The failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive, which was presented as a key move to defeat Russia in the war, has caused advocates of ambitious war goals in Ukraine to rethink their strategy. The consensus now is that the Ukrainian Armed Forces can defend against ongoing Russian attacks and prepare for future offensives with Western support until 2025. This plan relies on an evaluation of both sides’ capacities for strategic strikes. The belief is that with enough high-impact medium and long-range missiles, Ukraine can disrupt Russian logistics and control nodes and make occupied territories, including Crimea, unsustainable for Russian forces. This perspective also posits that Russia is running low on crucial munitions and lacks the ability to sustain long-term pressure on Ukrainian infrastructure. However, these strategies are flawed and could potentially put Kyiv and its Western allies in a more precarious military position in the coming year.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces received about 20 M39 Block I Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles from the United States in late 2023. These older variant missiles have a range of 170 kilometers and were reportedly used by the Ukrainian forces to target Russian-controlled airfields in southern and eastern Ukraine. Lawmakers have urged the Biden administration to transfer more ATACMS, including advanced longer-range variants, to Ukraine in order to maintain its deep-strike capability. Retired U.S. General Ben Hodges has argued that providing ATACMS and other Western missiles to Ukraine could isolate Russian-occupied Crimea and make it untenable for Russian forces. However, the effectiveness of massed ATACMS strikes assumes that the Russian military is static and cannot adapt to these weapons over time.
The introduction of U.S.-supplied HIMARS missiles in 2022 allowed the Ukrainian Armed Forces to successfully strike high-value Russian assets. However, the Russians quickly adapted by dispersing their munitions depots, jamming Western precision missiles, and employing more sophisticated air defense practices. It is likely that Russian command has already prepared countermeasures against Western medium and long-range missiles, reducing the element of surprise that initially gave these weapons operational success. Russia could respond to expanded Western missile deliveries with asymmetric measures, risking a dangerous escalation in the intensity of the war.
While Western-provided missiles can impose operational costs on Russian forces, they may not decisively defeat them in Ukraine. Without successful large-scale ground offensives to drive the Russians out of southeastern Ukraine, these attacks carry limited long-term strategic value. Despite strikes with Western-supplied missiles driving parts of the Russian Navy out of Crimea, this setback is not critical to Russian forces’ ability to sustain their occupation of southern Ukraine.
Contrary to the belief that Russia faces critical missile shortages, assessments by Ukrainian and Western officials suggest that Russia has enough precision-guided munitions to continue attacks on Ukraine for several months. Russia has successfully consolidated its defense-industrial base to sustain, if not grow, its long-range strike capabilities. This starkly contrasts with Ukraine’s air defense degradation in the face of relentless Russian strikes, undermining the notion that time is on Ukraine’s side.
After two years of fighting in which Russia has gained the upper hand, it is crucial for Kyiv’s supporters on both sides of the Atlantic to develop a realistic theory of victory that acknowledges the dire conditions faced by Ukraine and offers a sustainable framework for war termination on beneficial terms for Kyiv and the West.
