working within the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) path.[93] Drone operators of the thirtieth Spetsnaz Corporate (reportedly of the thirty sixth CAA, EMD) are reportedly working within the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) path.[94]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian purpose: Handle frontline positions and safe rear spaces towards Ukrainian moves)
Russian forces not too long ago complicated in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated pictures posted on April 7 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago complicated to western Stepove (northwest of Robotyne).[95]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces complicated northwest and northeast of Shcherbaky and southeast of Kamyanske (each northwest of Robotyne).[96]
Russian forces performed offensive operations northwest of Robotyne close to Mali Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on April 6 and seven.[97] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to Shcherbaky.[98]
Ukrainian state power corporate Enerhoatom Head Petro Kotin said to The Mother or father in a piece of writing revealed on April 6 that it might be unsafe for Russia to restart the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Energy Plant (ZNPP) as Russia must conquer main issues, together with inadequate cooling water, group of workers, and electrical energy provides.[99] Kotin famous that it’s inconceivable for Russia to restart even one unit reactor of the ZNPP all through wartime as it might take Ukraine between two months and two years to restart the ZNPP. Kotin said that Enerhoatom is ready to restart the ZNPP however Russian forces will have to go away, demine, and demilitarize the realm.
Order of Combat: Drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (forty second Motorized Rifle Department, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly working close to Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne), and drone operators of the Russian 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (nineteenth Motorized Rifle Department, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly working within the Orikhiv path.[100] Drone operators of the Russian ”BOBR” Speedy Reaction Drone detachment are reportedly working in Zaporizhia Oblast.[101]
Russian forces performed restricted offensive operations within the Dnipro path on April 6 and seven however didn’t advance.[102]
Order of Combat: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly placing Ukrainian forces at the west (proper) financial institution of the Dnipro River.[103]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and at the frontline)
See topline textual content.
Russian Mobilization and Power Era Efforts (Russian purpose: Enlarge battle energy with out carrying out basic mobilization)
The Kremlin continues to make use of its “Time of Heroes” program to militarize regional governments and society in occupied Ukraine. Crimea career head Sergei Aksyonov said on April 7 that Russian warfare veteran Anton Starostin finished an internship within the career govt in Crimea as a part of the “Time of Heroes” program and become the Deputy Chairperson of the State Committee for Early life Coverage in occupied Crimea.[104]
Russian trade outlet Kommersant reported on April 7 that the Russian Prosecutor Basic’s Administrative center filed a lawsuit to switch property value 79 billion rubles (about $917 million) of JSC Sayanskkimplast, Russia’s greatest manufacturer of polyvinyl chloride (PVC), to the Russian state.[105]
Russian Technological Diversifications (Russian purpose: Introduce technological inventions to optimize techniques to be used in Ukraine)
Ukraine’s Major Army Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 7 that Ukraine recognized an Indian-produced element in an unspecified Russian weapon for the primary time.[106]
Actions in Russian-occupied spaces (Russian purpose: Consolidate administrative management of annexed spaces; forcibly combine Ukrainian electorate into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance techniques)
ISW is postponing career protection in its day by day Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Exams. ISW is introducing a brand new product line monitoring actions in Russian-occupied spaces of Ukraine. The career updates will read about Russian efforts to consolidate administrative management of annexed spaces and forcibly combine Ukrainian electorate into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance techniques.
Vital job in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Russia continues efforts to extend management over Belarus during the Union State framework. Belarusian High Minister Alexander Turchin arrived in Moscow on April 7 to carry talks with Russian High Minister Mikhail Mishustin about import substitution tasks and unifying Russian and Belarusian power markets, commercial coverage, and transportation marketplace laws.[107]
Word: ISW does now not obtain any categorized subject matter from any supply, makes use of simplest publicly to be had data, and attracts broadly on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially to be had satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the root for those studies. References to all resources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
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